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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ANARCHY AND ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM: REASON, FOUNDATIONALISM,
AND THE ANARCHIST TRADITION
by
Joaquin A. Pedroso
Florida International University, 2016
Miami, Florida
Professor Clement Fatovic, Major Professor
Some contemporary anarchist scholarship has rejected the Enlightenment-inspired
reliance on reason that was supposedly central to classical anarchist thought and
expanded the anarchist critique to address issues ignored by their classical
predecessors. In making reason the object of critique, some contemporary anarchists
expanded the anarchist framework to include critiques of domination residing outside the
traditional power centers of the state, the capitalist firm, and the church thereby shedding
light on the authoritarian tendencies inherent in the intellect itself.
Though contemporary anarchist scholarship has sought to apply this antiauthoritarian ethos to the realms of epistemology and ontology (by employing Michel
Foucault’s analysis of power and other postfoundational thinkers), their own framework
of analysis is glaringly susceptible to what Habermas called a “performative
contradiction.” In questioning the authority of aspects of even our own intellect (and the
epistemological and ontological presuppositions that accompany it) we call into question
even the authority of our own argumentation.
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I answer this “contradiction” by interrogating two intellectual traditions. Firstly, I
question a key postfoundational anarchist premise. Namely, I assess whether an
understanding of classical anarchist thinkers as quintessential children of the
Enlightenment is justified. Secondly, I offer an alternative path to reconciliation between
the anti-authoritarian values of the anarchists and the anti-metaphysical values of the
postfoundationalists (that I think mirrors anarchist anti-authoritarian concerns) by
suggesting we are better served to think of an anti-authoritarianism of the intellect by
employing three key twentieth century thinkers: Richard Rorty, Paul Feyerabend, and
Ludwig Wittgenstein. I do so while anchoring Rorty’s, Feyerabend’s, and Wittgenstein’s
philosophies in the 19th century anti-metaphysical thought of Friedrich Nietzsche and the
philosophical anarchism of Max Stirner.
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Introduction
Anarchy, Reason, and Anti-Intellectualism
Anarchy, first employed in its modern non-derogatory sense by Pierre-Joseph
Proudhon, has been understood in anarchist circles since the 19th century as “the absence
of a master, of a sovereign.”1 More than simply a protest against the relational dynamic
between master and slave or sovereign and subject, anarchy was understood by Proudhon
and other so-called classical anarchists to be fundamentally anti-authoritarian.2 They
stood firmly against relations and structures of domination and coercion in the realm of
the political, the social, and the economic. Anarchic anti-authoritarianism took aim at all
social structures of domination, from the spiritual domination of organized religion, to the
coercive governance of state systems, to the alienating and exploitative nature of
capitalism as well as the relations of domination inherent in the inequalities bred from
these structures.3
Even though scholars agree that the classical anarchists forcefully challenged the
authority of countless institutions and practices, many claim they never challenged the
authority of Reason.4 Despite their anti-authoritarian ethos, many claim classical

1

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, What is Property? ed. Donald R. Kelley and Bonnie G. Smith (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 209.
2

The “classical” anarchists include William Godwin, Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, Peter
Kropotkin, as well as their immediate followers such as Rudolph Rocker, Emma Goldman et al.
3

See for example, Robert M. Cutler, ed., trans. The Basic Bakunin: Writings, 1869-1871 (Buffalo, NY:
Prometheus, 1992); Peter Kropotkin, The Conquest of Bread and Other Writings. Ed. Marshall S. Shatz
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, The General Idea of the
Revolution in the Nineteenth Century. Trans. John Beverly Robinson (London: Pluto Press, 1989).
4

Scholars who critique the classical anarchist reliance on Reason include Saul Newman, Lewis Call, and
Todd May.
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anarchists seemed oblivious to the authoritarian potential of Reason itself as well as its
auxiliary ideological notions like scientism and human nature.5 Proudhon himself
reflexively relied on the authoritative signaling of Reason as the unquestioned
methodology for arriving at truth, the arrival at truth itself being a prerequisite for any
meaningful exercise of liberty in the face of these perceived structures of domination. In
noting that “the opinion of no one is of any value until its truth has been proven, no one
can put his will in the place of reason – no one is king,”6 Proudhon reinforced what many
anarchists seemingly took for granted, namely the authority of Reason as both a liberating
vehicle and as a prerequisite for the liberation of humanity. These consummate antiauthoritarians seemed to reinforce and extend the authority of Reason in both employing
and celebrating it as the foundation for anarchic anti-authoritarianism.
Some contemporary anarchist scholarship has rejected the reliance on Reason that
seemed crucial to classical anarchist thought and expanded the anarchist critique to
address issues once supposedly ignored by their classical predecessors. In making
Reason the object of critique, some contemporary anarchists identified structures of
domination in realms other than the political, the economic, or the social. Moreover, in
expanding the anarchist framework to include critiques of domination residing outside
the traditional power centers of the state, the capitalist firm, and the church,

5

When referring to Reason (capital R) I am referring to Reason considered both as a faculty and as an
ideal. Otherwise, I will refer to reason (lower case r) when referring only to the faculty or to causes and
explanations for something.
6

Proudhon, Property, 209.
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contemporary anarchist scholarship shed light on the authoritarianism inherent in even
our own intellect.
Recent anarchist scholarship has sought to rectify this apparent oversight of the
classical anarchists. Some contemporary anarchists have applied this anti-authoritarian
ethos to the realms of epistemology and ontology (particularly to issues addressing the
legitimacy of the authority of Reason, representation, universality, and essentialist
categories and frameworks of analysis). This study will explore the trajectory of anarchist
thought (from the classical anarchism of the 19th century to contemporary
postfoundational anarchism, which, like Saul Newman, I will collectively refer to as
postanarchism) and the feasibility and coherence of anarchist principles not only in the
political realm but also in the realm of epistemology and ontology (especially as they
relate to the ideal of Reason, science and scientism, and human nature). That is, my
purpose is to sketch what a consistent anarchism would look like in the epistemological
and ontological spheres, which I refer to collectively as the “intellectual.”
The danger inherent in questioning even sacrosanct bulwarks of our intellect (e.g.,
Reason) is the possibility of falling into incoherence. In questioning the authority of
aspects of even our own intellect (and the epistemological and ontological
presuppositions that accompany it) we call into question even the authority of our own
argumentation. At the very least we call into question whether such an endeavor is even
possible.
As I will argue, the postanarchist endeavor seems susceptible to incoherence
when it decries the use of Reason while providing a sometimes-caricatured reading of the
so-called classical anarchists with regard to the question of intellectualism. The question I

3

ask is whether a critique of Reason (and, according to postanarchists, the essentialist
ideas, methodological hierarchies, and universalities that usually accompany it) that does
not rely on those same ideas even possible. Is it even possible for postanarchists to
coherently critique the classical anarchist reliance on Reason without having those
critiques somehow convey notions which themselves rely on essentialist ideas,
methodological hierarchies, or universalities apparently unavoidable in Western political
thought?
Ever since Plato’s attempt to establish the foundations of a just society on rational
principles, Reason has shaped the contours of Western intellectual life and still continues
to permeate the modern technocratic and instrumental society that critics of the
Enlightenment have assailed, serving as the basis for most theoretical constructs of
political order. While the ancient ideal of Reason rests on an unchangeable archetype or
is understood to be the source of first principles (most notably the idea of noncontradiction in Aristotle) needed to arrive at truth, medieval thinkers like Thomas
Aquinas argued certain religious notions exceeded the capacities of human reason yet
some theological truths could be attained through our faculty of reason.7
Modern thinkers like Rene Descartes and John Locke considered our individual
exercise of reason as the vehicle to arrive at truths once promised alone by faith or
unchanging archetypes accessible to a privileged few. Descartes considered the senses a

7

Thomas Aquinas, Of God and His Creatures: An Annotated Translation (with some abridgments) Summa
Contra Gentiles, trans. Joseph Rickaby (Westminster, MD: The Carroll Press, 1950), 7. However, this same
faculty of reason was understood by Aquinas as inherently limited and unable to conceive fully of the
omniscience and omnipotence of God and would always be a less noble pursuit than the exercise of faith.
See Aquinas, Of God and His Creatures, 228.
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source of “uncertainty and error” and considered unmitigated reason his means of escape
from such epistemological and ontological insecurity once alleviated by faith.8 Relatedly,
while Locke considered faith “above reason” Locke recognized that through our faculty
of reason we might come to know truths more certainly than by revelation and that the
“clear evidence of reason” obviates any need of revelation.9 Nevertheless, our reason is
necessarily insufficient and often “puzzled” because our ideas with which we reason are
“imperfect” and “obscure” and principles often “false.”10 David Hume and Immanuel
Kant also personalized Reason to be understood as on the one hand inherently limited (as
in Hume’s critique of induction and Kant’s insistence of the inaccessibility of the
noumenal) and subject to our own ends (even if derived from rational principles as in
Kant’s Categorical Imperative, yet not exclusively reliant on Reason as in Hume’s
sentimentalism) as opposed to dependent on a transcendent Good.11
In other words, while the ancients largely relied on Reason to determine objective
truth about ultimate ends or the good life (these notions being otherworldly), medieval
thinkers usually prized faith in God as both the ultimate end and inevitable outcome of
the proper exercise of reason. Modern thinkers often thought of Reason as a means of
8

Harry G. Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in Descartes’s Meditations
(New York: The Bobbs-Merril Company, 1970), 4. See also, Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method; and,
Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998).
9

John Locke, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Kenneth P. Winkler (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1996), 325.
10

Ibid, 320.

11

See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford; New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp
Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965); Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1956).
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determining a subjective good and considered otherworldly notions like the good life and
God to be largely beside the personalized aims of Reason. For Moderns like Descartes,
Locke, Hume, Kant, and others, while the exercise of our most prized faculty could
certainly reinforce the findings of faith it also served, more importantly, as our individual
means to “clearly” and “distinctly” assess reality (a concern independent of our faith and
matters of “salvation”). Though the modern individualist rendering of our most prized
faculty often highlighted its limitations it also clearly celebrated it as a guide to rendering
our world intelligible.
Politically, the ancient employment of Reason justified the construction of a
“noble lie”12 which served to create meaning and value for ends that only a rational few
could grasp and existed independently of those striving to achieve these ends.13 The
ancient ideal focused on unchanging principles that grounded all further knowledge that
existed independently of our own ends. Though Aristotle recognized the role of desire
and habit in shaping our ends they were subject to the authority and control of Reason
that shaped the ultimate end and validated the quest for truth. Likewise, Reason would
complement and reinforce revelation in medieval thought but would hardly stand as a
substitute for the ultimate grounding of both meaning and knowledge, God. Though it is
difficult to generalize, this reinforcement would often legitimize political orders based on
subservience to existing authority and adherence to ostensible Biblical mores.

12

See Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

13

Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1991), 10. See
also book VI of Plato, Republic, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press,
1994).

6

The modern individualist conception of Reason on the other hand is deployed as a
means for personal and political liberation accessible to all and couched in a seemingly
indefatigable optimism, present especially in radical thought, in our ability to rationally
order society to fit our ends. Rather than thinking of Reason as a faculty accessible only
through some kind of transcendent know-how, as a gift from God to be used only for
predetermined ends, or as the guarantor of truth, the modern employment of Reason was
subject to the limitations and aims of the individual exercising it.
Despite their differences, the ancient, medieval, and modern conceptions of
Reason all consider Reason as an authoritative measure of knowledge that serves as a
foundation for political order. The authority of Reason championed, for example, by
Plato’s philosopher kings or Aristotle’s conception of the good life is likewise understood
as the primary foundation of modern constructs of political order.14 In other words,
modern critiques still rely on a privileging of Reason to both justify new political
authority and critique existing ones. The ancient and modern employments of Reason are
not fundamentally different in that they both celebrate and continue to bestow a
privileged status on Reason.
It is claimed that the privileged position of Reason is especially evident in the
anarchism of thinkers like William Godwin, Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin,
14

See Book III of Aristotle’s Politics where he describes the end of the state as “the good life” and admits
that “political society exists for the sake of noble actions” to which only a few can contribute (1280b39 1291a8). Likewise, modern orderings of what Aristotle called “political society” rely on Reason by
deducing appropriate regime types from certain conceptions of human nature (as in Hobbes and Locke) or
seeing a flourishing of (or approximation to) Reason as the ultimate end (as in deliberative models like
Habermas’ ideal of communicative rationality. See Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative
Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, trans. by Thomas McCarthy (Boston, MA:
Beacon Press, 1984).).

7

and Peter Kropotkin, all of whom apparently continued the Enlightenment tradition of
harnessing the power of Reason to challenge the stifling effects of centralized state
power, concentrations of wealth, and church dogma and are best known for
delegitimizing the state and their rejection of institutions which justify arbitrary
authority.15 These anarchists sometimes employed Reason in much the same way Plato
did, exalting it in order to critique existing convention and custom and challenge what
they perceived to be arbitrary authority.
The general aims and conceptual pillars of the anarchist tradition have usually
been understood in terms of the social, economic, or political. That is, the employment
of Reason in anarchist thought hinged on a stinging critique of organized religion,
capitalism, and the state. Nevertheless, intellectual structures of domination (such as the
privileging of Reason) seemingly remained unscathed by the anarchist critique according
to some contemporary anarchist scholars. In other words, it is argued that anarchism has
relentlessly debunked the idea of a need for power and privilege and condemned the
domination inherent in all forms of government, the private firm, and the church but has
paid little attention to power and privilege in the realm of the intellect.
Ironically, in this reading of the anarchist tradition, liberation from structures of
domination (especially government) hinged on the unquestioned authority of Reason and
its command over a gradual process of enlightenment. That is, anarchism’s challenge of
arbitrary authority and domination accepts and privileges the authority of Reason. What

15

Self-proclaimed poststructuralist, postmodern, and postanarchist scholars like Todd May, Lewis Call, and
Saul Newman claim the classical anarchist tradition is beholden to Enlightenment values that limit the
radical potential of these anarchists.

8

underlies the classical anarchist tradition generally was an exaltation of Reason and belief
in auxiliary notions such as faith in a progressive advance towards truth or enlightenment,
universality,16 and an essentialist representational view that considered the privileged
faculty of reason as an integral part human nature. In other words, being notably absent
from the classical anarchist anti-authoritarian tradition, a critical appraisal of Reason did
not challenge the authority of these auxiliary claims central to supporting the anarchist
anti-authoritarian view. These anarchists thought of society as “scientifically observable
and determined by historical forces,” human beings as imbued with “essential moral and
rational characteristics which could flourish given the right social conditions,” and a faith
in a rationality that would overcome social and political oppression.17
According to this narrative, since its 19th century beginnings, the privileged
authority of Reason in anarchism remained unscathed until recent developments began to
question its legitimacy. Godwin understood that “The true supporters of government are
the weak and uninformed, and not the wise. In proportion as weakness and ignorance
shall diminish, the basis of government will also decay.”18 Godwin suggested a reliance
on individual Reason as a means to overcome this human “weakness” and “ignorance” in
order to be able to act with sound judgment and in liberty. Godwin notes,

16

Where universality denotes an authoritative meaning of a certain concept or truth understood the same
way in every context, i.e., independent of time, space, or community in which it is understood.
17

Saul Newman, Unstable Universalities: Poststructuralism and radical politics (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2007), 2.
18

Robert Graham, ed., Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas, 14.

9

If a man be in some cases obliged to prefer his own judgment, he is in all cases
obliged to consult that judgment, before he can determine whether the matter in
question be of the sort provided for or no. So that from this reasoning it
ultimately appears that the conviction of a man’s individual understanding is the
only legitimate principle imposing on him the duty of adopting any species of
conduct…19
It was only through an unquestioned privileging of and faith in our own rational
capacities that we were able to resist existing forms of arbitrary authority. That is, in
order to oppose “external” exercises of illegitimate authority, Godwin and others
expected us to be subject to the “internal” authority of our own Reason.
Similarly, Proudhon noted that the state and right of property (by which he meant
inherited wealth, accumulated interest on capital, and other monies not earned through
labor or occupation and the law which protected and privileged it) undermined the
potential of Reason to liberate humankind. He believed in the rational organization of
society independent of the state (which enforced the right of property). According to
Proudhon, the natural outgrowth of property was inequality and the natural outgrowth of
inequality was deference. It was deference, or “the use of conventional standards of rank
– mainly wealth, power, and prestige – to rate all members of society,” that was the target
of Proudhon’s attack.20 These “conventional standards” were contrary to Reason for

19

Ibid.

20

Alan Ritter, The Political Thought of Pierre Joseph Proudhon (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1969), 97.
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Proudhon and in seeking to liberate humankind Proudhon emphasized that freedom was
unattainable with the existence of deference stemming from property.
He argued that wherever rank or hierarchy was present, freedom would be
lacking.21 Indeed, Proudhon thought that “Deference engenders ‘special perquisites,
privileges, exemptions, favors, exceptions, all the violations of justice’ – in short,
oppression, including economic exploitation of the unprivileged.”22 All hierarchy for
Proudhon, even certain hierarchies necessary to redistribute wealth (e.g., state
bureaucracies) created inequality and paved the way for deference.23 That is, even
redistribution for the sake of complete material equality is an exercise in inequality for
Proudhon. Those in charge of the mechanisms of distribution would wield a
preponderance of power and it was only through the abolition of the state that humankind
would be free and Reason allowed to flourish.
Likewise, Kropotkin based his anarchism on an animal nature (which he felt
human beings shared) of cooperation. This cooperation is naturally enhanced by Reason.
Kropotkin argued that through “mutual aid” animals (and human beings) survived and
progressed as a species. Social conditions in the modern age, however, undermined this
natural condition of humankind and instead encouraged competition as the way to
21

Ritter notes “Choice can never be free where men view one another in graded hierarchy” in Proudhon,
96.
22

Ibid, 97.

23

Ibid, 99. According to Ritter, “The existence of inequality presupposes application of a rule that tells how
much wealth, power, and prestige each member of society should receive. Such a rule, indicating how
goods should be allocated among members of society, is an obvious example of a principle of distributive
justice. Hence, if inequality is to be abolished so must its underlying distributive principle. All rules of
distributive justice must be eliminated.”
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progress. This move toward competition corrupted the individual, denying them their
human essence. By eliminating the social institutions that promoted competition in the
modern age, humankind would be able to freely exercise Reason and cooperate in a
fashion where their human essence would again flourish.24 That is, in eliminating forms
of societal authority the authority of Reason would prevail.
Bakunin also outlined the dangers of authority and state power, even if
revolutionary in form. His debate with Marx over the inherent authoritarianism of state
power led to his expulsion from the First International and highlighted his concern over
authoritarian revolutionary means. Though he resisted authoritarian means to revolution,
he unquestioningly accepted the authority of Reason in helping humankind discover the
“natural laws” which held the promise of liberation. Bakunin was a staunch
Enlightenment-inspired empiricist who rejected the idea that a human being’s essential
nature was that of the atomized individual (as propounded by defenders of capitalism).
Instead he advocated a view that human beings naturally inclined towards freedom in the
form of spontaneity, that they were “naturally social and always lived in communities”
and that they instinctively orient themselves towards justice.25 This justice, for Bakunin,
derives from his belief in Reason and natural human sociability. In drawing the
distinction between the natural laws of, for example, human sociability (which are not
enforced and need only be discovered via Reason and science) and societal laws such as
property rights (enforced through coercion and violence) he differentiated the
24

Andrew M. Koch, “Poststructuralism and the Epistemological Basis of Anarchism,” Philosophy and the
Social Sciences 23 (1993): 330.
25

“The Philosophical Roots of the Marx-Bakunin Debate”, Ann Robertson, accessed 10/7/2012,
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bakunin/bio/robertson-ann.htm.
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authoritarianism inherent in state power and the authority of Reason and scientific
thinking. It is this distinction that is crucial to the humanist, Enlightenment-inspired
anarchist endeavor and key to differentiating it from its postanarchist successor.
Though critics of the Enlightenment have attacked the unquestioned authority of
Reason (and its perceived harmful technocratic effects) they have not addressed the
possibility of anarchism as a resolution to the problem of epistemic and ontological
authority until recently.26 The story is, by now, well known. Beginning arguably with
the Romantics and reaching its climax in postfoundationalist thought, the challenge to the
hegemony of Reason in philosophy and the critique of idealism and humanism in the
Enlightenment was manifested in an increasingly hostile reaction towards univocal or
transcendent meaning, instrumental rationality, and scientific worldviews couched in the
industrial and post-industrial processes of the 19th and 20th centuries.27
Diverse thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard, Jacques
Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, among others, have argued that Western
philosophical and especially Enlightenment considerations of Reason, including those
prized by classical anarchists, are problematic because they both conceive of human

26

See, for example, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of the Enlightenment: Philosophical
Fragments. Ed., Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans., Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2002). Horkheimer and Adorno argue that the excesses of the Enlightenment faith in reason and its
suspicion of anything which “does not conform to the standard of calculability and utility” led not only to
the ambitious project of dominating nature but also the dominion of society, paving the way for the 20th
century’s totalitarian regimes and the horrors of the Second World War (Horkheimer and Adorno,
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understanding as paradigmatically Reason-based and understand human liberation as a
uniform progress towards the flourishing of Reason. They considered the exaltation of
Reason as the “rationalization of coercion” (discipline in Foucault) and dismissed the
project of truth-seeking as a misguided endeavor that endangered the independence of
mind and autonomy central to critical inquiry. They saw the idea of progress as a
“strategy of repression” and while, at times, relishing the anti-establishment spirit of the
Enlightenment, these thinkers criticized what they saw as domination in the form of
universalizing tendencies and “meta-narratives” of modernity.28
Like the classical anarchists generally, these thinkers were vehemently antihierarchical and anti-authoritarian. They were concerned about how power structures,
relations of domination, and conceptual universality sustained hierarchy and arbitrary
authority. These postfoundational philosophies aimed at a “profound destabilization” of
authoritative “cognitive boundaries and frameworks” in challenging the hitherto lauded
ideal of Reason.29 More generally, the postfoundational philosophies as a whole engage
in a “fundamental questioning of the grand ideals and universal discourses that had
defined our social, political and cultural reality since the Enlightenment.”30
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For all the anti-authoritarian sentiment evident in postfoundational thought, what
is noticeably absent is an accompanying anti-authoritarian political project that embraces
anarchist values.31 That is, positions that characterized, among other things, the
privileging of Reason as “politically undesirable and philosophically impossible” seemed
to avoid the quintessentially anti-authoritarian anarchist tradition.32 This scholarship
(especially the work of Todd May, Lewis Call, and Saul Newman) has stressed the need
to reinterpret classical anarchist themes in light of postfoundationalism’s ontoepistemological concerns. This scholarship seeks to address this aspect of anarchist
thought by interrogating issues of hierarchy, arbitrary authority, and representationalism
in classical anarchist ontology and epistemology.
While traditionally anarchists have challenged the idea that representative,
ostensibly democratic, government is just, the anarchist critique is now expanded to
include an interrogation of not only how our political interests are represented but also
how we are categorized and characterized in ontological and epistemological terms.
Contemporary postfoundational anarchist theory recognizes a distinction between
perceived objects (be they modes of power and subjugation or even ourselves) and the
ideas of those same objects occasioned by our perception of them. In the same way that
Kropotkin in Words of a Rebel recognized that representative government is the protector
of privilege and not the guarantor of democracy or our interests, postfoundational
31
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anarchists seek to dismantle the structures of ostensible representation that govern how
we perceive ourselves and our world.33
These postanarchists extend the classical anarchist rejection of hierarchy, arbitrary
authority, and representationalism to the classical anarchist reliance on Reason as a tool
and byproduct of justice in the socio-cultural, economic, and political realms. Anarchism,
in a sense, is turned on itself to question the legitimacy of a Reason-based and
Enlightenment-inspired anarchist ontology and epistemology.34 In other words, in paving
the way for a society that truly embraces classical anarchist principles and rejects
arbitrary authority, hierarchy, and representation, Reason itself has become the object of
critique.
This recent anarchist scholarship takes its inspiration from Friedrich Nietzsche
and Max Stirner, two notable anti-essentialist, anti-metaphysical thinkers as well as the
postfoundationalist projects they inspired more generally. Lewis Call notes that
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His [Nietzsche’s] philosophy is thus anarchistic in the strong sense of the term: it
includes important elements of an anarchistic politics, but (more importantly) it
also contains an anarchy of thought. Nietzsche’s writing attacks hierarchy not
only at the political level but at the philosophical level as well, undermining the
very foundations of the deeply entrenched metaphysics of domination upon which
the West as come to rely.35
Likewise,
All our beliefs are dismissed by Stirner as so many ideological abstractions,
‘spooks’, ‘fixed ideas’: our faith in rationality is shown to be no less superstitious
than faith in the most obfuscating of religions; Man is simply God reinvented;
secular institutions and discourses are alive with spectres of Christianity;
universalism is spoken from a particular position of power.36
According to postanarchists, it is this thinking about hierarchy in every realm–including
the intellectual—which distinguishes these recent anarchist thinkers from the classical
anarchists. According to Newman and other postanarchists, classical anarchists still
prized hierarchy in the realm of the intellect, a hierarchy that undermines the anarchist
project. According to Call, “classical anarchism is haunted by a rationalist semiotics
which seriously limits its radical potential.”37 The postanarchist project employs key
themes in Stirner and Nietzsche, as well as prominent postmodern and poststructuralist
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thinkers, to address issues of hierarchy and arbitrary authority in questions of
epistemological and ontological import. Call, Newman, May and others interpret the role
of postfoundationalist thought as dissecting and debunking the privileged position of
Reason and other essentialist Enlightenment inspired notions in anarchist political
philosophy.
This approach, to some anarchist thinkers, is an ethical call. Todd May notes that
the “first ethical principle to which poststructuralism is committed is that practices of
representing others to themselves – either in who they are or in what they want – ought,
as much as possible, to be avoided.”38 In identifying the inherent authoritarianism of an
accompanying representational essentialist view of the individual, anarchists like May
note the dangers in acting or resisting based on authoritarian structures even in the realm
of the intellect. Newman notes “…resistance must not refer to essentialist foundations if
it is to avoid reaffirming domination.”39 He concludes that
…anarchism’s pure place of resistance against power, its uncontaminated point of
departure – the essential human subject and its related discourses of morality and
rationality – was found to be somewhat impure, and contaminated by power. The
place of resistance was, on the contrary, a place of power and domination. The
only trouble with this was that, while it exposed the authoritarian potential within
anarchism and indeed any revolutionary philosophy which was based on
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essentialist ideas, it deprived the anti-authoritarian project of its own point of
resistance.40
Indeed, postfoundationalism carries an anti-authoritarian ethos that complements
anarchist political, economic, and socio-cultural commitments. Recognizing the
relationship between the anti-authoritarian spirit in postfoundationalism, Nietzsche’s and
Stirner’s epistemology and ontology, and classical anarchist concerns is central to tracing
the “logical” extent of anarchist thought. In other words, in striving to remain consistent,
applying classical anarchist principles to all realms of life (specifically the realm of the
intellect), we are forced to interrogate the epistemological and ontological foundations of
classical anarchism in ways the classical anarchists supposedly did not consider. Indeed,
as Newman notes “Anarchism is animated by a living, breathing ‘spirit’ of anarchy that
disturbs its static foundations and fixed identities. Postanarchism reveals this joyous
moment of anarchy within anarchism…”41
In presuming to carry the mantle of classical anarchist values, postanarchists
move towards a pluralistic anarchism by attempting to embrace an anti-authoritarianism
of the intellect without falling into any rigid ideological or philosophical contours. Such
contours would limit the radical potential of this contemporary strand of anarchist
thought while undermining the liberating ethos of anarchism itself. In other words,
according to postanarchists, there is no single Archimedean point from which anarchist
thought and practice hinges but rather a confluence of opportunities to resist and
innumerable points at which to apply anarchist critiques. In resisting classical anarchist
40
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authoritarianism in the realm of the intellect, postanarchists seek to attune classical
anarchist thought with what they see as anarchist values.
While accepting that this recent anarchist literature embraces the spirit of classical
anarchist ideas I will question the viability of such postanarchist interpretations of
classical anarchist themes and assess its implications for anarchist political thought more
generally. The postanarchist endeavor is susceptible to the accusation that it becomes an
exercise in incoherence when it decries the use of Reason in the construction of any
radical (or otherwise political) project yet engages in ostensibly Reason-based analysis
when examining the pitfalls of essentialist vocabularies, arbitrary methodological
hierarchies, and unwarranted conceptual limitations. The question becomes: How can
postanarchists coherently critique the classical anarchist reliance on Reason without
relying on Reason itself in articulating that critique?
The postanarchist argument is reminiscent of Adorno’s endeavor in Negative
Dialectics that Habermas critiques, where
Philosophical critique…is unrelentingly negative and refuses to reconcile itself to
the positive for that would merely produce a new delusion. To do so is actually to
miscarry the thought-process since the dynamic aspect of thought lies in its power
to explode the illusion of identity: ‘Nonidentity is the secret telos of identification,
that which is to be rescued in it; the mistake of traditional theory is that it holds
identity as its goal.’ 42
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Habermas accuses Adorno of relying on the “tools” of Reason in denouncing the
“delusion” of the same. Critique here is “purposive–rational because it uses concepts
(since one cannot think without concepts), but is also more than this because it is aware
that the very instrumental nature of concepts is false – they do not measure up to their
own concept. Yet the critic nevertheless ‘thinks’ and ‘criticizes’.”43
This inescapable feature of philosophical critique is, according to Habermas,
central to modernity in that in creating its “normativity out of itself” it “sees itself cast
back upon itself without any possibility of escape.”44 A Reason-based critique is both the
result of and the impetus for this normativity. Though Adorno clearly distinguishes
between the dangers of Reason (especially instrumental reason) and reasons in
argumentation that underlie philosophical critique, Habermas argues such a distinction is
nonsensical in that philosophical critique is inherently limited to the horizon of this
understanding of Modernity and that Reason itself is redeemed even if engaged in a
critique of itself.45
The compulsion to “avoid” or “resolve” the aporia of Reason in anti-authoritarian
thought (that is, either to invent a new understanding of the aporia independent of Reason
or to seek to overcome it with novel intellectual tools that exclude Reason) is absent in
the postanarchists. The postanarchists do not argue for a need to overcome the aporia of
43
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Reason sketched by Habermas but rather critique it and dismiss their own supposedly
aporetic endeavor. Taking the Habermasian critique into consideration, I will echo
Martin Morris and pay particular attention to the distinction between the postanarchist
argument (and postfoundationalist endeavor, generally) being performatively
contradictory precisely in making a point (namely rejecting the hopeless or aporetic
nature of the postanarchist critique) and the argument remaining intelligible in its
reasoning, therefore remaining consistent and coherent.46 Moreover, I will point to how
these approaches contribute to an understanding of anarchist anti-intellectualism and
sketch alternative ways of approaching the question of freedom in the anarchist tradition.

Chapter Outline
Chapter one will critically consider the so-called classical anarchist tradition as
quintessential children of the Enlightenment. I will endeavor to unpack the veracity of
this reading of the so-called classical anarchists and highlight a nuanced understanding of
Reason, the celebration of science, and “foundationalisms” of all sorts in these same
thinkers. My hope is that such a critical interrogation of the classical anarchists will make
us re-think the popular characterization of anarchist ontology, epistemology, and reliance
on Reason. This chapter will briefly highlight the importance of an idealized Reason in
46
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the history of modern philosophy as well as survey its trajectory in the quintessentially
anti-authoritarian anarchist political project. I will also interrogate the necessity for a
consistent anti-authoritarianism in anarchist thought and will review challenges to the
Enlightenment faith in Reason in epistemology and ontology as well as suggest ways of
proceeding coherently with an anti-authoritarian onto-epistemological anarchist project.
Chapter two will explore, in more detail, the attitudes of William Godwin and
Pierre Joseph Proudhon towards Enlightenment values, Modernity more generally, and
consider how their thought contributes to anarchist anti-intellectualism. Godwin and
Proudhon generally deferred to the authority of Reason yet were ambiguous in their
treatment of foundational ideals like human nature and transcendent truth. While they
both celebrated Reason they recognized its limitations and even dangers. While they both
believed in the emancipatory potential of the Enlightenment they also challenged the
framework that grounded it. Unlike their anarchist counterparts, Bakunin and Kropotkin,
they both gradually shifted towards more critical stances on authoritative accounts of
Reason and auxiliary notions like human nature and science.
Chapter three will consider how Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin celebrated
the scientific method’s ability to decipher reality in such a way that would expedite
anarchist revolutions. Yet, while praising the liberating aspects of science (and the
usually accompanying ideal of Reason) they diagnosed an overreliance on these same
ideals and recognized the hierarchically institutionalized forms of scientific discovery,
the univocity of rational thought, and the pernicious division of intellectual from manual
labor that usually accompanied such an uncritical lauding on Reason and science. Instead,
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they emphasized spontaneity and improvisation. They promoted a healthy skepticism of
“intellectual authority” as urgently as they challenged the legitimacy of the state and
other forms of institutionalized hierarchy.
Chapter four will examine Max Stirner’s and Friedrich Nietzsche’s challenges to
metaphysics and epistemology and their connection to anti-authoritarian thought
(especially the anarchist tradition and recent developments in postfoundational anarchist
theory). In part, my purpose is to stress the importance of both Stirner and Nietzsche in
thinking through what anarchist anti-intellectualism looks like. Moreover, in doing so, I
hope to facilitate new ways in thinking about domination and authority in the realm of the
intellect and interrogate how such an anti-intellectualism can point towards what
anarchists like Stirner considered thinking “freely.”
In my concluding chapter, I frame my reading of anarchist anti-intellectualism in
terms of contemporary philosophical attempts to, as anarchists have termed it, be
“without adjectives.” I do so by assessing three main approaches (Wittgensteinian,
Feyerabendian, and Rortyean) in order to, as Svetlana Boym put it, think “without
bannisters.” In doing so, I attempt to “redescribe” anarchist anti-intellectualism as a kind
of ironism made public and hope to further what anarchists would consider thinking
“freely.”
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Chapter 1
Contextualizing and Theorizing Anarchist Anti-Intellectualism
In the usual reading of the classical anarchists we encounter two equally forceful
tendencies in their exaltation of Reason.47 On the one hand, we see an indefatigable faith
in the idea that Reason propels progress (and itself is progressively realized). On the
other hand, we see the idea that Reason should be unimpeded in its exercise. The latter
tendency is possible only with the progress of Reason itself. In other words, it is only
through the unimpeded exercise of Reason (that is, an exercise unencumbered by
arbitrary exercises of authority by government, private concentrations of wealth, or the
church) that we are able to eliminate those very same arbitrary exercises of authority.
Such a reading presents the reader with a problem. It seems impossible to grasp
the aspirations of the classical anarchists without admitting to their circular reasoning.
We see a considerable logical obstacle to their lauding of Reason, namely, in that its
unquestioned authority lies in demolishing all other forms of authority (in the social,
economic, and political realms) which itself requires an idealized Reason only possible
when this very same authority is absent.
In overcoming this apparently circular reasoning, a glaring inconsistency comes
to the fore. We see a consistent anti-authoritarianism in the social, economic, and
47 Among
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political realms subdued by the unquestioned authority of Reason itself. Indeed, this
allows the classical anarchists to, on the one hand, consistently decry the exercise of
arbitrary authority by the state, concentrations of private power, and the church, and, on
the other hand, blame the faulty realization of Reason as an ideal.
In this chapter, I will challenge this reading of the classical anarchists and
highlight a nuanced understanding of Reason in these same thinkers. This critical
interrogation of the classical anarchists will make us re-think the popular characterization
of anarchist ontology, epistemology, and their reliance on Reason. This chapter will
briefly highlight the importance of an idealized Reason in the history of modern
philosophy as well as survey its trajectory in the quintessentially anti-authoritarian
classical anarchist political project. I will also interrogate the necessity for a consistent
anti-authoritarianism in anarchist thought and will review challenges to the
Enlightenment faith in Reason in epistemology and ontology as well as suggest ways of
proceeding coherently with a consistent anti-authoritarian onto-epistemological anarchist
project.
Classical Anarchists as Children of the Enlightenment
Contemporary postfoundationalist critics of the anarchist tradition see the
emergence of classical anarchist anti-authoritarianism as couched in the heritage of the
Enlightenment that lauded, above all else, Reason’s potential. They claim that, in
understanding the Enlightenment as “man’s emergence from his self-incurred
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immaturity”48 or as an escape from “a certain state or will that makes us accept someone
else’s authority to lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for,”49 the classical
anarchists echoed Enlightenment thinkers in relying on an unquestioned authority of
Reason to guide societal progress. Indeed, the classical anarchists sought to harness the
power of Reason to overcome the stifling effects of concentrated state power, wealth, and
industrialization during the 18th and 19th centuries.50
Nevertheless, there are mixed interpretations of the nature of Enlightenment
thinking and the classical anarchists who garnered inspiration from it. The
Enlightenment is not considered a monolithic tradition nor is it understood as wholly
liberating. Some see the Enlightenment as a liberating intellectual movement, while
others see it flirting with dangerous totalitarian tendencies.51 The positive aspects
attributed to it as a liberating intellectual movement tend to echo the ideals of a perpetual
questioning of faith, tradition, and authority as well as a lauding of Reason. However,
accompanying these views are recent backlashes that point to dangerous totalitarian

48

H.S. Reiss, ed., Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 54.

49

Paul Ranibow, ed., The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 34.

50

See Saul Newman, From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power.
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001); Saul Newman, Unstable Universalities: Poststructuralism and
radical politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007); Saul Newman, The Politics of
Postanarchism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011); Saul Newman, ed., Max Stirner (United
Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Todd May, The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Lewis Call, Postmodern Anarchism.
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003).
51

Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Dialectic of the Enlightenment:
Philosophical Fragments (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).

27

tendencies sustained by a uniform conception of human nature and a “rational
absolutism” that seems to promise the “secret of the philosopher’s stone.”52
This faith in the epistemological, ontological, and social authority of Reason
seemed to mutually reinforce the political ideal of equality shared by many
Enlightenment thinkers. Political equality was rooted in a philosophical and political
anthropology that encouraged us to exercise a common faculty of reason to overcome the
traditional hierarchical political and social orders of the middle ages. Overcoming this
hierarchy required an enthusiasm for both an idealized conception of Reason and the idea
of progress.
The great enthusiasm for Reason that emerged during the Enlightenment
encompassed fervor for both the deductive rationalism of the continental tradition53 as
well as a newfound faith in sense experience via the philosophical systems of British
empiricists.54 Crowning the Enlightenment was Kant’s critique of Reason that
categorized and clearly delineated the limits of our most esteemed faculty.55 Indeed,
beginning in the late 17th and early 18th century we saw a “general process of
rationalization and secularization” that “eradicated magic and belief in the supernatural
from Europe’s intellectual culture” that supplanted theology’s hegemony in the world of
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study.56 In Western Europe, theology itself became increasingly self-critical and through
a process of reformation and counter-reformation that appeased the growing thirst for
critical attitudes in every realm of life.
Intellectual life became increasingly de-centered, local knowledge was prioritized
over absolutist epistemologies, traditions of political authority were transformed, and
modes of economic life began to be questioned along libertarian lines.57 These all
converged with a plethora of radical ideas that were “nurtured within an urban milieu
characterized by exceptional fluidity of social relations and movement between social
strata, features which correspond directly to the freer, more flexible intellectual
framework which emerged.”58
The reverberations of the intellectual crises of the Enlightenment were felt just as
forcefully in the politics and sociology of class. This new intellectual culture both
fostered and was cultivated by the “advent of new associations and locations with no
fixed rules of access, which … provided a social space not specific to any one class.”59
The Enlightenment inspired and was generated by a sort of intellectual
meritocracy, as envisioned by some of its key participants such as Lord Shaftsbury,
where society would be ruled not by the traditional landed elite but rather a “new kind of
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élite of affairs and ideas – an élite of the cultured, well-meaning, and gentlemanly.”
Moreover, the movement would claim liberty as a “political and social condition” and not
just a narrow constitutional affair as defined by the ‘Glorious Revolution’. Instead, it was
envisioned as a liberty “defined by debate, criticism, and cultural exchange.”60
Though there were innumerable debates among these schools (as well as various
schools of skeptics, subjectivists, and deists of all sorts), the underlying and edifying
theme of the Enlightenment was a reliance on private judgment guided by ones reason.
The emerging intellectuals of Enlightenment Europe hoped that private judgment would
stand hegemonic over intellectual pursuits. This intellectual hegemony would encompass
a belief that all modes of inquiry should rely, as little as possible, on traditional sources of
both knowledge and power. The church and the state were seen as sources of arbitrary
authority that impeded the pure analytical and investigatory potential of our cognitive
faculties.
In addition to a lauding of Reason, the idea of progress is also omnipresent in
Enlightenment thought as well as the classical anarchists who point to the expanding
quality of our intellectual endeavors. Indeed, the classical anarchists believed and hoped
for progress in both our moral capacities as well as our rational and scientific pursuits.
This notion of progress in the classical anarchists reflects the firm basis of their thought
in the Enlightenment tradition. But, like the classical anarchists, the Enlightenment
tradition is itself nuanced when it comes to the idea of progress. There are strong
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elements of a belief in progress as well as a healthy skepticism (often contradictory)
towards the ideal of Reason and the notion of inevitable progress.
There are many instances of a notion of progress accompanying our increasing
ability to, as Descartes put it, master and possess nature by harnessing the power of
Reason. Nevertheless, advances in science and technology seemed to point to a historicintellectual end-point thinkers in the Hegelian tradition recognized as the “end of
history.”61 In any case, this spirit of progress in the post-Enlightenment frenzy over the
limitless potential of Reason marched intellectual and social life towards a vague sense of
completion.
However, it would be unfair to characterize Enlightenment thinkers as wholly
worshipping at the altar of Reason. While Hume questioned the value of induction and
stressed the non-rational aspects of cognition, like sentimentalism, and Kant highlighted
the inaccessibility of the noumenal62, Giambattista Vico, Johann Georg Hamann, and
Johann Gottfried Herder stressed the historical nuance of “rival values within systems”
and “different value systems with divergent backgrounds” that posses “their own
independent validity and authenticity.”63
Even quintessential children of the Enlightenment like Proudhon had their doubts
about the hegemony of Reason in promoting progress. In a letter to Marx, Proudhon
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warned of the need to “…not become the leaders of a new intolerance.” He continued,
“…let us not pose as apostles of a new religion, be it the religion of logic, the religion of
reason. We should welcome, encourage all protests; denounce all exclusions, all
mysticisms; let us never see a question as exhausted, and when we will have made our
final argument, let us, if needed, begin again with eloquence and irony.”64
Proudhon’s message of tolerance resonates with contemporary critics of the
Enlightenment tradition. It echoes the concern over the possibility of domination even in
the sphere of the intellect. Predating postfoundationalist critiques of essentialism,
representation, and universalism, Proudhon appealed to a fundamental anarchist antiauthoritarian sentiment. Indeed, the classical anarchist tradition is not so easily
interpreted as simply “essentialist.” According to Cohn,
The notion that classical anarchist theory presupposes an “essentialist foundation”
outside of the flux of history is also open to challenge. Rather, in refusing
dualisms of matter and thought, bodies and souls, nineteenth century anarchists
locate their theory within a process of development that is at once natural and
historical. The visible universe does not ask for a transcendental supplement, but
is the source of its own autopoietic and self-transformative creativity.65
Indeed, his fellow anarchists eventually accompanied Proudhon in his wariness of the
totalitarian potential of Reason. However, their critical embrace of Reason and critique
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of intellectualism was often sporadic and inconsistent. Often times, Proudhon himself
seemingly contradicted this concern by celebrating the emancipatory potential of Reason
and reiterating accompanying “essentialist” and “universalizing” concepts like truth,
progress, and human nature. He, along with his fellow classical anarchists, continued the
long tradition of privileging our uniquely human faculty of reason albeit not
unquestioningly.
On the Need for Consistent Anti-Authoritarianism
Anarchism, like any set of values, prizes some ideas more than others. Above all,
we can say the classical anarchists prized a society that cherished individual liberty.
While differences abound as to how to achieve such a society (e.g., whether to have
communal ownership of the means of production – as in Kropotkin and Bakunin – or
ensure access to private property – as in Godwin, Proudhon, and Max Stirner was a key
question) a thorough regard for individual aims and individuality remains constant
throughout all classical anarchist thinkers.
It can be argued that the main impetus behind the classical anarchist faith in
Reason and private judgment, when present, is an undeniable embrace of individuality
and a rejection of representation (which is premised on a denial of our uniqueness that
cannot be represented).66 It is the drive towards exercising individuality through
autonomy that forges the anarchist individualist perspective that relies on the ideal of
Reason. The tension arises when such a privileging of Reason hampers rather than
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facilitates this individual freedom. It is such an obstacle to individual freedom that
postanarchists claim is at the heart of their postfoundationalist critique of classical
anarchism.
According to L. Susan Brown, this individualism is an offshoot of the
individualism of classical liberalism. Responding to Macpherson’s interpretation of the
liberal tradition, in which he posits its underpinning in “possessive individualism,” she
identifies two competing strains of individuality in this understanding: on the one hand an
instrumental individualism that entails a right to both real property and property in your
person, and existential individualism which seeks freedom independently of any
ownership of property. She notes that these two strains conflict. It is in seeking a
resolution to these two competing strains, identified by Brown, that the postanarchists
largely base their endeavor. Postanarchists recognize the “radical commitment to
individual freedom while rejecting liberalism’s competitive property relations” as well as
embrace the need to overcome the “totalizing” nature of privileged Reason.
However, as we have seen, the premise of the “totalizing” onto-epistemological
foundation of the classical anarchists can be easily doubted. There is plenty of textual
evidence to indicate that the classical anarchists were more nuanced than the
postanarchists make them out to be. The question then becomes whether a more explicit
framework (as the classical anarchists are often unclear, vague, and even contradictory
when it comes to their analysis of Reason) is needed to sketch what anti-authoritarianism
in ontology and epistemology would look like for an anarchist.
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Classical Anarchism and Postfoundationalist Anti-Authoritarianism
According to Brown, the ontological framework characteristic of anarchists is
shared by another philosophical tradition usually not associated with essentialist
renderings of the human condition. She notes,
Human individuals, for the anarchist, are best suited to decide for themselves how
to run the affairs of their own lives; they are best served when left unrestrained by
authority and unhampered by relationships of domination. The ontological basis
for these beliefs is an understanding that individuals are free and responsible
agents who are fit to determine their own development. This ontology is shared at
least in part by a number of philosophies; however, it has been most fully
developed by the existentialists.67
The existentialists, like the anarchists, perhaps best considered as fellow travelers and not
disciples of any specific thinker or creed, represent, for Brown, an ontological lineage
that spurns essentialist renderings of human nature and other familiar “foundationalisms.”
As we have seen, many of the classical anarchists approached the question of
human nature and the authority of Reason with both conviction and skepticism.
However, key postanarchist thinkers endeavor to highlight the foundationalist (and in
their view authoritarian) tendencies underlying the classical anarchist project.
Contemporary anarchist scholars like Saul Newman question the classical anarchist’s
“ontological and epistemological foundations.” The onto-epistemological character of
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classical anarchist thought is conceived as centering on an essentialist view of human
nature that expounds the idea of a rational and generally progressive being as well as
lauds the ideal of Reason.
Newman notes that consistent anarchist anti-authoritarians should embrace the
postfoundationalist critique of epistemology and ontology and apply it to the social and
political realms. To do this we “should adopt, with Lyotard, a degree of skepticism
towards metanarratives.” That is, “subject to closer critical scrutiny the idea that there are
universal moral and rational perspectives, or that there is a certain dialectical movement
of historical forces that determines social relations.” We should also, “abandon the notion
of essential identities” and “place a certain emphasis on the role of language and
discourse in constituting social relations, practices, and identities.” And, lastly,
postanarchists should “accept the Foucauldian insight that power is constitutive (rather
than simply repressive) and that it is more pervasive than we had perhaps imagined.”68
Newman and other postfoundationalist anarchists insist that such skepticism towards
metanarratives, essentialism, and a strictly repressive view of power limit the anarchist
imaginary in ways that neglect examples of illegitimate epistemological and ontological
authority.
However, generally absent from the postanarchist critique is an acknowledgement
that the classical anarchists took care to recognize the authoritarian potential of an
unquestioned Reason and, for the most part, rejected monolithic understandings of human
nature. The seeds of a critical reflection on a “rational absolutism” are already present in
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Godwin’s literary works in which he exposes the “conceptual violence” implicit in such
an adulation of Reason.69 According to David Collins, in Things as they Are; or, The
Adventures of Caleb Williams and St. Leon: A Tale of the Sixteenth Century, Godwin (of
the classical anarchists, perhaps the most unapologetic champion of Reason) takes care to
warn his audience of the dangers of an aspiration to omniscience or perfectibility. Indeed,
in St. Leon Godwin challenges the notion of perfectibility and detached objectivity while
couching his critique in a thorough undercutting of progressive modernity. Godwin’s
novels extoll the virtues of, what he called, private judgment, all the while
acknowledging the impossibility of having that private judgment grasp reality in its
entirety.70
Nevertheless, scholars like Brown acknowledge that classical anarchism would
benefit from a postfoundationalist understanding of human nature. She notes, “The
political philosophy of existentialism, with its rejection of a fixed human nature and its
affirmation of humanity as freedom itself, offers anarchism a fluid conceptualization of
human nature more in keeping with its individualist imperative.”71
The classical anarchists, though acknowledging the inherent diversity in
individuals, still seemingly relied on an Enlightenment framework that, at least in part,
limited freedom-seeking to the social, political, and economic realms, leaving musings of
freedom in the realm of the intellect largely untouched. While Godwin and others hinted
a the futility of sketching an ideal of Reason or the hope for a perfect private judgment,
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the key to a free society remained rational individuals acting out their natures (social or
otherwise).
The Postanarchist Critique and Anarchist Anti-Intellectualism
The postanarchist fusion of classical anarchist and postfoundationalist thought is
an avenue that embraces the spirit of classical anarchist anti-authoritarianism in ontology
and epistemology. Nevertheless, like other postfoundational philosophies it is susceptible
to incoherence. The challenge that faces postanarchist criticism is the question of
authority in that very critique. That is, can the postanarchist critique be contained within
a coherent programmatic challenge to the authority of Reason and the conceptually
limiting auxiliary notions that usually accompany it?
The postanarchist endeavor is susceptible to the accusation that it becomes an
exercise in incoherence when it decries the use of Reason in the construction of any
radical (or otherwise political) project yet engages in ostensibly Reason-based analysis
when examining the pitfalls of an adulation of Reason, essentialist vocabularies, arbitrary
methodological hierarchies, and unwarranted conceptual limitations. The question
becomes, how can postanarchists coherently critique the classical anarchist reliance on
Reason without relying on Reason itself in articulating that critique?
The story is by now familiar. While the postfoundationalists (Foucault, Lyotard,
Derrida, et al.) often brazenly critiqued the onto-epistemological assumptions of
modernity as authoritarian and limiting, others (especially Habermas) claimed that the
possibilities for critique were already built into modernity itself and that attempting to
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circumvent such foundational assumptions was an exercise in incoherence. Feyerabend
problematizes the Habermasian critique well. He notes,
Now- how can we possibly examine something we are using all the time? How
can we analyse the terms in which we habitually express our most simple and
straightforward observations, and reveal their pre-suppositions? How can we
discover the kind of world we presuppose when proceeding as we do?72
The Habermasian idea of “performative contradiction” claims that the
postfoundational literature is unable to decry the lauding of Reason and the
accompanying epistemological and ontological assumptions because they are
nevertheless present in the critique itself. That is, Habermas claims that movements like
postanarchism necessarily employ the very same devices they claim are unjustifiable or
illegitimate in the application of anarchist values to epistemology and ontology.
According to Habermas there is no need to avoid the trappings of an authoritarian
Reason or the accompanying onto-epistemological assumptions because they already
reflect the auto-critical character of modernity. This inescapable feature of philosophical
critique is, according to Habermas, central to modernity in that in creating its
“normativity out of itself” it “sees itself cast back upon itself without any possibility of
escape.”73 A Reason-based critique is both the result of and the impetus for this
normativity. According to Habermas, philosophical critique is inherently limited to the
72

Paul Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge (London: Verso, 1978),
31.
73

Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 2000), 7.

39

horizon of this understanding of Modernity and that Reason itself is redeemed even if
engaged in a critique of itself.74
The compulsion to “avoid” or “resolve” the aporia of an authoritative Reason in
anti-authoritarian thought (that is, to either invent a new understanding of the aporia
independent of Reason or seeking to overcome it with novel intellectual tools that
exclude Reason) is absent in the postanarchists. The postanarchists do not argue for a
need to overcome the aporia of Reason sketched by Habermas but rather critique it and
dismiss their own supposedly aporetic endeavor. In other words, postanarchists largely
talk past this Habermasian critique. So, how can we question the postanarchist endeavor
along Habermasian lines while sketching a way to overcome the seemingly arbitrary
authority of Reason pointed to by postanarchists?
Perhaps a better way to approach the problem of Reason and consistent antiauthoritarianism would be to interrogate an alternative framework by which to
understand the critique. We could do so by incorporating Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy.75 Wittgenstein moves us away from a representationalist, interpretational, or
correspondence-based epistemological paradigm to a view focused on “obeying rules” or
simply a “deed-based” approach to understanding. Admitting to the force of the
postanarchist critique we can still hope to overcome its “performative contradiction” by
bridging the critique with a procedural logic by employing key ideas in Wittgenstein,
such as “knowing how to go on” and “rule following.”
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“Knowing how to go on” is understood here as the idea that language has a
multiplicity of applications which vary according to community and where understanding
is largely based on practice. It is actually applying how one conceives of rules, attitudes,
principles, and orientations and, in a way, internalizing them so as to not figure it
necessary to hold some external marker as your guide.76 That is, rather than point to a
fixed meaning, Wittgenstein notes the plurality of meanings and the need for practice as
the ultimate measure of meaning. In this sense, understanding is always part of an
activity. Indeed, it is “the activity of clearing up the confusions caused by the
bewitchments cast by language.”77
In fact, we should see language and the principles and meaning derived from it as
“living forms” rather than logical ones.78 Moreover, we should resist the temptation to
transform our thoughts and desires into “things.” That is, we should resist the idea that
every meaningful word must correspond with some object and this very idea must be
undercut by means other than argumentation or doctrine.79 Rather, it should be undercut
by “magnanimity towards idiolects.”80 In the Wittgensteinian framework, a
transcendental idea of Reason would not serve as a roadmap to anarchist or anti76
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authoritarian theory and action but rather would inform the context-dependent and, more
importantly, action-oriented understanding of such theory and action.
Such an incorporation of Wittgensteinian ideas into the postfoundational anarchist
project would overcome the “aporia” of Reason in anti-authoritarian thought while still
remaining faithful to the postfoundational endeavor. In this case, a context-dependent
and action-oriented understanding of Reason and the postanarchist non-rational or antirational program would stand opposed to the universalized authoritative account of the
same. In this context, localized “reasons” would be embraced over any ideal of Reason.
Indeed, classical anarchists like Kropotkin also claimed that universalizing
schemes (like overarching moral concepts – e.g., thou shall not steal) are illegitimate for
similar reasons. Kropotkin thought that these overarching principles served as tools of the
ruling classes that protected their power and privilege. Instead, he noted we should act
how we should expect others to act in similar situations. Kropotkin thought we should
“Do to others as you would have others do to you in the same circumstances.” In this
way, Kropotkin understood the dynamism of anarchist principles and reasoning.81 What
Kropotkin advocated in the realm of morality, Wittgenstein explored in the realm of
epistemology. It is Wittgenstein’s epistemological ideas of “knowing how to go on” an
“rule-following” that mirror the context-based approach to action that Kropotkin’s
variation of the Golden Rule implored in the realm of morality.
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In order to advance with the postanarchist critique a Wittgensteinian procedural
logic is convenient so as to not fall into incoherence. Moreover, in order to avoid falling
into universalized renderings of Reason a Wittgensteinian “knowing how to go on” is
required to make intelligible a non-contradictory postanarchism. With this incorporation
of Wittgenstein, “meaning” would correspond with “doing” and not with any object of
our understanding. How we describe or understand a state of affairs or a conceptual
rendering of values is embedded in human ways of acting and living. While concepts are
inherently ossifying and limiting to the postfoundationalist, actions are both fleeting and
liberating to the anarchist and the postfoundationalist. In this framework, concepts are
understood as uses of words.82 “Knowing how to go on” denotes an act rather than simply
conceptual comprehension. Since language enables a multiplicity of uses, meanings, and
particularities that vary across time, space, and communities, repeated action (i.e.,
custom) comes to define meaning and guide continued action while acknowledging the
ever-changing context in which these actions are embedded. It is this action that will in
turn outline the contours of postanarchism’s theoretical substance and avoid the trappings
of an unwarranted authoritarian Reason in anarchist theory.
In other words, anarchist practices and customs may redeem localized antiauthoritarian reasons for opposing Reason as a transcendental marker or guide without
falling into a privileging of Reason. Recognizing and combating the dangers of a
privileged Reason in a non-contradictory anti-authoritarian anarchism is only possible
when Reason itself is considered as a context-dependent “lived” concept rather than a
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universalized noumenal Reason in-itself. The universalizing of meaning and the
authoritative rendering of Reason derivative of that universality is challenged by the
plurality secured by the Wittgenstinian framework. In this case, no “local” meaning is
authoritative over any other rendering or critique of Reason and allows understandings of
“lived” concepts as opposed to transcendental ideas.
In thesis 146, in his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein reminds us that
only when we can properly understand the rules underlying correct use can we be able to
sketch a picture of comprehension that reflects our doing and not merely our indefinite
replication of a process. In the same way as one can mimic the brush strokes of a master
painter, this alone does not make us a master painter for when our guide runs out we also
come to a halt. Underlying our mastery of painting is instead a “state which [sic] is the
source of correct use.”83 That is correct use, instead of mimicry or perceived adherence to
certain ossified conceptual renderings, allows for a non-authoritarian embrace and
exercise of Reason.
Moreover, Wittgenstein’s idea that to follow a rule is to act in accordance with a
communal practice, which is established through continued employment of the rule,
informs our “knowing how to go on” and is crucial, I argue, to the postanarchist endeavor
and to a consistent anti-authoritarianism. Likewise, “rule-following” in Wittgenstein has
no necessary relation with a correct interpretation of meaning or with defined contours of
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philosophical reasoning; rather it is simply oriented towards how we act on the rule.84
While explanations for rules eventually run out (as Wittgenstein puts it our “spade” is
“turned”), in the end all that matters is what we do. I consider these Wittgensteinian
ideas, as action-oriented understandings of meaning where “knowing how to go on” and
“rule-following” are considered “performative” abilities and not “rationally articulable”
understandings that complement and likely underlie the possibility of a consistent,
coherent, and non-contradictory postanarchism and a guide to sketching what a
postfoundationalist understanding of anarchism would look like when considering
matters of authority in the realm of the intellect.85
This is just one possible avenue to overcome Habermasian objections to the
postfoundational endeavor. The spirit of anti-authoritarianism in epistemology and
ontology generally embraces a healthy skepticism towards many bulwarks of the intellect
– most notably the authority of Reason and the essentialisms that usually accompany it as
axiomatic truths – while acknowledging that the standards of scientific knowledge are
quite arbitrary.
Indeed,
It is clear, then, that the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of rationality,
rests on too naive a view of man and his social surroundings. To those who look
at the rich material provided by history, and who are not intent on impoverishing
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it in order to please their lower instincts, their craving for intellectual security in
the form of clarity, precision, ‘objectivity’, ‘truth’, it will become clear that there
is only one principle that can be defended under all circumstances and in all
stages of human development. It is the principle: anything goes.86
Moreover, what should unite consistent anti-authoritarians is not a faith in the autocritical character of Reason or Modernity, or exclusively a rejection of “totalizing”
epistemological and metaphysical notions, but rather an acknowledgment of the dangers
of “thought” becoming the “source and soul guide of life.” In Bakunin’s words,
consistent anti-authoritarianism requires a recognition that
Life develops out of its own inexhaustible depths by means of a succession of
diverse facts, not a succession of abstract reflections; the latter, always produced
by life but never producing it, like milestones merely indicate its direction and the
different phases of its spontaneous and self-generated development.87
Indeed, in the final analysis it seems “allegiance to new ideas will have to be brought
about by means other than arguments.”88
It is clear that the so-called classical anarchists both celebrated and admonished
the excesses of our most cherished faculty. They understood Reason as a vehicle for
achieving liberty as well as a potential idol that would stymie our ability to exercise it.
The popular characterization of anarchist ontology, epistemology, and their reliance on
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Reason is caricatured. Moreover, the tools for a consistent anti-authoritarianism that
challenges not only authority of the state, the church, and forms of economic domination
but also modes of intellectual hierarchy and domination have always been present in
these same anarchists despite the insistence of some contemporary scholars. Moreover,
contemporary postfoundational efforts to circumvent the forceful Habermasian critique
have provided new avenues to challenge the Enlightenment-inspired narrative of classical
anarchist thought that some contemporary anarchist scholars have pursued and afforded
new ways of thinking about anarchism in the realm of the intellect.
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Chapter 2
Reason, Anti-Intellectualism, and the Reluctant Modernism
of William Godwin and Pierre Joseph Proudhon
The authority of Reason usually exists alongside notions that facilitate its exercise
as a faculty and give purpose to its celebration as an ideal. These notions include a stable
and univocal concept of the being to which the faculty belongs (i.e., human nature) as
well as a faith in the existence of transcendent truth. Absent these notions, the authority
of Reason seems to collapse and any consideration of it tends to drift towards a critical
deference at best and outright hostility at worst. In other words, without a stable
conception of human nature and a transcendent notion of truth underlying any
consideration of the authority of Reason that authority is undermined. However, this was
not the case with so-called classical anarchist thought.
Generally, anarchists have not found it problematic to celebrate Reason where
they thought it appropriate while critiquing notions like human nature, transcendent truth,
and similar foundational concepts. While contemporary postfoundational anarchism
highlights the poststructural and postmodern onto-epistemological framework (or lack
thereof) of a consistent anti-authoritarian anarchism, such a critical attitude towards the
ontological and epistemological foundations of anarchist thought was already present in
the so-called classical anarchists.89 While the so-called classical anarchists are often
characterized as firm believers in progress and as staunch individualists who reject the
89
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state because of their adherence to Enlightenment values, a closer reading reveals that
they were quite nuanced in their appreciation of Reason, the scientific method,
foundationalisms of all kinds, and the accompanying intellectualism it usually breeds.90
By and large, the so-called classical anarchists realized that Reason could be employed
for good but it could also represent a danger to the same liberty they sought.91
All of the better-known eighteenth and nineteenth century anarchists, including
Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin, struggled between notions of immanence
and transcendence. They navigated the seemingly transcendent ideals they vociferously
defended (e.g. equality, liberty, truth) while celebrating the ephemeral nature of life itself
(a life they thought was reflected in anarchy).92 While they admitted to the otherworldly
ideals that should underwrite anarchist values, these same ideals only existed as part of
our everyday life. They were only manifested in living. It was this tension between what
could simply be termed theory and individual practice that itself served as the prime
philosophical impetus of anarchist thought.93 Such a struggle continues to this day in
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postfoundational anarchist literature.94 However, novel ways of tackling these issues in
contemporary anarchist thought have largely reflected the debates among 19th century
anarchist thinkers and their interlocutors.
More specifically, two such anarchist thinkers, Godwin and Proudhon, exhibited
general deference to the authority of Reason and yet did not subscribe to purely
transcendental ideas about auxiliary notions like human nature and transcendent truth.
While they both privileged Reason they acknowledged its limitations and dangers. In
doing so, they illuminated the interrelation of human nature, transcendent truth, and
Reason. They both couched their calculated embrace of Reason and its supporting
concepts in a thorough grappling with the defining features of modernity. While they
both believed in the emancipatory potential of the Enlightenment, they also challenged
the framework that grounded this enterprise. Moreover, they illuminated ways in which
the Enlightenment itself undermined static understandings of human nature as well as an
unthinking deference to Reason and intellectualism. Unlike their classical anarchist
counterparts, Bakunin and Kropotkin, they both gradually shifted towards a more critical
and hesitant embrace of Reason and authoritative accounts of auxiliary notions of human
nature and science.95
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William Godwin as Repentant Intellectualist
Beginning in the early 1700’s, the politically radical intelligentsia of England and
Europe, of which William Godwin96 was a primary figure, were consumed by the
ideational force of private judgment and Reason as a propeller of progress.97 What most
concerned and inspired Godwin, as well as other classical anarchists and radical thinkers,
was a faith in deduction, empiricism, the scientific method, and similar exercises of
individual private judgment seemingly independent of the social forces that may have
constrained and conditioned them. According to Godwin and others, it was this
independence from hierarchical social forces (e.g., the church, the state) and the arbitrary
authority they exercised that made progress possible.
If given a chance to flourish, Reason would propel human progress and hold to
account these arbitrary exercises of authority. Indeed, as Francis Bacon put it in his 1620
book Novum Organum, the “formation of ideas and axioms by true induction is no doubt
the proper remedy to be applied for the keeping off and clearing away of idols.”98 A
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century later Enlightenment figures would continue to champion the ideal of “true
induction” to overcome superstition, parochialism, and the power and authority that were
often empowered by and dependent on them. From the “perfectionism” of man in the
thought of Joseph Priestly and Marquis de Condorcet to notions of historical and
sociological progress in Giambattista Vico and Adam Smith, the idea that history (which
reflects this progress) is a “change from darkness to light, from superstition to sound
knowledge and from a most debasing servitude to a state of the most exalted freedom” is
central to many of Godwin’s contemporaries who were themselves inspired by Bacon’s
prescription.99
As Godwin put it, our “modes of social existence, are susceptible of perpetual
improvement” and “It is to the improvement of reason therefore that we are to look for
the improvement of our social condition.”100 According to the anarchists everyone
possesses this faculty of reason and it is through its exercise that the ideal of Reason
would trump existing hierarchical social forces. It is important to note that it was
precisely reason’s egalitarian nature (i.e., the fact that anyone could exercise the faculty
of reason) that gave it revolutionary potential. If only we were all able to access and be
inspired by Reason we would recognize injustices and be empowered to correct them.
While the ability to access the faculty of reason was sometimes hampered by social
conditions, we had an innate ability to access it given the right environment. Moreover, it
99
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was Reason itself that would usher in the conditions for its own flourishing. Indeed, the
seed to social progress was in Reason’s eventual triumph over the forces of hierarchy,
arbitrary authority, and inequality.
According to Godwin’s Political Justice, our very equality lay in the underlying
faculty of reason and its attunement to truth. Every person could recognize the authority
of Reason given the right social conditions. Such recognition, however, was a solitary
affair. In many cases, social and political relations interfered with an attunement to
Reason. Propaganda, the Church, and social customs all made it increasingly difficult to
attune ourselves to Reason and ultimately truth. While the reasons for our occasional
inability to recognize Reason and truth lay in our intercourse with others, we escaped this
challenge by relying on our own unimpeded private judgment. Nevertheless, the
existence of an independent marker, existing outside the everyday lives of all who share
the faculty of reason, is a necessary and guiding end of our own individual efforts.
He notes, “There is no satisfactory criterion marking out any man, or set of men,
to preside over the rest…all men are partakers of the common faculty, reason; and may
be supposed to have some communication with the common instructor, truth.”101 It is the
access to truth via the faculty of reason that made us equal. Such equality begat,
according to Godwin, a rejection of all authority other than Reason itself. Even the
authority of law was meaningless unless it agreed with our private judgment. It was
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necessary that “every man should stand by himself, and rest upon his own
understanding.”102
According to Godwin, the only laws of any significance and worthy of deference
or respect are the laws of Reason. This importance stemmed from the fact that they were
prior to the man-made laws that often stymied the flourishing of Reason.103 Indeed, the
coercive nature of prescriptive law itself damaged the march towards “perfectibility” for
Godwin. “ ‘All coercion’, as Godwin affirms, ‘sours the mind’. In time, the ‘simple’
exercise of omnipotent reason will replace the tyranny of positive laws. In the meantime,
whilst also enduring its coercive penalties, humanity must dedicate itself to the ultimate
destruction of this tyranny.”104
As Collings notes, Godwin
Attacked any attempt to reduce reason to a legal code, arguing that no code could
ever anticipate the contingencies of any specific case, that rather than resolving
legal disputes it would only give rise to the need for more codification ad
infinitum. The only possible standard of justice was uncodified [sic] justice itself,
whose dictates must be determined case by case in light of reason alone.105

102

Ibid, 198.

103

David Collings, “The Romance of the Impossible: William Godwin in the Empty Place of Reason”
English Literary History, 70:3 (2003): 847-874.
104

Ian Ward, “A Love of Justice: the legal and political thought of William Godwin,” The Journal of Legal
History, 25:1 (2004): 10.
105

Collings, “Romance of the Impossible,” 847.

54

That is, according to Godwin’s reasoning, the only ideal standard of justice worthy of the
name are the dictates of Reason that are always capable of adapting to specific
circumstances. The flexibility and contingent character of these dictates preserve the need
to adapt to specific circumstances while still reflecting some otherworldly or eternal
standard that Godwin does not make clear.
Moreover, Reason, in Godwin, frames and underlies social relations. It is the
basis for any conception of natural law. He notes,
Legislation, as it has been usually understood, is not an affair of human
competence. Immutable reason is the true legislator, and her decrees it behooves
us to investigate. The functions of society extend, not to the making but the
interpreting of law; it cannot decree, it can only declare that which the nature of
things has already decreed, and the propriety of which irresistibly flows from the
circumstances of the case.106
In other words, the “nature of things” is already in line with Reason; we just have to be
able to recognize it. This may seem paradoxical to any understanding of anarchist
thought given its traditional emphasis on revolution and social change. However, there is
a strong determinist streak in Godwin’s thought and Godwin considers this already
determined social reality as undeniably anarchistic in nature. Recognition of such a
reality is contingent on Reason’s ability to decipher it, and that ability is itself
paradoxically dependent on the kind of social change (ridding society of authoritarian
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structures) that would enable Reason to flourish. It is in this way that the immutable laws
of Reason both inform and recognize the ideal social organization.
According to Godwin, human beings, having equal access to the laws of Reason,
should therefore rely on their private judgment to evaluate both personal and political
disagreements or questions. It is especially pertinent that an attunement to Reason
underlies all justification of political relationships (if any). Godwin believed that in
appealing to Reason any raison d’état necessarily fades into oblivion. That is to say, the
special logic of state that informs matters of governance and that justifies everything
from the quelling of a domestic rebellion to war with other countries is rendered both
incoherent and utterly meaningless when faced with the dictates of Reason. The logic that
operates in the sphere of politics or statesmanship is always voided by “immutable
reason.” Indeed, no social organization or political authority reflected the immutable laws
of Reason better than our own private judgment. Godwin notes, “The conduct of an
enlightened and virtuous man can only be conformable to the regulations of government
so far as those regulations are accidentally coincident with his private judgment…”107
Moreover, he emphasized that, “The true supporters of government are the weak and
uninformed, and not the wise. In proportion as weakness and ignorance shall diminish,
the basis of government will also decay.”108 In other words, the more we are empowered
to exercise Reason the more we will recognize the needlessness of government. The
enabling of individuals to rely on their private judgment and access Reason’s immutable
truths is dependent on the abolition of the authoritarian structures (the Church and the
107
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State) and this same abolition requires access to Reason. The argument seems circular but
is not contradictory to Godwin’s own determinist beliefs.
According to Godwin, Reason regulated everything from the lust for power and
wealth, liberty and equality, to moral as well as intellectual progress.109 Private judgment,
guided by Reason, stood as both the intellectual bulwark of informed opinion (i.e. a
rejection of traditional sources of knowledge, especially the church) and the source of
inspiration for the radical upheaval of traditional social and political hierarchies. Indeed,
Godwin saw the workings of Reason as responsible for the civilizing effects of limited
government and other social and political liberties.
In addition to Reason and a transcendent notion of truth, another main idea at
work in Godwin’s Political Justice is a utilitarianism also grounded in faith in Reason.
While making reference to abstract or immutable truth he often couched it in the
language of utility. He often understood truth as inevitably and undeniably consistent
with the greatest good for the greatest number. The truths of right and wrong as with
every guide to action are recognized by a thorough consideration of their utility. Godwin
assumes such utility reflects these truths. However, the “calculation of consequences”
does not necessarily constitute “right and wrong” but our “private judgment” and “public
deliberation” are a means to discover these in Godwin. According to F.E.L. Priestly,
109
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Godwin already supposes that our considered judgment of utility will reveal immutable
truths.110 For Godwin,
The unchanging truths of the universe, if known, must dictate actions which will
produce the greatest good, but since human judgments are fallible, no judgment or
multiplicity of judgments as to the utility of an action will necessarily reveal its
relation to universal truth; still less will multiplicity or even universality of
judgment constitute universal truth. Utility may be permitted to be the criterion of
virtue, as for all practical purposes it must be; but it is not its essence.111
Nevertheless, we should be careful not to attribute a wholly independent and external
existence of Reason to Godwin (though at times he clearly seems to imply it). Godwin
claims that our powers of abstraction that accompany and in fact necessitate the faculty of
reason are inseparable from mind itself, that is our inner and abstract conception of our
thinking faculty and ourselves.112 Curiously, it is only the human mind that can conceive
Reason (an abstract yet apparently truly existing notion) and it can only do so because it,
partly, brings it into existence. Despite this seemingly idealist or subjectivist point of
view, Godwin recognized that we all have equal access to an idealized Reason and should
endeavor to attune ourselves to it for the sake of progress. In attuning ourselves to
Reason and assuming that its laws are equally accessible, Godwin presupposes both the
existence of an external marker of Reason and that we are all endowed with an equal
110
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capacity to exercise this ideal (as a faculty) in us. He claims this all the while
occasionally referring metaphorically to Reason as a personified legislator whose decrees
we should follow.113 While the metaphysical status of Reason is sometimes unclear in
Godwin the basic thrust of its role in social justice is clear.
Reminiscent of an intellectual “invisible hand,” the belief that Reason propels
progress on social, economic, political, and intellectual fronts reflects Godwin’s
insistence that unimpeded private judgment is the key to any semblance of justice. No
institution could hope to mediate between people and reason, or between people
themselves.114 Godwin, like most anarchists, understood human relations to exist outside
any political understanding of social organization. In other words, he understood human
relations as independent of any political framework. Human relations are both best
understood as existing outside political relations and usually do exist outside or
independent a political framework. Godwin and anarchists generally recognize that our
everyday lives mostly revolve around personal, inter-personal, social, economic and
cultural concerns. While these may have a relationship with political organization the
everyday experience of these spheres of life exist independent of politics, government,
and the logic of state.
Included in these human relations are understandings of justice. For Godwin
especially, it is a justice rooted in the primacy of private judgment. Usually taken to be a
political idea par excellence, justice is understood among the classical anarchists to lie in
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the realm of interpersonal relations not mediated by the state. Godwin proposed that we
examine justice “as it exists among individuals” and avoid in its search a “political
view.”115 In this way, government is largely considered superfluous. When most of our
waking lives involve no thought of “political” justice it makes little sense to understand
justice as exclusively (or even primarily) a governmental matter.116
In Godwin, our concern for justice should be mediated by Reason itself
(independent of institutions that claim to channel it). There is no idea of justice
independent of the dictates of Reason. According to Godwin, Reason is both the ideal we
should aspire to and the means to reach that ideal. The thrust of Godwin’s argument, and
of the classical anarchists that followed, advocated thinking of justice as necessitating
both an appeal to Reason and an exercise of the same. Reason was the ultimate end and
perpetual means by which justice is both conceived and employed. Godwin and the
classical anarchists embraced a faith in Reason as both leading to truth and accordingly
realizing justice.
Curiously, Godwin also relied heavily on a deterministic view of nature to justify
action. Far from considering determinism as discouraging action (since it would seem
pointless given the inevitability of results) Godwin thinks it imperative to desire the very
end he considers inevitable. According to Godwin, determinism actually encourages our
search for truth and reinforces the idea that Reason reflects reality, constitutes it, and is
only through it that we are able to discover the same.
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Indeed, Godwin notes,
The more I resign myself to the influence of truth, the clearer will be my
perception of it. The less I am interrupted by questions of liberty and caprice, of
attention and indolence, the more uniform will be my constancy. Nothing would
be more unreasonable than that the sentiment of necessity should produce in me a
spirit of neutrality and indifference. The more certain is the conjunction between
antecedents and consequents, the more cheerfulness should I feel in yielding to
painful and laborious employments.117
This deterministic view allows for a “tendency to make us survey all events with a
tranquil and placid temper, and approve and disapprove without impeachment to our selfpossession.”118
However, there seems to be some circular logic at work here. This determinism
seems to rely on an established Reason that both constitutes reality as well as helps us
understand it. According to Godwin we are naturally attuned to truth. However, as
Weston explains, “this automatic perception of truth and the moral action it engenders is
conditional upon our attaining that ‘perfectly voluntary state’ of consciousness which
evidences ‘the perfection of the human character.’”119 Such a “perfectly voluntary state”
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is dependent on overcoming the social and political obstacles to a flourishing of Reason.
But, such flourishing is only possible when we achieve this state.
Nevertheless, Godwin’s view of Reason in Political Justice was not entirely
grounded strictly on this view. Sometimes, he seemed to anticipate romanticist thought
in giving primacy to our sentiments. Godwin notes, “Reason is not an independent
principle, and has no tendency to excite us to action; in a practical view, it is merely a
comparison and balancing of different feelings.”120 The reader can also infer from
Godwin the dangers of basing social and political life on an ideal of Reason that claims to
access immutable truths. He claims that ossifying certain social practices via institutions
(privileging, say, private judgment concerning market transactions or a “rational”
education based on “critical thinking” at universities) is dangerous. He notes,
“institutions calculated to give perpetuity to any particular mode of thinking, or condition
of existence, are pernicious.”121 Godwin is of course making reference to the damaging
role of theological dogmatism or the often unquestioned justificatory frameworks of state
authority, but we can imagine how a hardened faith in Reason and our supposed abilities
to access the truths it reveals (e.g., about the workings of the market, our human nature,
knowledge of “things as they are”122) could be just as “pernicious.”
In any case, the thrust of Godwin’s philosophy in Political Justice is recognition
of the innumerable obstacles to the proper exercise of reason (and subsequent recognition
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of utility). Such a proper exercise would give us access to its “instructor,” truth. While we
often rely on custom and habit rather the faculty of reason, Godwin would urge the kind
of social environment conducive to creating customs and habits already attuned to
Reason.
Interestingly, Godwin forcefully shifts to a more complex view of Reason in his
literary works. Godwin exchanges “universalism” and “essentialism” in Political Justice
for a “skeptical romanticism” that highlights the contingency in our natures.123 That is he
shifts to a more holistic understanding of human beings and what it means to be human.
Godwin realizes the ratiocination so critical to the detached objectivity of Political
Justice is actually incapable of generating the attunement to Reason necessary to
justice.124
The tension between an immutable reason and humility (and the necessity of
gaining insight with the help of others) permeates Godwin’s novels. As Collings explains,
while the “aggression implicit in absolute reason dominates in the relatively unselfconscious” Political Justice, his novels “expose the cost of such conceptual violence in
acute, implicitly self-critical, and progressively more sweeping terms. Total conceptual
revolution modulates into a searching critique of the irrational component of rational
absolutism.”125
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Probably his most popular novel, Things as They Are, or The Adventures of Caleb
Williams best embodied Godwin’s changing attitudes. While still thoroughly steeped in a
rationalistic ethos it also opens a space for critical reappraisal of our most cherished
faculty.126 The story centers on Caleb Williams and his employer Ferdinando Falkland
who has committed a murder and is noticeably unnerved by his act. While Falkland felt
compelled to commit the crime (the victim of his crime, Barnabas Tyrrel, was a cruel
man and apparently deserving of such punishment) he is nevertheless racked with guilt.
Williams insists on finding out the truth and once he does is subject to Falkland’s ire.
The story concludes with Falkland being emotionally moved to confess the murder by the
example of Williams’ integrity.
In Caleb Williams the miscarriages of justice (in this case the failure to initially
convict Falkland of murder) are considered in concert with the injustices of the world
(which arguably caused Falkland to commit the crime). This interplay and vagueness in
assigning moral blame for events make up the heart of “things as they are.” While the
novel obviously highlights the horrors of the justice system and the hypocritical mores of
England’s aristocratic class it also makes a philosophical statement about the
indeterminable reality that permits them. It is this indeterminacy that points to the gulf
between our ability to decipher reality and our pretension in assuming we can control it.
In considering the injustice of Falkland’s actions and his persecution of Caleb, Godwin
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navigates our inability to fix certain wrongs even if we can rationally contemplate how to
bring about justice.127
More directly than does Caleb Williams, Godwin’s novel St. Leon critiques our
modern faith in Enlightenment values. St. Leon introduces the reader to the hubris
inseparable from claims to unlimited resources and eternal youth and vigor. Godwin
shows how even what can seemingly make us free ensnares us in other modes of
subjection. The gradual fall of the protagonist, Reginald de St. Leon, reflects our
intractable yearning for control over nature and society. The protagonist, endowed with
“exhaustless wealth and eternal youth”128 seeks to better the circumstance of his family
and countrymen. However, such efforts only invite suspicion and produce calamity.
Despite his grandiose schemes to improve the human condition and help his fellows (e.g.,
attempting to revitalize the economy of a Hungarian village and giving charity to the
poor), all his efforts end in catastrophe. He is alienated from his family and persecuted by
governmental authorities thanks to suspicions of witchcraft and other intrigues. His
actions, though well intentioned, force him into exile and bring dishonor to his family.
Despite his “divine abilities” Reginald becomes increasingly isolated.129 His fumbling
attempts to help his family and neighbors are handicapped by his embrace of the
philosopher’s stone and the elixir of life that proves the fault in our Enlightenment-
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inspired attempts to command and control. St. Leon radically “undercuts the fantasy of
inhuman knowledge – the secret of the philosophers stone – even as it enables readers to
share the experience of possessing such knowledge.”130
According to Rowland Weston, St. Leon represents Godwin’s “rejection of the
sufficiency of modern, scientific rationalism as a guide to, and guarantee of, the radically
renewed social and political order he and other progressives of the late eighteenth century
pursued.”131 Indeed, Reginald quickly realizes that although he has access to unlimited
wealth and eternal youth, he is unable to communicate this knowledge to anyone. This
robs the possession of such insight of any value or meaning. Moreover, this very
knowledge serves as an obstacle to his relations with his family (a prominent theme
throughout) and conveys Godwin’s increasing stress on “domestic affections” all the
while highlighting the futility of grand schemes of social engineering. In this way, he
highlights classic anarchist themes while also emphasizing the role our sentiments play in
both personal and public success.
Perhaps even more than St. Leon, Godwin’s novel Fleetwood communicates the
centrality of affections and emotions to our development and “private judgment.”132
Despite his early celebration of Reason in Political Justice, Godwin is considered to have
shown increasing appreciation for the impact of feelings and our relationships with others
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on our “determined” life choices. In Fleetwood Godwin does so by tackling several
Rousseauian themes.
In this coming-of-age story, Casimir Fleetwood’s upbringing and tutelage leave
him ill-suited for the real world (specifically for relationships with others). His
interpersonal relations leave much to be desired (they usually end in tragedy) and reflect
his descent into lunacy as a consequence of his unsociable and lonely upbringing. While
he eventually recovers some of what he has lost (his marriage, his child, the respect and
love of others) he is led to reflect on the dangers of solitary life (which tends towards
delusion and disappointment).
In many of his works, Godwin largely responded to Rousseau’s arguments
concerning education and its role in fostering communal sensibilities. Godwin is
responding mostly to Rousseau’s insistence that isolation from the harmful effects of
others is a positive influence on a child’s rearing and education. While Rousseau would
claim learning with others would corrupt our natural abilities, Godwin would insist that
learning in isolation would lead to the same. 133 Fleetwood continued this response in
literary form (sometimes quite explicitly).134 As the plot develops, it becomes obvious
133
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how Casimir’s education becomes an impediment to his ability to confront the
vicissitudes of life. Egoism and a sense of grandiosity born of his “natural education”
removed from the corruption of society lead to his intractable contempt for humanity
(and his inability to relate to others and fully share in the delights of companionship and
fellow feeling). The lesson here concerns what goes wrong when we reject the
contingencies of life with others and instead misguidedly celebrate an idealized solitary
reflection that ostensibly favors the unimpeded exercise of reason.
Indeed, Godwin’s literary works show the futility of the pronounced ratiocination
of Political Justice. Though Godwin makes sure to indicate the direction of “progressive
modernity” to the reader (e.g., ideas of perfectibility, indefinite improvement, a
celebration of Reason), he also makes sure to refuse it.135 Godwin interrogated one of the
defining debates of the Enlightenment: the reconciliation between “sense and sensibility,
reason and romance.”136 Godwin concluded that society could not be understood simply
in terms of natural law or the dictates of Reason. He embraced the idea that a progressive
and tolerant society could only be an expression of fellow feeling and it could not be
manifest in institutions of government.137
Godwin’s faith in Reason’s liberating yet deterministic role in Political Justice
offers a simplistic understanding of classical anarchist sentiments. It is a point of view
that would evolve in Godwin. He would eventually convey an appreciation for the limits
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of Reason in his literary works that also reflect the general thrust of classical anarchist
thought. Other classical anarchist thinkers shared Godwin’s devotion to our most
esteemed faculty but likewise did not translate such faith into axiomatic understandings
of human nature, the nature of political society, or intellectual life more generally.
The Hesitant Rationalism of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon
Proudhon is sometimes described as a child of the Enlightenment who shares the
excitement of the philosophes over the seemingly boundless increase in human
knowledge and our ability to transmit such knowledge through education. He shares with
others in both the anarchist and Enlightenment traditions a belief in our individual
abilities to decipher reality and collectively foster meaningful progress and juxtaposes
such belief to religious faith and divine guidance or any other external authority.138
While Proudhon certainly shared with his Enlightenment kin a thorough
celebration of Reason and auxiliary notions such as a clear conception of human nature
(in Proudhon’s case an asocial and egoistic character that could be overcome by creating
the right social conditions), as his thought evolved he came increasingly to oppose an
unadulterated reverence of Reason and a faith in the accompanying scientific
methodology that Enlightenment thinkers often praised. Despite the evolution in
Proudhon’s attitude towards our most esteemed faculty and the supporting scientific and
anthropological worldviews that sustain it, he was remarkably consistent in his views on
political economy as the starting point of all inquiry. It is this consistency that structured
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his theory of justice and, like his radical comrade, Marx, sought to understand reality in
terms of economics so as to revolutionize the same. In other words, despite his evolving
views on the importance of Reason he retained an axiomatic understanding of political
economy that reflected the kind of intellectualism of which many anarchists are wary.
Interestingly, despite this common point of departure and their revolutionary
ideals, Proudhon and Marx disagreed substantially over the notion of authority within the
revolutionary process.139 This disagreement neatly highlights Proudhon’s sometimes
skeptical attitude towards Reason. In a letter to Marx, Proudhon was clear he did not
want to substitute capitalist oppression and exploitation with the tyranny of a “new
intolerance.” In this case, he was referring to the intolerance of the “religion of reason.”
Despite Proudhon’s desire to overcome all a priori dogmatisms and perpetually question
our philosophical assumptions with “eloquence and irony” he also held fast to a
foundational place for political economy within his philosophy.140
In fact, as Proudhon jostled with Marx on issues of authority and vanguardism he
was also engaging in productive dialogue over the authority of Reason. Marx is well
known for his claims that knowledge should be rooted in the material conditions of
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“concrete existence” and Proudhon echoed Marx in his repudiation of absolutism, both
ecclesiastical and intellectual. Proudhon was intent on highlighting that there is no final
destination but rather “indefinite progress and metamorphosis” by which we are
characterized as a species and as a society.141 Nevertheless his axiomatic understanding
of political economy agreed with Marx’s view of the importance of material conditions
and also reflected his belief in objective truth.
This rootedness in the material conditions of concrete existence is crucial for
Proudhon. This existence is manifested in the truths of political economy. The objectivity
of political economy served as a linchpin for solidarity with the oppressed and exploited
people of the world as well as the guiding truth and metaphysical grounding of
Proudhon’s theory of justice. Proudhon was clear in the objective character of political
economy. He notes that
It is indeed with political economy as with other sciences: it is inevitably the same
throughout the world: it does not depend upon the fancies of men or nations: it
yields to the caprice of none. There is not a Russian, English, Austrian, Tartar, or
Hindoo [sic] political economy, any more than there is a Hungarian, German or
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American physics or geometry. Truth alone is equal everywhere: science is the
unity of mankind.142
It is this truth that should guide the efforts of humankind in improving their lot. The
“science” of political economy (considered by Proudhon the ultimate and grounding
science underlying the study of all other subject matter) was seen as voiding the necessity
of government and being the “sovereign arbiter of interests.”143
Indeed, Proudhon shared a thoroughly materialist metaphysical outlook with
Marx. Proudhon notes, “In other words, economic science is to me the objective form
and realization of metaphysics; it is metaphysics in action, metaphysics projected on the
vanishing plane of time; and whoever studies the laws of labor and exchange is truly and
specially a metaphysician.”144 And, in a further allusion to the grounding philosophical
framework of political economy, he equates what he considers the main driver of political
economy (i.e. labor) with the universality of God’s creation. Proudhon notes, “The labor
of man continues the work of God, who, in creating all beings, did but externally realize
the eternal laws of reason.”145
Nevertheless, there is a curious tension between the objectivity of political
economy and the arbitrariness of property in Proudhon. While political economy reflects
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underlying metaphysical truths, property, a seemingly integral feature of political
economy, is contingent on power, chance, and a host of other factors completely opposed
to metaphysical truth. Property, after all, is theft!146
Interestingly, Proudhon is able to simultaneously praise the objectivity of political
economy, celebrate Reason as the guide to deciphering reality and as an ideal to be
aspired to, as well as acknowledge the contingent and often-arbitrary nature of human
relations. While the basic truths of political economy were objective, they had no bearing
on the current state of exploitation and injustice in human relations but were nevertheless
the key to understanding how to overcome them. This seemingly convoluted
epistemological roadmap to human liberation is based on a faith in the just reign of
Reason. Indeed, the government of man (based on our arbitrary wills, passions, and
desires) instead of reason will never be just. The government of man invites “domination
by the arbitrary and willful” while the government of reason invites justice.147 Proudhon
clearly distinguishes between our human will (under the unjust relations of capitalism and
state rule) and Reason. In contrasting the arbitrary will of men and reason, Proudhon
invokes anarchy as substituting our “habit of taking man for our rule and his will for our
law.” He cautions against the “height of disorder” and the “expression of chaos” that
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reigns in a society governed by men and celebrates the “absence of a master, of a
sovereign” where the “sovereignty of will” gives way to the “sovereignty of reason.”148
It is an unfailing Reason that protects us from arbitrary injustices. According to
Proudhon, “Reason, aided by Experience, shows man the laws of nature and of society,
and says to him: These are the laws of necessity itself. No man has made them: nobody
forces them upon you.”149 It is the interplay between an abstract Reason and everyday
experience that guides us to liberation and justice.
Proudhon’s theory is thoroughly grounded in everyday living. He considered
knowledge to derive from experience. But, there was more to this Proudhonian insistence
on experience than simply induction. His consideration of experience always highlighted
the idea of process, becoming, and contingency. Proudhon found life to resist fixed and
absolute schematization.
“Reality,” writes Proudhon, “is inherently complex; the simple never leaves the
realm of the ideal, never arrives at the concrete.”…In the face of a universe whose
“infinities” are “inexhaustible,” Proudhon asks us to attend to the “fecundity of
the unexpected,” which “outstrips any foresight” – the “fecundity of the creative
power” of “Nature,” whose works are “always new and always unforeseen…a
text which cannot be exhausted of conjectures.”150
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Proudhon thought knowledge of this “text” was not “prior to phenomena,” but
“discovered in them.” By discovering the regular relations and laws in nature we discover
the essential rationality of the universe. We can only discover such laws by regular
intercourse with the fleeting and contingent experiences of everyday life. However
arbitrary or even artificially orderly this kind of knowledge may seem, Proudhon
(especially in his later work) scorned those who divorced their theories from daily human
experience.151
This “rational structure” in Proudhon’s theory is not static. “Rational
determination is always modifiable and modifying.” This “notion of reason and of
rationality of existence incorporates an assumption that process is essential to reality, and
fixity alien to it.”152 This attitude has political implications. If “process” is essential to
reality then a rejection of any fixed status quo becomes logical. So, Proudhon’s emphasis
on experience reflects the critical importance of flux and ephemerality rather than
principled consistency in both politics and epistemology.
This attitude towards change and becoming also implies progress and enthusiasm
towards the prospect of enlightenment although Proudhon usually avoids the “naïve
optimism common to both his contemporaries and their Enlightenment forebears.”
Indeed, Proudhon recognized there were many obstacles to progress.153 Nevertheless, he
never wavered in his rejection of stasis and our urge to freeze the gains of one generation
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for the sake of avoiding an unknown (a progressive unknown for Proudhon) “to come.”
154

According to Hoffman, though Proudhon engaged in some of the systematization
so popular in nineteenth-century social and political theory he maintained that his
philosophy was “not absolute, but insistently non-dogmatic.” At times, Proudhon seems
to combine an unapologetic rationalism with a suspicion of systemic thought and what he
calls “absolutism.” Proudhon rejects the absolutism of inflexible conceptual frameworks
and systematization of philosophy (positivist thinking in social science was a favorite
enemy) just as vociferously as he does the absolutism of the State and the Church.155
Nevertheless, Proudhon occasionally lends his voice to a celebration of Reason that
overcomes the arbitrary will of others (especially those impositions that are channeled
through unjust institutions).
In any case, Proudhon does not entirely dismiss system building. It can serve
practical purposes when trying to improve understanding or working towards some goal.
However, such utility should not be confused with the nature of reality itself. Though a
conceptualized pattern of regularity can improve our rational understanding such
“patterns are imposed on reality and not a part of it.”156 Moreover, he recognized “no
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certainties except moral obligation” and assumed “that no knowledge or concept is final.”
In Proudhon’s philosophy there is a “rejection of the dogmatism and fatalism” of
“traditional thought” and of the “positivism born of modern science” yet a thorough
appreciation for the utility of generalization and conceptualization to fuel the important
liberating effects of an adherence to Reason.157
This insistence on non-dogmatism tends to sit uncomfortably with Proudhon’s
occasional flurries of celebration concerning Reason as well as his accompanying notion
of human nature. Proudhon’s rebellion against the established order was not a “rejection
of the rule of law, but adherence to the higher law of reason” and integral to Proudhon’s
idea of freedom is the idea of the unimpeded exercise of reason. Proudhon notes, “To be
free: the man who is in possession of his reason and of his faculties, who is neither
blinded by passion, nor constrained by or impeded by fear, nor deceived by false
opinion.”158 In this sense, Proudhon echoes Plato, Kant, and many other seminal figures
in Western thought. However, while the unimpeded exercise of reason does yield the
only genuine possibility of freedom Proudhon thinks such an exercise will not reveal
immutable truths about the proper ordering of society but rather progressively pave the
way to justice.
Much of Proudhonian political theory rests on this idea of freedom. Justly
engaging in market transactions, political relationships, and working towards the public
interest are all contingent on our ability to be free in the Proudhonian sense. Having no
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alternative but to enter disadvantageous transactions because of unequal conditions is
bred of those same structures of inequality that impede the exercise of reason. Proudhon
sees Reason as the vehicle through which liberation occurs as well as conceives of it as
the ultimate end-point (as liberty and equality are always in accord with Reason and vice
versa). This is rooted in a principled faith in our ability to autonomously make our own
decisions and, given the requisite freedom, have those decisions attuned to Reason.
Like Kant, Proudhon “recognizes no external authority as source of any norm.
The rules a man lives by must be entirely internal in origin, stemming from his rational
faculties.” This is the only way we are able to act morally. This idea of the internal origin
of morality also reflects rationality as inherent to human identity precisely in the
essentialist vein that much of Proudhon’s own thought about justice would reject. Within
this frame, equality reflects the fact that we can all reason regardless of how effectively
we do so. In other words, justice does not necessarily imply a perfect outcome for
Proudhon but rather the possibility of striving for an outcome freely.159
In addition to considering the exercise of reason as central to our identity, and
despite his weariness over a “new intolerance” of logic and reason, Proudhon did not
hesitate to celebrate Reason and to promote the axiom of our “constant, unchangeable
nature.”160 This “essentialist” conception of humankind points to an unashamed embrace
of Enlightenment philosophical anthropology. He notes, “…man is moved by an internal
attraction towards his fellow, by a secret sympathy which causes him to love, interact,
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and sympathise [sic], so that, to resist this attraction, he must pit his will against his
nature.”161
In addition to sympathy, Proudhon also thought we are endowed with other
uniquely human capacities. Both evil (error, for Proudhon) and good (truth, for
Proudhon) are the products of two human faculties, instinct and reflection. As Proudhon
puts it “evil is the product of incest between two opposing forces, and good will sooner or
later be the legitimate child of their holy and mysterious union.”162 Proudhon, like most
anarchists, believed in an adaptable nature that varied as circumstances changed. We are
capable of great good and great evil and both are products of human instincts and our
capacity for reasonable reflection. Proudhon recognized we have egoistic and base
instincts and an ability to use reasoning in disheartening ways for horrific ends as well as
the capacity for sympathy and an ability to employ reason for great good. However, these
instincts and our propensity for reflection were themselves fixed and unchanging while
they served us in flexible ways depending on our circumstance.
Among our fixed mental traits Proudhon claims our psychological egoism or, as
Alan Ritter describes it, the “propensity of a man to aim for nothing but his own
satisfaction.”163 Proudhon claims even apparent instances of altruism can be dismissed as
expressions of an incurable egoism.164 Likewise, Proudhon sees egoistic hedonism as
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another inherent human trait. That is, the idea that we get more pleasure from satisfying
ourselves rather than others (thereby limiting the potential pleasure derived from
altruism). But our nature is also mixed for Proudhon; while undeniably pugnacious we
are also “the most sociable of animals.”165
It is in accordance with our mixed (yet seemingly unchanging) natures that
Proudhon envisions anarchist society. It is a society where personal property is respected
but the means of production should be owned communally, where societal dominion is
unacceptable but authority in the home is tolerated, and where we can be just as easily
dominated by the ambition of others as by our own cognitive and moral limitations and
excesses. Indeed, Proudhon notes the dangers of both “internal” and “external” restraint.
Not only does he challenge the restrictions posed by “duly enacted laws, social pressures,
religious codes, economic, and even physical forces, as by the arbitrary wills of other
people,” but he also presupposes the “divided self” by pointing to the “internal restraint”
that includes “not just the tyranny of the passion, but control by conscience.”166
Despite admitting the authoritarian potential of, at least, parts of our selves,
Proudhon has no qualms about accepting the potential for domination in our most
privileged faculty. In fact, he privileges reason to the point where he considers it an
antidote to the caprice of injustice in the social, economic, and political realms. In
challenging the age-old notion of property he notes,
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Finally, as to the time required for prescription, it would be superfluous to show
that the property in general cannot be acquired by simple possession for ten,
twenty, a hundred, or a hundred thousand years, and that, so long as there exists a
human head capable of understanding and contesting the right to property, this
right will never be prescribed. For it is not a principle of jurisprudence or an
axiom of reason but only an accidental and contingent fact. One man’s
possession may prescribe against that of another man, but just as the possessor
cannot prescribe against himself, so reason has always the capacity to reform and
revise itself, for the past is not binding on the future. Reason is external and
always the same. The institution of property, the work of uninformed reason, may
be abrogated by a more informed reason. Thus, property cannot be established by
prescription. This is so certain and so true, that it is the basis of the maxim that in
matters of prescription a legal error may not profit anyone.167
Likewise, it is this external marker of Reason that should guide the proper administration
of public affairs. Proudhon notes,
Every question of domestic politics must be decided by departmental statistics;
every question of foreign politics is an affair of international statistics. The
science of government rightly belongs to one of the sections of the Academy of
Sciences, whose permanent secretary is necessarily prime minister; and since
every citizen may address a memoir to the Academy, every citizen is a legislator.
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But as the opinion of no one is of any value until its truth has been proven, no one
can put his will in the place of reason-no one is king.168
In other words, Proudhon considers governing a science. He appeals to the eternal laws of
Reason as guides to the proper mode of governmental administration. This sits uneasily
with his rejection of government and his overall anti-authoritarianism. The fact is that
Proudhon celebrated Reason in ways that often seemed to contradict his general suspicion
of arbitrary authority.
In any case, while celebrating Reason as both an ideal and a faculty, Proudhon
also makes an “essentialist,” albeit ambivalent, case for a human nature (based on our
incurable egoism and inherent sociability) that both anchors and attunes itself to Reason.
Likewise, this same varied human nature informs our understanding of moral authority.
While Proudhon conveys that we are both egoistic and sociable he does not think history
really began this way. “‘It is only abstractly’” that man “‘can be considered in a state of
isolation and with no law but egoism.’”169 However, scholars like Ritter contend,
Perhaps his claims to the contrary are best interpreted as experimental hypotheses.
Proudhon may assume that if he can show the possibility of liberation for men
who start without social ties and with a selfish morality, he will also have proved
liberation possible under more conducive initial conditions.170
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The idea is that these assumptions would avoid common utopian criticisms by not relying
on an “enlightened self-interest” to argue for reform or revolution.171 Nevertheless,
Proudhon himself also recognizes our sympathy for others and that to resist this fellow
feeling is unnatural.
In light of our egoism and sociability, Proudhon found anarchist social
organization to harmoniously overcome as well as cohere with our nature. In this view,
blaming societal “antinomies” on either human nature (as in Christianity) or on the
depravity of society (as in Rousseau or the utopian socialists - Saint-Simon, Owen,
Fourier, and their disciples) is seen as simplistic and misguided to Proudhon.172
Moreover, in addition to highlighting our varied natures, Proudhon’s stance on
moral authority is ambivalent. On the one hand he has a deontological ethical stance.
According to Ritter, “An action is right, he [Proudhon] maintains, only if it conforms to
the specifications of an ultimate norm, and regardless of the actual or expectable results
that follow from adhering to it.” For Proudhon, there are such things as intrinsically good
actions which are “‘indispensable, imperative, often onerous, indifferent to self-interest,
concerned only with what is right and binding, however unprofitable circumstances make
the former, however disastrous they make the latter.’”173
Yet, Proudhon also seems to embrace a kind of moral constructivism by insisting
that “the last word in ethical disputes belongs to the adversaries themselves” while
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holding to a subjectivist position, which again appeals to the authority of Reason. As
Proudhon puts it,
Every man should decide for himself, at least about the specific obligations
entailed by first principles. ‘In the last analysis, each individual is the judge of
right and wrong and is empowered to act as an authority over himself and all
others. If I decide for myself that something is unjust, it is futile for the prince or
the priest to call it just and order me to do it: it remains unjust and immoral…And
conversely, if I decide inwardly that something is just, it is futile for the prince or
the priest to claim to forbid me to do it: it remains just and moral.174
Both beliefs, while seemingly at odds, point to a respect for freedom of choice, free
agreement, and autonomy. For Proudhon, it is only with others that we can decide for
ourselves. This is not a kind of moral relativism, rather it is a recognition that morality is
only recognized and normative belief only justified when in accordance with Reason and
Reason is itself always a reflection of our freely made choices and agreements. Whether a
construction by the agents involved, socio-economic context, or physical reality, we are
obliged to choose for ourselves and Proudhon takes it that we can.
In claiming that all “questions of legislation and politics are matters of science,
not of opinion” Proudhon recognizes that a simple recognition of truth via Reason is
enough to compel justice and legality.175 Nevertheless, he firmly believes that all systems
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are equally opposed to progress.176 How then can we reconcile these two points of view if
we take a strict adherence to Reason as a system of thought?
Proudhon thought of an adherence to Reason as self-legitimating. Much like
Habermas, who believes in the self-validating role of reason,177 Proudhon sees our most
prized faculty, and the ideals derivative of it, as grounded in an ecosystem of selfreverence, self-reference, and auto-critique while authority, in any manifestation, is
anathema to Reason for Proudhon. The generational authority of parents, the authority
patriarchy and physical force in what Proudhon calls barbarous people, faith among
sacerdotal peoples, primogeniture or caste in aristocracies, by lot or number as in
Rousseau’s political thought – none of it can stand the scrutiny of reason. Unthinking
submission is the only option for these traditional modes of authority; if any of these
types of authority is met by reason their principles crumble. “Authority, like Liberty,
recognizes only itself as a principle” but is, curiously, still imposed through “the
investiture of Power.”178
However nuanced Proudhon’s conception of the authority of Reason might be
(especially in his What is Property? and General Idea of Revolution in the Nineteenth
Century), it is clear that his thought becomes more sophisticated and less unthinkingly
176
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reverential to our most prized faculty (and the auxiliary notions that usually sustain it) as
he matures. This is tied to his evolving understandings of static philosophizing in an everchanging world. Proudhon’s denial of stasis and embrace of the dynamic is more evident
in his later work (especially The Philosophy of Poverty and De la Justice dans la
revolution et dans l’Eglise). In these works he is keen to not only defend anarchism as a
response to rigid social organization but also to attack absolutism in all its forms including intellectualism and other dogmatisms.
The Anarchist Embrace of Anti-Intellectualism and Modernism
Many have echoed the heart of the anarchist attitude towards Reason. From
Hegel’s politics of “inclusivity” to Habermas’ communicative rationality, the idea that we
could non-coercively attune ourselves to truth and a politics grounded in freedom (of
course how this freedom would materialize is the subject of continued debate) is central
to not only anarchism but to modernity itself.179 This attitude is, first and foremost, a
self-critical and anti-authoritarian appreciation for the importance of knowledge and its
centrality to freedom and justice.
The means by which this “knowledge” is deployed informs both what constitutes
knowledge and the means of arriving at it. Anarchists of all stripes would agree that our
179
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modern world is governed by our hubristic drive to command and control nature. The
idea that “knowledge is power” is reflective of this modern understanding of knowledge
oriented towards mastery and away from wonder.180 This shift in emphasis attempts to
harness the seemingly limitless power of Reason, and reinforces the “iron cage”
described by Weber as a consequence, and leads to domination in several spheres of life,
including the intellectual.
This ironically positions us to fail more intensely in the pursuit of freedom such a
drive promises. Any “absence of control is experienced as unfreedom and imposition: the
experiences of alienation, estrangement, repression, authoritarianism, depression,
underdevelopment, intolerance, powerlessness and discrimination thereby become
extended and intensified in modern life.”181 Both Godwin and Proudhon recognized this
danger. In an attempt to circumvent its effects, Godwin and Proudhon gradually came to
embrace a “soft” rationalism that admitted Reason’s place as our guiding faculty but
recognized the dangers of celebrating it and therefore rejected the predictable
intellectualism that would follow.
Thinking otherwise than Reason remained a difficult endeavor for both Godwin
and Proudhon as many of their supporting concepts and ideals rested on a firm
appreciation for the same. Our ability to freely engage one another and construct a mode
of social organization free from coercion required Reason as the primary means and
guiding principle. According to Godwin and Proudhon, Reason had the ability to justify
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itself and embodied the kind of “self-critical reassurance” so typical of modernity and
critical to anarchist practice.182
Nevertheless, Reason and the auxiliary notions usually employed to support it
themselves became objects of critical consideration for both Godwin and Proudhon. They
both came to rely less heavily on Reason as the exclusive framework from which
freedom and justice would derive and instead embraced a multi-faceted appreciation for
uniquely human faculties (like reason) and the romanticist impulses and counterEnlightenment thinking (e.g., an appreciation of our “domestic affections” and
“sympathy”) which they considered central to both freedom, justice, and truth.
Later anarchist thinkers shared this critical view of intellectualism but came to
embrace it from the start. In other words, intellectually, while Godwin and Proudhon
progressively became less like hedgehogs and more like foxes,183 other classical anarchist
thinkers, most notably Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin, were always more diverse
in their philosophical inspirations and less dogmatic in their appreciation of Reason. In
the next chapter I will interrogate how Bakunin and Kropotkin came to their critical
embrace of Reason and how they always kept the ideal (and the accompanying
intellectualism) at arms length.
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Chapter 3
Reason, Science, and Anti-Intellectualism in Mikhail Bakunin and Peter
Kropotkin
The pursuit of scientific knowledge is as central to the anarchist endeavor as is the
fight against the state. The so-called classical anarchists of the 19th century, especially
Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin celebrated the scientific method and its ability to
accurately and consistently facilitate an understanding of reality and contribute
knowledge that would expedite anarchist revolution. While celebrating the liberating
aspects of science (and the usually accompanying ideal of Reason), both Bakunin and
Kropotkin diagnosed a kind of intellectual monomania that relied exclusively on Reason
and science (and the auxiliary notions that usually sanctify them) to bring about
revolution. They were wary of hierarchically institutionalized forms of scientific
discovery, the dogmatic insistence on the univocity of rational thought, and the
intellectualism and estrangement from quotidian tasks bred of a firm division of
intellectual from manual labor incited by such monomania.
Mikhail Bakunin was not a doctrinaire, systematic thinker. As Bakunin declared,
“I cleave to no system, I am a true seeker.”184 Bakunin thought systematicity
impoverished the value of lived experience and education itself.185 While systematic
thought may serve utilitarian ends, these ends are not inherently valuable. In a rejection
of “scientism” and “instrumental rationality,” Bakunin forcefully scorned the runaway
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self-legitimating character of scientific “progress” and technological advances that later
scholars would identify as the genesis of horrors on a vast scale.186 Indeed, as Paul
Avrich put it, Bakunin disdained intellectuals who sacrificed “real life on the alter of
scholastic abstractions.”187
Peter Kropotkin equally disdained this kind of scientism and the intellectualism
that predictably followed. While it is clear that Kropotkin accepts the epistemic authority
of science, he does not embrace the accompanying scientism and intellectualism that is
central to the ideological frameworks of many systems of domination. According to
Kropotkin, anarchism itself is anathema to any institutionalized, scientific, or
philosophical rendering of social relations. While Kropotkin did rely on evidence from
nature (e.g., the behavior of animals) to inform his brand of anarchism, especially his
theory of mutual aid, he clearly delineated the limits of such intellectual endeavors as
divorced from our lived experience. Once our lived experiences are filtered through the
lens of ideology, science, and philosophy, or are academically catalogued or
institutionally itemized, they lose their immediacy. According to Kropotkin, it is this
immediacy that is steeped in the everyday experience of working class and poor people
that reflects anarchism.188 In this sense, Kropotkin was a thorough anti-authoritarian and
anti-intellectual. Nevertheless, like his Enlightenment predecessors, Kropotkin saw the
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liberating potential of science and our faculty of reason while recognizing the dangers of
its institutionalized forms and an obsession with their purity and preeminence.
Both Bakunin and Kropotkin shared a suspicion of concentrations of political,
economic, and cultural power. Prominent among these concentrations and something
that intersects all these spheres are centers of ostensible “intellectual authority.” They
were both wary of scientific associations and universities not because their ostensible
goals were contrary to anarchist ideals but rather because their increasingly hierarchical
structure sometimes facilitated the authoritarian tendencies contrary to these ideals and
encouraged a worship of their guiding mantra of science and Reason.
Bakunin and Kropotkin reflected the Russian anarchist movement of the 19th
century that “manifested a deep seated distrust of rational systems and of the intellectuals
who constructed them.”189 Anarchist historian Paul Avrich notes, “While inheriting the
Enlightenment’s belief in the inherent goodness of man, the Russian anarchists generally
did not share the faith of the philosophes in the power of abstract reason.”190 Both
Bakunin and Kropotkin rejected the supposed “scientific” theories of history and society
(reacting mainly to the Marxists) as “…artificial contrivances of the human brain which
served only to impede the natural and spontaneous impulses of mankind.”191
This emphasis on spontaneity, fluidity, and contingency does not pin Bakunin and
Kropotkin against all systematic scientific and rational thought. They promoted a healthy
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suspicion of all “intellectual authority” in the same way they challenged authority vested
in the state or other forms of institutionalized hierarchy. What this emphasis on flexibility
does do is recognize our ability to employ these rational and scientific methods for our
own ends. For anarchists like Bakunin and Kropotkin, these ends were the liberation of
humankind. Insofar as the scientific method and the ideal of Reason contributed to such
ends they were employed readily. However, whenever these means stifled or contradicted
the march towards liberation they were combated at every turn.
Mikhail Bakunin as Anti-Authoritarian Anti-Intellectualist
Most of Bakunin’s writings exhibit a clear contempt for what he considered the
authoritarian machinations of Karl Marx.192 The “dictatorship of the proletariat” and the
accompanying social, cultural, and political institutions needed to govern such a
revolutionary state struck Bakunin as contrary to his ideals of liberty. While the Marxists
may have discovered the laws of political economy, their scientific pretension in
translating those laws into revolutionary action struck Bakunin as elitist and totalitarian.
According to Bakunin, it was not the role of an enlightened revolutionary vanguard but
rather the people as a whole (perhaps with the input of philosophers, intellectuals, and
political theorists) to make revolution.
Intellectuals were to have an auxiliary role in the revolution. The revolution
needed to be made by the people themselves. Bakunin thought it would be messy and that
this was a good thing. The freedom to mature the revolution in fits and starts, to
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equivocate and correct, to quibble and overcome, was all a necessary part of a
revolutionary process that would never quite culminate in some final stage of history or
complete overcoming of injustice. For Bakunin, this freedom stood in contradistinction to
the determinist and teleological worldview of the Marxists. Bakunin and the anarchists
did not share Marx’s theory of history that crowned the successful dictatorship of the
proletariat and eventually dissolved all class distinctions because it seems to overlook the
importance of individual agency and creativity in a revolutionary process seemingly
drowned in historical necessity. Rather, they considered history a reflection of the
constantly negotiated roles and resistance integral to not only class conflict but also
individual flourishing and the free association of persons and groups.
Bakunin rejected the intellectualism of ossified centers of social, cultural, and
political thinking. Academia, scientific associations, and governmental agencies
dedicated to the dissemination of culture or knowledge were all potentially dangerous
according to Bakunin. While they ostensibly furthered the aims of science (i.e., the search
for truth) they also embodied structures of domination that threatened free association
and the individual liberty Bakunin cherished. While the goal of science is certainly noble,
a government by science or in the service of science posed a threat to liberty because the
hierarchy inherent in government necessarily excluded full participation. Moreover, such
a government would substitute reasons of state with reasons of science. In this case, for
Bakunin, the arbitrarily authoritative and unaccountable idol remains only under a
different guise. He argued such a government and the associations that could potentially
comprise it are divorced from the true ends of revolutionary anarchism. Most
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importantly, though perhaps facilitating access to truth, such a government would
obstruct our liberty to recognize this truth.
It is worth quoting Bakunin at length. He notes, “The liberty of man consists
solely in this: that he obeys natural laws because he has himself recognized them as such,
and not because they have been externally imposed upon him by any extrinsic will
whatever, divine or human, collective or individual.” He continues,
Suppose a learned academy, composed of the most illustrious representatives of
science; suppose this academy charged with legislation for and the organization of
society, and that, inspired only by the purest love of truth, it frames none but the
laws in absolute harmony with the latest discoveries of science. Well, I maintain,
for my part, that such legislation and such organization would be a monstrosity,
and that for two reasons: first, that human science is always and necessarily
imperfect, and that, comparing what it has discovered with what remains to be
discovered, we may say that it is still in its cradle. So that were we to force the
practical life of men, collective as well as individual, into strict and exclusive
conformity with the latest data of science, we should condemn society as well as
individuals to suffer martyrdom on a bed of Procrustes, which would soon end by
dislocating and stifling them, life ever remaining an infinitely greater thing than
science.
The second reason is this: a society which should obey legislation
emanating from a scientific academy, not because it understood itself the rational
character of this legislation (in which case the existence of the academy would
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become useless), but because this legislation, emanating from the academy, was
imposed in the name of a science which it venerated without comprehending –
such a society would be a society, not of men, but of brutes…It would surely and
rapidly descend into the lowest stage of idiocy.193
Indeed, Bakunin considered the institutions that serve the perpetuation and safeguard the
rigor of science to tend towards intellectual authoritarianism or at the very least to
discourage the independent exercise of reason.
It was not only the institutionalized forms of science that bore Bakunin’s
criticism. Science itself was not free of criticism. While he saw himself laboring for truth
and considered Reason the key to unlocking the truths of nature and society, he also saw
a danger in limiting emancipation to our limited capacity to grasp truth in its entirety. Our
limitations as finite thinking beings are aided by the scientific endeavor in that we can
accumulate knowledge in the aggregate and “stand on the shoulders of giants” but by the
same token we run the risk of being made prisoners of an all-encompassing ideology that
promises to expedite thinking.194 In the face of our limited individual potential science
becomes a useful tool for collective liberation but it should not be turned into just another
belief system. Bakunin is clear in considering science a method to discover particular
facts and not a comprehensive worldview. Bakunin notes,
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Vast as the world itself, it [science] exceeds the capacities of the individual man,
even though he may be the most intelligent of all humans. No one is capable of
encompassing science in all its universality, and in all its infinite details. He who
clings to the general and neglects the particular lapses therewith into metaphysics
and theology – for the scientific generalization differs from the generalization in
theology and metaphysics in that the former is built not upon an abstraction from
all particulars, as is the case with metaphysics and theology, but, on the contrary,
solely by relating the particulars into an ordered whole.195
Bakunin is clear in his admiration of the ability of science to further progress in our quest
for truth and knowledge. It facilitates the aggregate accumulation of knowledge while
avoiding the grandiose metaphysical oversimplifications that ostensibly facilitate access
to comprehensive belief systems. While it may be easy to hold beliefs through theology,
ideologies, or sweeping philosophical systems that explain the world in ostensibly
accessible ways, these methods necessarily avoid the kind of particularities that actually
constitute knowledge.
While the scientific method effectively allows us to discover truths, the
metaphysical systems employed by philosophers and theologians hinder our access to
knowledge. It is impossible to grasp the ordered whole of the universe in any
intellectually rigorous way and this is what makes science so useful. According to
Bakunin, sweeping intellectual explanations and rationalizations of reality, that are
readily available in theology and metaphysical thinking, do an injustice to the complexity
195

Mikhail Bakunin, ed. G.P. Maximoff, The Political Philosophy of Mikhail Bakunin: Scientific
Anarchism (New York: The Free Press, 1953), 72. The italicized emphasis is Bakunin’s.

96

of our world. Science on the other hand is able to demystify reality in all its concrete
particularities by avoiding overarching and necessarily oversimplified intellectual
systematizations. Science deals with particular questions, problems, and puzzles and for
this very reason is ill-suited to answer the overarching questions that metaphysics,
ideology, and philosophy easily tackle.
While Bakunin is clear regarding the advantages and usefulness of science he is
also wary of its idolization. There is also a clear disdain for the fetishizing of science in
Bakunin’s work. Once the idea of science is elevated to the position of ideology,
metaphysics, or philosophy its explanatory power is weakened and its institutional
manifestations become authoritarian. For Bakunin, the worship of science becomes just
as dangerous as the worship of God once it is celebrated as the answer to all of our ills.
Bakunin thought once science itself was considered a belief system that promised to
eventually solve all our problems human beings would easily be sacrificed at the “alter of
abstractions” for the sake of an imagined progress in its name.
This is consistent with Bakunin’s insistence that authentic revolutionary action
must sprout from the people themselves and not their so-called leaders. It is the
particular, local, and contingent desires and wisdom of the people that fuels revolutionary
action. Sweeping solutions to public problems (in Bakunin’s day a critique of Marx’s
“dictatorship of the proletariat” was especially pronounced), however democratic they
may seem, did not allow for the free organization of people from the bottom up without
“interference, tutelage, or coercion from above.” Instead, these solutions, no matter how
republican or supposedly democratic, organized the masses from the top down and were
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headed by “an educated and thereby privileged minority which supposedly understands
the real interests of the people better than the people themselves.”196
Bakunin’s unshakable faith in our ability to perceive our own interests and our
rational capacity to discern the truth given access to adequate information is central to his
anarchism and anti-intellectualism. He, like Godwin, Proudhon, and many Enlightenment
thinkers before them, trusted our “private judgment” to adequately arrive at truth. That is,
they believed we were essentially capable of exercising our most esteemed faculty in the
service of truth so long as the obstacles to its free exercise were overcome. However,
such faith in our most prized faculty did not translate into subservience to Reason itself.
Nor did it translate into an absolute deference to those who claim mastery, specialization,
or expertise in any endeavor where intellectual authority or expertise is called for.
Bakunin clearly distinguished between hostility towards intellectual pursuits and
hostility towards intellectuals, between a derision of education or science and distaste for
a privileged education and scientism, as well as between an aspiration to intellectual rigor
and an appeal to intellectual authority. Bakunin sums it up best in God and the State
when he notes,
In the matter of boots, I refer to the authority of the bootmaker; concerning
houses, canals, or railroads, I consult that of the architect or engineer. For such or
such special knowledge I apply to such or such a savant. But I allow neither the
bootmaker nor the architect nor the savant to impose his authority upon me. I
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listen to them freely and with all the respect merited by their intelligence, their
character, their knowledge, reserving always my incontestable right of criticism
and censure. I do not content myself with consulting a single authority in any
special branch; I consult several; I compare their opinions, and choose that which
seems to me the soundest. But I recognize no infallible authority, even in special
questions; consequently, whatever respect I may have for the honesty and the
sincerity of such or such an individual, I have no absolute faith in any person.
Such a faith would be fatal to my reason, to my liberty, and even to the success of
my undertakings; it would immediately transform me into a stupid slave, an
instrument of the will and interests of others.197
Bakunin makes clear that were he to follow another’s guidance on intellectual or
political matters it would be because it was “imposed” by his own “reason.” Moreover,
he would give such guidance as much as he received it. Such, he says, “is human life.”
He continues, “Each directs and is directed in his turn. Therefore there is no fixed and
constant authority, but a continual exchange of mutual, temporary, and, above all,
voluntary authority and subordination.”198 The idea of intellectual authority itself is
always being negotiated and should not stand outside the relations of “voluntary authority
and subordination” that comprise the anarchist ideal. Bakunin notes,
This same reason forbids me, then, to recognize a fixed, constant, and universal
authority, because there is no universal man, no man capable of grasping in that
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wealth of detail, without which the application of science to life is impossible, all
the sciences, all the branches of social life. And if such universality could ever be
realized in a single man, and if he wished to take advantage thereof to impose his
authority upon us, it would be necessary to drive this man out of society, because
his authority would inevitably reduce all the others to slavery and imbecility. I do
not think that society ought to maltreat men of genius as it has done hitherto; but
neither do I think it should indulge them too far, still less accord them any
privileges or exclusive rights whatsoever; and that for three reasons: first, because
it would often mistake a charlatan for a man of genius; second, because, through
such a system of privileges, it might transform into a charlatan even a real man of
genius, demoralize him, and degrade him; and, finally, because it would establish
a master over itself.199
While rallying against the dangers of top-down organizational and intellectual schemes
he points to the dangers and corrupting influences of hierarchy and privilege on our
natures (however noble or genius they may be).
According to Bakunin, hierarchy and privilege corrupt our “naturally social and
communal” instinct. Contrary to Proudhon’s varied view of humankind (the idea we can
be both unapologetically egoist as well as the most sociable of creatures), Marshall Shatz,
in his introduction to Statism and Anarchy, describes Bakunin’s view on human nature as
instinctually social and communal. He notes,
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Bakunin believed that social solidarity, a deep-rooted social and communal
instinct, was an innate feature of human nature. If it failed to manifest itself
consistently in contemporary society, that was only because it had been
suppressed, or distorted, by the artificial structure of the state. To create a new
and better society, therefore, did not require the reeducation of its inhabitants or
the transformation of human nature, but only the release of the masses’ pent-up
natural instincts and social energies by destroying the institutions thwarting
them.200
Nevertheless, to complement this seemingly axiomatic view of human beings as
social creatures, Bakunin is also quite skeptical of the ontological underpinnings that
ground such a theory. In this context, he calls into question the authority of what he calls
“metaphysics,” and “scientism.” According to Bakunin,
By “metaphysicians” we mean not just the followers of Hegel’s doctrines…but
also positivists and in general all the present-day worshippers of the goddess
science; all those who by one means or another (if only by a very diligent but
necessarily always imperfect study of the past and present) have created for
themselves an ideal social organization into which, like new Procrustes, they want
to force the life of future generations whatever the cost; in short, all those who,
instead of regarding thought or science as one of the necessary manifestations of
natural and social life, take such a narrow view of that poor life that they see in it
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only the practical manifestation of their own thought and their own always
imperfect science.
He continues, “Metaphysicians or positivists, all these knights of science and thought, in
the name of which they consider themselves ordained to prescribe the laws of life, are
reactionaries, conscious or unconscious.”201 In other words, the very philosophical
foundations that ground the enterprise of discovering humankind’s social nature, the very
underpinnings of any scientific categorization of human beings as social or anti-social,
and the very ontological presuppositions that Bakunin makes are at odds with the spirit of
his skepticism towards the Procrustean tendencies of the metaphysicians. While he notes
that “thought and science” are two of the “necessary manifestations” of “natural and
social life” he also warns against taking these manifestations as a reflection of a
particular, subjective, point of view, or a reflection of a particular worldview or science
itself (especially scientific reductionism or an omniscient Reason itself as a worldview).
Yet, at times, Bakunin seems to echo Hegelianism and the notion that “the
rational alone is real.” Paul McLaughlin references Bakunin on this issue. In commenting
on Bakunin’s philosophy of nature he notes
In a sense, then, nature is the field of the possible or, we might say, the causable –
which is the logical; its limit is the uncausable or the impossible – the illogical. In
other words, ‘All that is natural is logical, and all that is logical has already been
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realized or is bound to be realized in the natural world, including the social
world.’202
Despite McLaughlin’s Hegelian reading of Bakunin, Bakunin disdained an
overreliance on Reason and the intellectualism it tends to breed. Such an overreliance
was inimical to the concrete changes needed to forge egalitarian and free relationships
along non-hierarchal and participatory lines. Bakunin equated intellectualism with
reactionary politics precisely because it tended towards authoritarianism and the worst
excesses of privilege. Likewise, the corresponding veneration of science, or scientism,
evacuated all meaning from social existence. Bakunin notes,
Only general scientific education will become common property, particularly a
familiarity with scientific method as a way of thinking, that is, of generalizing
facts and drawing more or less correct conclusions from them. But there will
always be very few encyclopedic minds, and, therefore, learned sociologists.
Woe to mankind if thought ever became the source and sole guide of life, if
science and learning began to govern society. Life would dry up, and human
society would be turned into a dumb and servile herd. The government of life by
science could have no other result than to turn all mankind into fools.
He continued,
We revolutionary anarchists are proponents of universal popular education,
liberation, and the broad development of social life, and hence are enemies of the
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state and of any form of statehood. By contrast to all metaphysicians, positivists,
and scholarly or unscholarly worshippers of the goddess science, we maintain that
natural and social life always precedes thought (which is merely one of its
functions) but is never its result. Life develops out of its own inexhaustible
depths by means of a succession of diverse facts, not a succession of abstract
reflections; the latter, always produced by life but never producing it, like
milestones merely indicate its direction and the different phases of its spontaneous
and self-generated development.203
As opposed to an overreliance on Reason and the intellectualism it usually breeds,
Bakunin favored a widely accessible and integrated education that would become the
“common property of all” (as opposed to the patrimony of a privileged few) and
emphasize both “science and handicrafts” (as opposed to the “hollow abstractions of
religion, metaphysics, and sociology”).204
This chiding of abstractions has a philosophical and a practical component.
Philosophically, abstractions do not facilitate the kind of thinking that serves the
aggregate accumulation of knowledge (as opposed to the scientific method which
provides the tools by which individuals can accumulate knowledge within scientific
communities and then share these with the general public). Practically, a focus on mental
labor as opposed to physical labor subtracts from Bakunin’s revolutionary goals by
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making potential revolutionaries either intolerant of or incompetent in the everyday tasks
(both menial and skilled) necessary for the triumph of the revolution.
The only way we make life is by creatively constructing it and not speculating on
it. In other words,
…what Bakunin rejects is a certain kind of philosophy, a kind he associates with
figures whom, in part, he admires (e.g., Marx and Comte); that is, systematic and
theologistic philosophy and, especially, philosophy which claims to have the
future within its speculative sight.205
This rejection of “speculation” and a focus on lived experience is grounded in what can
be called Bakunin’s naturalism or a “naturalistic account of the structure of being and
reality.”206 While Marx is also well known for his similar idea of philosophical
materialism (understood both in terms of the idea that life determines consciousness and
the concrete everyday experience of the working class), Bakunin still thought Marx
elevated his theory to futile abstractions that would not serve the cause of revolution.
Indeed, Bakunin’s “naturalism” does not correspond to Marx’s materialism. While
Marx’s materialism is based, in part, on the general idea that our material conditions of
life determine our consciousness (consciousness defined specifically as the ideological or
philosophical effects of our material conditions), Bakunin considered our
“consciousness” involved more than simply a deterministic relationship between our
material conditions and our ideas, inclinations, and philosophical outlook. While Bakunin
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embraced an empiricist Enlightenment-inspired naturalism he did not ascribe any kind of
ideological or teleological component to his empiricism as did Marx. While Marx’s
historical materialism is rooted in ideological and political theoretical concerns,
Bakunin’s naturalism is epistemic.
Moreover, Marx famously thought human nature evolved as the modes of
production evolved, though we had innate qualities like intelligence, creativity, and
emotions, material conditions and social relations would, to a large degree, influence how
our nature manifested itself. Bakunin, instead, thought that we have a communal nature
that is manifested in our individual exercise of liberty whereby we act “naturally and
consequently freely” by “not exploiting” our neighbors, thereby allowing each other to
“live naturally and freely.” Essentially, “one individual’s freedom serves as a
confirmation and extension of another.” Indeed, as Bakunin notes, “... collective liberty
and prosperity exist only so far as they represent the sum of individual liberties and
prosperities.”
Bakunin operated
…within the naturalistic framework established by the empiricist current of the
Enlightenment. Humans are conceived as embodying a permanently fixed nature
with behavior basically determined by natural laws. This state of affairs is then
identified with what is good. However, when coercion enters into the relations
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among people, we enter the realm of the unnatural. We are alienated from our
natural condition and we lose our freedom.207
While in Marx our idea of what is “good” is itself morphed according to changes in the
modes of production, Bakunin thought what is good is already present before any
consideration or influence of coercive relations within certain modes of production. For
Bakunin, what is natural is good. While Marx believed a transformation of the underlying
modes of production (likely necessitating a “dictatorship of the proletariat” to bring it
about) would result in our “consciousness” changing to reflect a newfound sense of
justice, Bakunin considered our “natural” way of being, or our spontaneous impulses, to
be inherently good and existing prior to and in spite of coercive modes of production that
often distorted this underlying nature. No other laws but the “laws of our own nature”
should limit us. In this way, Bakunin thought we were already free in so far as we could
act according to our natures; Marx rejected this logic in favor of a more determinist
account of our inclination towards freedom. In this way, Bakunin felt the “instinct of
liberty” was lacking in Marx.208
Bakunin often returned to his critique of the “speculations” he thought integral to
Marxian theory but was equally aware of the benefits of a “rationalistic” and “scientific”
approach both to the study of society and the command and control of the natural world.
While Marx and Bakunin were not adherents to any kind of a priori metaphysics
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(associated with figures like figures like Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz) they both
championed the utility of science and the notion of universal enlightenment.
Bakunin thought we could certainly have tools (e.g., our faculty of reason,
science, and technology) to manipulate our environment and dominate it for the sake of
our liberation, thereby echoing the mechanistic ideals of Francis Bacon and Sir Isaac
Newton.209 He also recognized that such tools, while indispensable to the rational
organization of society, were incapable of concerning themselves with what is “real and
living” and therefore contrary to the “real or practical organization of society.”210 That is,
Bakunin distinguishes between the (what he thinks is a false) idea that only that which is
measurable is real and therefore manipulable and the actual manipulation of things being
concretely beneficial. One seems to be a purely philosophical controversy for Bakunin;
the other seems to be a political or practical judgment.
Moreover, echoing his Romantic predecessors and contemporaries, Bakunin saw
anarchism much like art, and he sees scientific efforts to discover principles of justice as
contrary to the revolutionary ideals that guided him.211 He notes, “Art, then, is as it were
the return of abstraction to life; science on the contrary, is the perpetual immolation of
life, fugitive, temporary, but real, on the altar of eternal abstractions.”212 According to
Bakunin, anarchism reflects our bodily rhythms, communal instincts, biological cycles,
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and natural inclinations. It reflects our nature and is in turn natural. While science seeks
to manipulate, change, and renounce that nature. Bakunin insisted science sought to tame
our creative urges and channel our natural inclinations in ostensibly productive ways.
Such a “scientific” endeavor was, for Bakunin, anathema to anarchists.
Bakunin saw improvisation and emotion as central to the revolutionary endeavor.
The constant resistance of anarchists to standardization and abstraction (especially when
concerning revolutionary strategy) is part and parcel of the anarchist ideal. It is a
sentiment echoed often by anarchists, most notably Emma Goldman, who famously
insisted she did not want a revolution where she could not dance.213
Nevertheless, Bakunin’s thinking on science and Reason oftentimes seems to
contradict his steadfast opposition to intellectual absolutism. Bakunin has a complicated
philosophical relationship with science. While he admonishes the authority of
institutionalized science he recognizes the incredible technological advances only made
possible by science. He also recognizes the liberty such advances facilitate. Many of
Bakunin’s writings on science, Reason, and intellectualism are attempts to reconcile the
authority of science with his unshakable belief in liberty. He often does so by invoking
the notion of progress (a quintessential Enlightenment ideal). He makes a distinction
between revelation and investigation by noting that while the authority of the state and
the church are based on either coercion or some unverifiable faith (often-times both), the
authority of science lies in its ability to correct and continually perfect itself (reflecting in
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this way the anarchist ideals of reinvention and openness). He makes the distinction
between revelation and investigation. While the authority of the state and the church is
usually given, the authority of science is based on its ability to objectively verify its
findings and investigate its own shortcomings all the while unceasingly furthering the
human quest for truth and understanding.
For this reason, Bakunin notes, anarchists “recognize the absolute authority of
science” but “reject the infallibility and universality of the savant.” He continues,
In our church – if I may be permitted to use for a moment an expression which I
so detest: Church and State are my two bête noires – in our church, as in the
Protestant church, we have a chief, an invisible Christ, science; and, like the
Protestants, more logical than even the Protestants, we will suffer neither pope,
nor council, nor conclaves of infallible cardinals, nor bishops, nor even priests.
Our Christ differs from the Protestant and Christian Christ in this – that the latter
is a personal being, our impersonal; the Christian Christ, already completed in an
eternal past, presents himself as a perfect being, while the completion and
perfection of our Christ, science, are ever in the future: which is equivalent to
saying that they will never be realized. Therefore, in recognizing absolute science
as the only absolute authority, we in no way compromise our liberty.214
Moreover, while statist and religious paradigms often call for sacrifice in the name of
patriotism or salvation, Bakunin thinks science does no such thing. Instead of our lives
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being imbued with meaning and purpose through our cultivation of national identity or
religious piety with disastrous consequences for the expansion of our freedom, science
helps lead us to our self-identified goals and thereby expands freedom by bringing us
progressively closer to truth (truth being the natural consequence of freedom for Bakunin
and many anarchists). Essentially, “In a word, science is the compass of life; but it is not
life.”215
Science cannot tame life nor can it grasp it in its entirety. The conceptual
distinction to keep in mind here is Bakunin’s differentiation between our natural life
(rooted in spontaneity, instinct, and art) and the kind of artificial conceptual or scientific
analysis that many times tries to impose itself on natural life. As mentioned earlier,
Bakunin’s “naturalism” reflects the ongoing disagreement with Marxists on a host of
issues that unite anarchists against the perceived “absolutism” (both political and
metaphysical) of Marxist philosophy. McLaughlin notes,
Indeed, this rejection of ‘absolute’ historical materialism, or of historical
materialism as such (the theory – understood either as all-explaining, or in
Popper’s terms, unfalsifiable or irrefutable economic determinism… or as grand
metaphysical construct – is absolutist by its very nature) unite anarchists from
Bakunin and Kropotkin to Bookchin and Chomsky.216
It is, again, this tendency towards intellectualism, abstraction, and “metaphysics” usurps
the spontaneity so central to Bakunin’s anarchism.
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Moreover, and perhaps most forcefully, Bakunin identifies intellectualism and the
worship of science with a worship of the state. He finds both supportive of hierarchy and
arbitrary authority as well as equates the totalizing nature of one to be easily translated
into and transferable to the other. Bakunin notes,
Idealists of every stripe, metaphysicians, positivists, defenders of the
predominance of science over life, and doctrinaire revolutionaries – all of them
with identical ardor through different arguments uphold the idea of the state and
of state power. With perfect logic [sic] (in their own terms), they regard it as the
sole salvation of society. I say with perfect logic [sic] because once they have
adopted the position – utterly false, in our view – that thought precedes life, that
abstract theory precedes social practice, and that sociology must therefore be the
point of departure for social upheavals and reconstructions, they necessarily
conclude that since thought, theory, and science, at least for the present, are the
property of a very few individuals, those few must be the directors of social
life.217
According to Bakunin, so-called intellectuals tend to serve power precisely because they
tend to think they should, themselves, occupy positions of power and because they are
less likely to want to change a status quo that has elevated their social status. Moreover,
Bakunin claims the more critical they may be in the world of ideas the less so is that
critique translated into progressive social action. In a commentary on servility to power in
mid-nineteenth century Prussia, Bakunin notes that

217

Bakunin, God and the State, 136.

112

…it is clear why the doctors of philosophy of the school of Hegel, despite their
fiery revolutionism in the world of abstract ideas, in actuality turned out to be not
revolutionaries in 1848 and 1849 but for the most part reactionaries, and why the
majority of them today have become avowed supporters of Bismarck.218
Bakunin recognized the tendency of intellectual aristocratism to translate into political
absolutism precisely because intellectuals either benefit from this absolutism or it pleases
their elitist pretensions. Moreover, Bakunin simply viewed the enterprise of elitist
intellectual debate as wholly divorced from fostering social change. He notes, “Even the
most rational and profound science cannot divine the form social life will take in the
future. It can determine only the negative conditions, which follow logically from a
rigorous critique of existing society.”219 In other words, we cannot map out exactly how a
future society would look like, but only question and critique the existing one. This
seems to draw a distinction between state planners and political activists like Bakunin
and further encourage us to view Bakunin as an anti-intellectual as well as an antiauthoritarian thinker.
Intellectual aristocratism is central to the tendency towards government by
scientists. Bakunin considers it an evil inherent to reformists and “social engineers” of all
political persuasions. They all share an underlying faith in our ability to shape the desires
of the people and channel these desires as well as their creative urges in politically
expedient ways. Those who aspire to these feats of social engineering usually occupy
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important posts in ever more powerful states and these constitute, according to Bakunin,
government by scientists. He parses this observation by noting that such a government by
scientists is contrary to liberty while science itself is key to it. As Bakunin emphatically
put it,
But until the masses have reached a certain level of education, will they not have
to let themselves be governed by men of science? God forbid! It would be better
for those masses to dispense with science altogether than to allow themselves to
be governed by men of science. The first effect of the existence of such a
government would be to render science inaccessible to the people. For such a
government necessarily would be aristocratic, because existing scientific
institutions are aristocratic by their essential nature.220
He means to say scientific institutions exclude the general population despite the need of
the general population to utilize science for their own liberation. Moreover, such a
general education cannot be reached when the ends of education are the furthering of
institutionalized science (we see this at universities that tailor research to funding dollars
instead of to human needs). Rather, education independent of the institutional logic of
centers of education is what was necessary for Bakunin.
Moreover, Bakunin notes that the scientific, technocratic, educated, and otherwise
“intellectual” class tends to further the interests of the bourgeoisie. He notes,
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In all European states it is only the bourgeoisie, an exploiting and dominating
class – including the nobility, which today exists only in name – that receives a
more or less serious education. Apart from that, a special minority is produced
from the midst of the bourgeoisie, one which devotes itself exclusively to the
study of the greater problems in philosophy, social science, and politics. It is this
minority that, properly speaking, constitutes the newest aristocracy of the licensed
and privileged ‘intellectuals.’ It is the quintessence and the scientific expression
of the spirit and interests of the bourgeoisie.221
Indeed, advances in science as well as art and culture seem to mostly benefit a small
privileged class according to Bakunin. Like Marx, Bakunin claims these advances also
serve as instruments of domination and exploitation undeniably reflecting the culture and
interests of the dominant class. Bakunin also realizes the growth of poverty among the
masses is accompanied by the growth of technical progress under capitalism. While this
“progress is stupendous,” it is also true that “the more it grows, the more does it become
the cause of intellectual and consequently material slavery, the cause of poverty and
mental backwardness of the people; for it constantly deepens the gulf separating the
intellectual level of the privileged classes from that of the great masses of the people.”222
“How can workers break this vicious circle?” Bakunin asks. He answers,
They must, of course, acquire knowledge and take possession of science – this
mighty weapon without which, it is true, they can make revolutions, but lacking
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which they will never be able to erect upon the ruins of bourgeois privileges the
equality of rights, justice, and liberty which constitute the true basis of all their
political and social aspirations.223
The role of science as a tool for liberation is clear in Bakunin. Nevertheless, he also
regrets that advances in the “administration of things,” themselves reflective of scientific
advances, were designed to oppress workers.224 The difficulty is then to take control of
“science” in much the same way the proletariat should seize the means of production in
Marxism. What is certain is that no “dictatorship” should follow from such a takeover
according Bakunin.
This brand of anti-authoritarian anti-intellectualism draws a clear distinction
between the concentration of scientific knowledge in institutions that tend towards
authoritarianism and science itself. Bakunin made clear that “science is first of all based
upon the co-ordination of a mass of personal experiences – past and contemporary –
always subjected to the rigorous test of reciprocal criticism. It is impossible to imagine
any more democratic basis than this.”225 Science serves as a common language across
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space and time and between people of different cultures.226 It is for this reason that,
according to Bakunin, the scientific method is essentially democratic and egalitarian.
This view of science reflects Bakunin’s hope for the unity of humankind. While
we are infinitely varied in our interests, tastes, and dispositions, we all share an
underlying humanity that reflects Bakunin’s view of science. In other words, Bakunin
contrasts the democratic and egalitarian nature of science to the authoritarianism and
privileged position of theology and metaphysics. He considered science could provide an
epistemological unity without the pretension to abstraction. The results of scientific
research aggregated bits of knowledge without an aspiration to universal, abstract (and
ultimately, empty and meaningless) knowledge. He notes, “The great unity of science is
concrete. It is unity in infinite diversity, whereas the unity of theology and metaphysics is
abstract; it is a unity in the void.”227
To complicate matters a bit, while we are all unique (though essentially social
creatures), and Bakunin thought we should embrace that diversity, he also thinks we
share the underlying faculty of reason. While this does not contradict his celebration of
human diversity it does call into question his commitment to difference in the face of
totalizing metaphysical abstractions. Indeed, Bakunin complicates the neat distinction
between science and its institutionalization as well as between science and metaphysical
abstractions when he equates human reason as a unifying and identical faculty we all
share and, moreover, identifies that unifying faculty with science itself. He undermines
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the individuality he praises by highlighting our identical rationality and its relation to
science. Bakunin notes
The world is a unity, notwithstanding the infinite variety of its component beings.
Man’s reason, which takes this world as an object to be recognized and
comprehended, is the same or identical, despite the infinite number of various
human beings – past and present – by whom it is represented. Science, therefore,
also must be unified, for it is but the recognition and comprehension of the world
by human reason.”228
He continues, “Metaphysics…acted according to the method of centralized states.
Rational philosophy, on the contrary, is a purely democratic science.”229
Despite claiming that we are naturally endowed with an identical faculty of reason
he made no claim to our “natural” equality. The inequality bred of intellectualism is not a
reflection of differences in our natural endowments but rather differences engendered by
social injustice. Intellectualism is dangerous because it privileges certain members of
society. When we create institutions and modes of society that create castes of
“intellectuals” (e.g., a vanguard party or a privileged class of people that attend the most
well funded and prestigious universities) we create inequality in every other sphere of
society (including the economic and the political). That is why Bakunin was convinced
that “the social environment, social position, and conditions of existence, are more
powerful than the intelligence and will of the strongest and most energetic individual. It
228
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is precisely for this reason that we demand not natural but social equality of individuals
as the condition for justice and the foundation of morality.”230
Bakunin’s general attitude toward intellectualism can be summarized in the
following way. The distinction between the democratic and egalitarian nature of science
and the authoritarian manifestations of its institutionalization and the contrast between
science and the authoritarian pretensions of theology and metaphysics are at the heart of
Bakunin’s anti-intellectualism. While Bakunin equates scientific institutions with
aristocracy, he equates science itself with egalitarianism. While he rejects the overarching
ideal of Reason, he embraces our most esteemed faculty, reason. While he understands
the limits of the scientific endeavor he also sees that same endeavor as the key to guiding
our search for liberty. Indeed, Bakunin recognized the reductionist impulse of scientism
as a danger. The usually self-glorifying notion of scientific progress represented an
uncritical faith in the benign nature of technological and scientific advancements.
Bakunin warned that technical and scientific experts might use their knowledge to
dominate ordinary citizens and while Bakunin was critical of this potential domination he
did not reject the validity of scientific knowledge. He only recognized that the tendency
to reduce life to formulaic expressions and subsume it to technocratic control would
likely lead to tyranny.231 This was at once a stance against the authoritarian tendencies of
intellectuals and institutionalized science as well as a wariness of totalizing metaphysical
notions like Reason itself.
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Indeed, there seem to be two competing tendencies in Bakunin’s thoughts on
science and intellectualism. On the one hand, his skepticism towards the concentration of
scientific knowledge (in institutions as well as individuals) points to its pernicious effects
in much the same way as concentrations of political or economic power would have
pernicious effects. On the other hand, there is an unsullied hope in the unity of
knowledge and the existence of such unity being decipherable through our faculty of
reason, yet still somehow interwoven with the infinite contingencies of the human
experience.
Between Reason and Scientism: Peter Kropotkin and Free Inquiry
The general thrust of Kropotkin’s writings on anarchism includes not only a clear
opposition to the state and capitalism but also highlights anarchism’s underlying
scientific basis. Kropotkin was the quintessential representative of “scientific anarchism.”
A scientist himself (he was a geographer), he based his anarchism on evidence of human
cooperation as a survival strategy. Kropotkin’s anarchism was based not on abstract
principles but rather on these naturally occurring cooperative elements and tendencies of
human life that undergird the processes of free association central to the anarchist tenets
of liberty and equality. Nevertheless, while celebrating science as central to progress and
to discovering the proper ordering of society, Kropotkin also recognized the limits of
science and, more importantly, both the sometimes authoritarian excesses of its
practitioners as well as the authoritarian institutional logic of scientific associations and
universities. He also took aim at the specialization and division of labor that was a
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byproduct of scientific progress and hoped to further the idea of “integral education” that
would combine both “intellectual” and “manual” labor.
According to Roger N. Baldwin, Kropotkin described anarchism “in relation to
the tendencies away from metaphysics and towards physics.”232 By this he meant that
Kropotkin sought to shift the basis of anarchism from abstract ideals to notions rooted in
empirical scientific evidence and understanding. According to Kropotkin, these naturally
occurring elements and strategies of cooperation are only discoverable through the
scientific method and empirical observation.
Through his observations, Kropotkin came to the conclusion that
…anarchism proves to be in accordance with the conclusions arrived at by the
philosophy of evolution. By bringing to light the plasticity of organization, the
philosophy of evolution has shown the admirable adaptability of organisms to
their conditions of life, and the ensuing development of such faculties as render
more complete both adaptations of the aggregates to their surroundings and those
of each of the constituent parts of the aggregate to the needs of free
cooperation.233
Kropotkin forcefully contrasts this view with a faith in the ideal of Reason. While he
celebrated the scientific method he remained skeptical of overarching philosophical
systems and the ungrounded faith in Reason on which they often depend. Many
philosophical systems, such as Hegelianism for example, embraced the rational spirit or
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the quasi-cosmic order of the universe; others, like Cartesian rationalism, relied on a
thorough rational skepticism of the outside world and a celebration of the deductive
method which cemented the mind/body divide and contributed to much subsequent
philosophical scholarship and the idea that there exists a firm wall of separation between
our mental and physical faculties.
Reacting to Hegelian idealism and the rationalism of scores of philosophical
schools in his essay “Modern Science and Anarchism” Kropotkin notes
When the metaphysicians try to convince the naturalist that the mental and moral
life of man develops in accordance with certain ‘In-dwelling Laws of the Spirit,’
the latter shrugs his shoulders and continues his physiological study of the
phenomena of life, of intelligence, and of emotions and passions, with a view to
showing that they can all be resolved into chemical and physical phenomena. He
endeavors to discover the natural laws on which they are based. Similarly, when
the anarchists are told, for instance, that every development consists of a thesis, an
antithesis, and a synthesis; or that ‘ the object of law is the establishment of
justice, which represents the realization of the highest idea;’ or, again, when they
are asked what, in their opinion, is ‘the object of life?’ they, too, simply shrug
their shoulders and wonder how, at the present state of development of natural
science, old-fashioned people can still be found who continue to believe in
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‘words’ like these and still express themselves in the language of primitive
anthropomorphism…234
Moreover, for Kropotkin, just as important as a rejection of these philosophical systems
was an appreciation of both mental and manual labor. Kropotkin would echo Bakunin’s
idea of integral education by describing anarchist communities where everyone would
perform both “mental and manual labor.”235
Kropotkin criticizes the division of labor and the intellectualism born of it. He
laments the separation of the “brain worker” and the “manual worker” and the contempt
among intellectuals and scientists of manual labor. Central to Kropotkin’s notion of
“integral education” is a blurring of the line between mental and manual labor as well as
a celebration of the well-rounded individual. Kropotkin recognizes that knowing more
and more about less and less is a feature of modern industry, science, and learning. While
specialization may serve to advance science and industry it hinders the full development
of individuals. Ostensibly, advances in science and industry should contribute to
developing our human capacities in a free society, but under conditions of political and
economic oppression they contribute to hindering human development.
Kropotkin sees the solution to this stagnation in combining scientific and, what he
calls, handicraft education. He notes, “We maintain that in the interests of both science
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and industry, as well as of society as a whole, every human being, without distinction of
birth, ought to receive such in education as would enable him, or her, to combine a
thorough knowledge of science with a thorough knowledge of handicraft.”236 According
to Kropotkin, employing our mental and bodily powers brings a sense of fullness and
better prepares us for the work of the revolution and for revolutionary society.
Nevertheless, this belief in the importance of an integral education does not
belittle the importance of science to discovering the tendencies in human relations and
the proper ordering of society. Kropotkin is clear in his celebration of the scientific
method. Indeed, anarchistic thinkers have taken him to task for it. Paul Feyerabend, for
example, accuses Kropotkin of unquestioningly supporting the epistemological authority
of science. He writes that Kropotkin, and anarchists generally, “swallow without protest
all the severe standards which scientists and logicians impose upon research and upon
any kind of knowledge-creating and knowledge changing activity.”237
Feyerabend is largely correct about Kropotkin’s celebration of science and logic.
However, this does not mean that Kropotkin unquestioningly supports the idea that we
should “swallow without protest” the standards of either. Kropotkin, like Bakunin,
esteems individual and folk wisdom just as much as a strict scientific method and our
faculty of reason. Moreover, Kropotkin contends the state and institutions like academia
often marginalize unorthodox voices that might challenge the arbitrary epistemological
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authority Feyerabend worried about. It is precisely the institutional manifestations of
science (especially science supported by the state for reasons of state) that often exhibit
an authoritarian impulse and reflects the class background of its practitioners.
Kropotkin does not see science itself (nor the underlying Reason it is said to
reflect and manifest) as authoritarian despite the many authoritarian instantiations of
reason and science in the same way we would not consider our sense of vision as
inherently faulty in light of its many real-world imperfections (astigmatisms and the like).
If we consider Reason as analogous to vision we can see that it would seem nonsensical
to seek liberation from our sense of vision simply because of the many possible
imperfections in those who see. Moreover, we can even claim that our personal
experience and cultural background will affect how we “see” but it would be nonsensical
to seek liberation from our vision for this reason. Indeed, Kropotkin would argue our
capacity for reason (and the science that is bred of this human faculty) should not be
denigrated because of the detrimental effects of certain instantiations of reason (and the
institutions that have celebrated science and logic and cultivated a certain kind of
knowledge).
We could parse this analogy a bit more and understand that Kropotkin views a
certain kind of “vision” as authoritarian in the same way he considers a certain kind of
exercise of science (and the institutional power and authority that accompanies it) as a
threat to freedom. Indeed, we should think of it in the same way we think of "looking"
and "seeing." While looking certainly describes vision in some sense it does not always
entail an appreciation of dimensions, distances, or even accurate representations (we can
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think of how someone suffering from astigmatism of some kind does not really "see"
what's in front of them but can certainly "look" at it). An appreciation of the
"dimensions" of what is being "seen" is central to anarchist thought in the same way that
a healthy skepticism of (or wearing corrective lenses to better "see") what is being
"looked" at is generally a good thing if we suffer from astigmatism.
A dogged insistence that we should only "look" with our God-given eyesight in
its purest form without corrective lenses or a consideration of what we are looking at and
in what context we do so would be silly and unnecessarily dogmatic or
conceptually "authoritarian" for anarchists like Kropotkin. Anarchists, including
Kropotkin, have always been keen to appreciate context and particularities of given
situations in this way. To continue the analogy, Kropotkin would insist that while there
is only one way to "look" there are many ways to "see" and that anarchists can appreciate
vision as well as anyone but they are also skeptical as to the idea of "looking" always
entailing "seeing.”238
It is the danger of insisting on only a certain kind of “looking” that Kropotkin sees
as dangerous. Kropotkin rejects the dogmatism of a celebration of Reason or science
while embracing our faculty of reason and the scientific method. Indeed, Kropotkin
exemplified the spirit of rational inquiry while noting the dangers of a scientism that
would reduce the study of humankind to totalizing onto-epistemological axioms.
According to Brian Morris, Kropotkin, like Marx, “stood firmly in the tradition of the
Enlightenment” in his “affirmation of reason.” He stressed the importance of
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…free inquiry and secularism; an advocacy of scientific materialism and the
repudiation of mythology, mysticism, and religious dogma as modes of
understanding the world; a respect for craftsmanship and an enthusiasm for
industry, coupled with a belief in human progress through the application of
science and technology; an emphasis on individual liberty and equality and the
promotion of a cosmopolitan outlook; and finally, a repudiation not only of sacred
texts but of the past, of the classical literature of antiquity, as a source of
authority.
However, Kropotkin’s worldview was not a simple scientism. According to Morris,
Kropotkin thought the “identification of the Enlightenment with a blind faith in progress
or with a naïve rationalism is facile in the extreme.”239 Nor did Kropotkin reduce human
existence or nature to a scientistic reductionism.
Kropotkin took care to remind us that individuals have varied natures. He
recognized that we were capable of great altruism and cooperation as well as other
desires that led us to egoism and the domination of others.240 Importantly, this conception
of human nature resisted the axiomatic reductionism of other classical anarchist thinkers.
Nevertheless, for Kropotkin, it is precisely this variation that necessitates an anarchist
society of free association. In his The Conquest of Bread, Kropotkin notes,
And as all men do not and cannot resemble one another (the variety of tastes and
needs is the chief guarantee of human progress) there will always be, and it is
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desirable that there should always be, men and women whose desire will go
beyond those of ordinary individuals in some particular direction.241
According to Morris,
He [Kropotin] shared with Marx a great debt to both the logic and content of the
eighteenth-century French Enlightenment, but… he rejected entirely its
metaphysics of nature. He thus repudiated the anthropocentrism and essentialism
of Enlightenment thought…as well as its radical dualisms (humanity/nature,
mind/body, individual/society) and its mechanistic world picture.242
In large measure, Kropotkin endeavored not to invent society or human relations anew
but rather to base his idea of social organization on what he saw as present and obvious in
existing relations. Kropotkin’s anarchist communism extrapolated from a perceived
nature of human relations. It was
…less a vision of a future utopia but rather an attempt to sustain and develop the
kind of institutions based on sociality and free cooperation that already formed an
essential part of all human societies, even the most tyrannical. It was to preserve
and expand the precious ‘kernel’ of social customs without which no human or
even animal society, could exist.243

241

Peter Kropotkin, The Conquest of Bread, ed. Marshall Shatz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007), 95.
242

Morris, 173.

243

Ibid, 76.

128

Kropotkin emphasized that individuals have varied natures and the most successful
human societies and endeavors have been those based on cooperation. From his
celebration of medieval guilds to the fact that wolves and lions hunt in packs and bees
and ants cooperate to build their hives and colonies, examples of mutual aid are
plentiful.244
Kropotkin’s anarchism is based on a thoroughly scientific worldview that rejects
the metaphysical dualisms reminiscent of the Enlightenment and embraces humankind’s
varied nature and its identification with nature itself. Morris quotes Kropotkin,
Upon a mechanical explanation of all phenomena, embracing the whole of nature
– that is, including in it the life of human societies and their economic, political
and moral problems. Its method of investigation is that of the exact Natural
Sciences, and, if it pretends to be scientific, every conclusion it comes to must be
verified by the method by which every scientific conclusion must be verified. It
aims to construct a synthetic philosophy comprehending in one generalization all
the phenomena of nature – and therefore also the life of societies.245
Indeed, “Kropotkin, following the radical implications of Darwin’s theory of evolution,
therefore rejected any metaphysical dualism between humans (and their social life) and
nature – for Kropotkin continually emphasized that humans are a part of nature.”246
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As is made evident by the historical, sociological, and consequentialist reflection
in Mutual Aid247 as well as his scientific outlook, Kropotkin sought not to marry himself
to any one philosophical paradigm. Kropotkin’s philosophy, most notably his philosophy
of nature, seemed to be a via media between the idealism of those who postulate a
“radical separation of humanity and nature” or deny “the reality of an external world
(exemplified by neo-Kantian philosophy, hermeneutics, and postmodernism), and a
reductive form of materialism.” Kropotkin combined a humanism that emphasized
“human agency and the recognition that human social life and culture constitute a
relatively autonomous realm of being” and a naturalism that recognized humans as “an
intrinsic part of nature.”248
Revolution, for Kropotkin, entailed a transformation of society attuned to natural
human relations absent the ossification of its institutional residues in the form of
government. “The notion of a ‘revolutionary government’ Kropotkin considered to be a
contradiction in terms, for ‘revolution’ and ‘government’ were incompatible concepts.
‘The one is always the negation of the other,’ he wrote, and apart from anarchy ‘there can
be no revolution.’”249 Likewise, for Kropotkin, law itself (perhaps the most omnipresent
instantiation of state power) was antithetical to the both the basis of a free society and its
natural state. “We need to recognize that the ‘law’ is a relatively modern phenomenon
and that humans have lived for many centuries without any kind of written law. Since
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earliest times humans have regulated their lives through habits, local customs, and
cultural usages.”250 Indeed, “Nothing good, he wrote, ‘is made except by the free
initiative of the people, and all power tends to kill it.’”251
In fact, for Kropotkin, it is precisely science that combats the totalizing ontoepistemological maxims and axioms of the nineteenth century metaphysicians that sought
to root out “habits, local customs, and cultural usages.” Kropotkin saw science as
providing knowledge for solutions to specific problems while following a general method
for attaining that knowledge. While the scientific method was standard, the problems
tackled and experimental results could be applied to an infinite variety of localized
contexts. This possibility is central to Kropotkin’s anarchism and to the anarchist
acknowledgement of our “need of knowledge, of brains and of the voluntary
collaborations of a host of local and specialized forces which alone can attack the
diversity of economic problems in their local aspects.”252
Kropotkin notes,
In anarchism there is no room for those pseudo-scientific laws with which the
German metaphysicians of the first thirty years of the nineteenth century had to
content themselves. Anarchism does not recognize any method other than the
natural-scientific, and it applies this method to all the so-called humanitarian
sciences. Availing itself of this method as well as of all researches which have
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recently been called forth by it, anarchism endeavors to reconstruct all the
sciences dealing with man and to revise every current data of right and justice on
the bases which have served for the revision of all natural sciences. Its object is to
form a scientific concept of the universe embracing the whole of nature and
including man.253
While this call may seem epistemologically and ontologically universalizing it is
important to keep in mind what Kropotkin means by science. Science is a tool that, while
embracing the study of nature (including human beings and society) as a whole, serves
the interests of particularized solutions to specific problems as well. In Kropotkin’s case,
the overarching problem is a proper ordering of society that Kropotkin thinks should
reflect both the history of human communities (themselves, historically, run along the
lines of free association and mutual aid) and the behaviors of animals.
Nevertheless, Kropotkin also clearly outlines what he thinks are the limits of
science in so far as it informs anarchism.
Anarchism like socialism in general, and like every other social movement, has
not of course developed out of science or out of some philosophical school. The
social sciences are still far removed from the time when they shall be as exact as
are physics and chemistry…It would be unreasonable, therefore, to expect of the
young social sciences, which are concerned with phenomena much more complex
than winds and rain, that they should foretell social events with any approach to
certainty. Besides, it must not be forgotten that men of science, too, are but
253
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human, and that most of them either belong by descent to the possessing classes
and are steeped in the prejudices of their class, or else are in the actual service of
government. Not out of universities therefore does anarchism come.
It remains important, according to Kropotkin, to recognize the limits of both science itself
and those who practice science as well as to guard against the institutional logic (itself
bred of authoritarian tendencies) of scientific associations and universities. He continues,
“Like socialism in general, and like all other social movements, anarchism was born
among the people; and it will continue to be full of life and creative power only as long as
it remains a thing of the people.”254
Reconciling Anti-Intellectualism, Reason, and Science
By seeing the social world and the physical world as just one natural world,
Bakunin and Kropotkin saw science as reflective of our natural ability to reason and as
the key to discovering the “natural laws” that would lead us to anarchism. They
considered the anarchist endeavor intimately tied to scientific progress all the while
noting the dangers of elevating science and our most esteemed faculty to the level of their
most cherished ideal: liberty.255 Instead, anarchists like Bakunin insisted, “Once more,
Life, not science, creates life; the spontaneous action of the people themselves alone can
create liberty.”256
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Bakunin and Kropotkin recognized Enlightenment values as channeling both
liberating and pernicious tendencies. While both thinkers celebrated the discovery of
truth through science and the exercise of reason they were also quick to point out that
excessive abstraction, institutionalization, and compartmentalization of rationality and
science led to concentrations of power and authority that are unacceptable to anarchists.
The predictable consequences of the worship of Reason and science, which take the
shape of an intelligentsia subservient to power, the excessive separation of intellectual
from manual labor, and the idolization of Reason and science, contribute to the
intellectualism Bakunin and Kropotkin consistently combatted.
In both Bakunin and Kropotkin we see a clear distinction between a disdain for
the intelligentsia and an appreciation of reason and science. While scientism and a
worshipping of Reason were products of the intelligentsia and the institutions that
afforded and perpetuated their power, a clear appreciation for Enlightenment values
unvarnished by the class oppression of state and capitalist systems imbued most anarchist
thought. By keeping in mind this qualified support of the ideal of Reason we see a clear
appreciation for science as a liberating force (so long as it is divorced from its
authoritarian ties to the state and capitalism).
By rejecting dogmatism in every realm (including the intellectual) both Bakunin
and Kropotkin highlighted the anti-authoritarian elements of diversity, localism, and
pluralism in matters of philosophy and science. They both share a steadfast opposition to
univocal expressions of truth, Reason, and science as well as a healthy suspicion of the
institutional manifestations of them all. They agree there are many ways to tackle
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important social issues and matters of justice yet diagnosed a persistent intellectual
monomania in the problematizing and resolving of these same issues.
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Chapter 4
Anti-Authoritarianism as Anti-Intellectualism:
Stirner, Nietzsche, and the Anarchic Politics of Postfoundationalism
“Caminante no hay camino se hace camino al andar.” – Antonio Machado257
This chapter will examine Max Stirner’s and Friedrich Nietzsche’s challenges to
traditional Western metaphysics and epistemology and their connection to antiauthoritarian thought (especially the anarchist tradition and recent developments in
postfoundational anarchist theory). My purpose is to stress the importance of both Stirner
and Nietzsche in thinking about an anti-authoritarianism of the intellect (i.e., an antiauthoritarianism aimed at the epistemic authority of Reason, the scientific method, and
other authoritative accounts of knowledge, as well as against the ontological categories
usually used to sustain them). Conceiving of such an anti-authoritarianism of the intellect
facilitates new ways of thinking about important political notions in the
postfoundationalist context (e.g., domination) and relating them to traditionally nonpolitical notions (e.g., intellectualism).
I will consider how the anti-authoritarianism of these thinkers questions the
legitimacy of not only politics and political institutions but also apolitical hierarchies that
nevertheless govern our thinking. This anti-authoritarianism of the intellect rejects what
William James called “intellectualism” or the grafting of conceptual frameworks onto our
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understanding of the world and the lauding of such grafting as exact, thorough, and
scientific.258
While the history of critical political thought is rife with anti-authoritarian
discourse aimed at political, economic, and cultural domination, postfoundational
anarchist discourse takes inspiration not only from radical anti-capitalist and anti-statist
frameworks of analysis but also anti-metaphysical thinkers like Stirner and Nietzsche.
Stirner and Nietzsche highlighted our dubious romance univocal understandings of
Reason, essentialist views of human nature, and other kinds of onto-epistemological
foundationalism. Their interrogation of foundationalism illustrated anarchist antiintellectualism.
Intellectualism in the anarchist tradition is nuanced and defies easy categorization.
While other radical traditions like Marxism openly espouse their scientific and
rationalistic aspirations (e.g., a theory of scientific socialism and a dialectically
materialist understanding of history) and other quintessentially modern political traditions
like liberalism easily betray their foundational assumptions (e.g., atomized individuality,
rational self interest), anarchism does not lend itself to a static philosophical reading.
While these scientific aspirations and foundational assumptions frame Marxism’s and
Liberalism’s endeavor to secure liberty and equality they also seem to unwittingly
reinforce a certain kind of domination, hierarchy, or arbitrary authority.
Historically, the calling of anarchism has been to oppose domination, hierarchy,
and arbitrary authority wherever it may be present. These sorts of dominion have been
258
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readily challenged in the realms of state power, the concentration of wealth, the spiritual
authority of the Church, and patriarchy while it has been little explored in the “struggle
over signs, symbols, representations, and meaning in…everyday life.”259
Postfoundational anarchism seeks to fill such a gap in anarchist anti-authoritarianism.260
In order to do so these contemporary anarchists appropriate postfoundationalist
discourses to better apply such anti-authoritarian critiques to the realms of ontology and
epistemology. Such a broadening of how we think about domination, hierarchy, or
authority in the postfoundationalist context is crucial to understanding these
contemporary currents of anarchist theory and their precursors in anti-metaphysical
nineteenth century thought.
Here, I will address Stirner’s rejection of the ostensibly emancipatory value of
language, essentialism, and rationality while noting his views on self-legislation and
autonomy. I will also focus on Nietzsche’s challenge to the authority of Reason in his
analysis of the creative forces of the Dionysian, his rejection of transcendental moral
absolutes, and his perspectivism. I will interrogate both Stirner’s and Nietzsche’s role in
conceptualizing the beginnings of a postfoundational anarchism as well as their role in
259
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sustaining and continuing the anti-intellectualist strain of anarchist thought. This will be,
in part, an engagement with issues in the anti-intellectualism of these two thinkers and a
reflection on their connection to the anarchist tradition (especially concerning the
“anarchist turn” of late).261 While anti-intellectualism of this kind is not unique to Stirner
and Nietzsche,262 they did serve as a clear bridge to contemporary anarchist antimetaphysical and, I argue, anti-intellectualist thought.
Anti-Intellectualism
By embracing these political features of seemingly apolitical onto-epistemological
frameworks of understanding we consider an understanding of anti-intellectualism as an
anti-authoritarianism that is key to the evolution of postfoundationalist anarchist thought.
My aim is to frame an understanding of contemporary postfoundationalist anarchist antiintellectualism as grounded in these two thinkers and I hope to make evident the
connection between this kind of anti-authoritarianism and the anarchist tradition.
As mentioned above, many consider the postfoundationalist tradition as the first
sincere attempt to elude the hold of Reason on philosophy and what prominent social
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theorists have considered the “rationalization” of society. Reflections on the “iron cage”
of modernity, the nihilism fueled by all-consuming rationalistic culture, the
“disenchantment” of the Western world and the rise of instrumental rationality all
contributed to a steady critique of the dangers of modern industrial and technological
society. The move towards mastering “all things by calculation”263 impelled social critics
of all stripes to condemn the de-humanizing and dangerous tendencies of Fordist
industrialism, politico-administrative instrumentalism, and the tragic expressions of
rationality in twentieth century totalitarianism. This critique culminates in the Critical
Theory of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno that lambasted the liberating veneer of
the Enlightenment ethos – namely, the idea that harnessing the power of reason to master
both nature and ourselves led inevitably to freedom from the intellectual shackles secured
by myths of all kinds (religious, political, cultural, etc.).264
However, these understandings of reason and rationality are distinct from those
present in so-called classical anarchists like Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin
(and the anarchist tradition generally). While the former seems to center on an endeavor
to command and control – an effort to instrumentally exploit the faculty of reason for the
sake of an imagined progress, order, and efficiency – the latter seems strictly a
satisfaction of the perennial philosophical and psychological need for certainty and even
enjoyment in endeavoring towards an ideal that promised liberty and equality.
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This difference is crucial to understanding why the classical anarchist tradition
(itself derivative of Enlightenment ideals) does not laud the “rationalization” of society–
that is, the instrumental logic that pervades social relations and administration and is
usually accompanied by a callous disregard for the originally emancipatory quality of
Enlightenment ideals - and the disjunction between anarchist and postfoundational
anarchist thought. While critics like Weber, Adorno, and Habermas lambasted the
rationalization of society, postfoundational anarchist critics attempt to escape the
conceptual clutches of both rationalization and the ostensibly limiting discourse of the
Enlightenment tradition while staying true to the intellectual spirit of classical anarchist
anti-authoritarianism.
In other words, we should recognize a difference between this rationalization
being dangerous because it moves away from Enlightenment ideals and those very same
Enlightenment ideals being dangerous. According to Weber,265 Horkheimer and
Adorno,266 and Habermas,267 Enlightenment ideals are perverted by this rationalization
while postfoundationalist critics recognize danger in these very ideals. It is the
conception of Reason (the capital R denoting reason understood both as a faculty and an
265
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ideal) that accords with the latter which sustains much of the classical anarchist tradition
as well as informs the kind of intellectualism to which Stirner, Nietzsche, and their
postfoundationalist interlocutors react.
It is the latter conception that I argue is understood as a dominating force that
serves as the critical object of anti-intellectualism and which sustains the critical ground
of a politicized sense of onto-epistemological domination. Postfoundational anarchists
seek to fulfill the promise of anarchism by applying anarchist anti-authoritarianism to
ontology and epistemology. This is an attack on not only the “rationalization” already
identified by Weber and others but also the support, albeit qualified, for Enlightenment
ideals evidenced in the so-called classical anarchist tradition (or at least present in some
of its figureheads: Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, et al.). While these
figureheads all had complex and occasionally contradictory approaches to intellectualism,
Bakunin and Kropotkin were most outspoken on the issue. Bakunin was a thorough antiintellectualist and critic of what he called “metaphysics” and “scientism”268 while
Kropotkin accepted human nature as varied while committed to scientific free inquiry.269
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Godwin, on the other hand was, occasionally, an unapologetic rationalist,270 while
Proudhon was a qualified essentialist and rationalist.271 Despite the variety in thought on
the issue of Enlightenment ideals they all, in one form or another, embraced the
intellectual spirit it fostered and endorsed the purportedly liberating effects of its
zeitgeist. Nietzsche and Stirner on the other hand vociferously opposed Enlightenment
ideals themselves and their purportedly liberating effects. It is the latter opposition that I
think more directly addresses the anti-intellectualistic aspirations of postfoundational
anarchy.
Anti-Intellectualism and Postfoundationalism
As already discussed, postfoundationalist anarchism is premised on recognizing
the inherent authoritarianism in giving primacy to Reason and auxiliary concepts like
human nature, “essentialisms” of all kinds, and binaries in the classical anarchist tradition
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that may restrict meaning, understanding, and anarchist practice. The postfoundationalist
anarchist recognition of authoritarianism in ontology and epistemology, especially the
primacy given to Reason as an emancipatory tool and ideal in the anarchist tradition,
echoes nineteenth century critiques of modernity. From Romanticism’s attack on order
and rationalism to American Transcendentalism’s admonishment of intellectualism and
empiricism, there has been no lack of criticism of the rationalistic, instrumentalist, and
nihilistic tendencies of modernity. However, recent critiques of the Enlightenment and
its discontents stress the incompatibility between freedom and the stifling effects of
rationalistic discourse.
More recently, we have seen the debate over the authority of essentialist and
universal accounts of ontological and epistemological categories that accompany such
rationalism intensify in many philosophical traditions. American pragmatism and Latin
American philosophy of liberation have both sought to counter supposedly Euro-centric
tendencies272 in epistemology and ontology while others admit to the arbitrary nature of
scientific principles and the mutually supportive naturalism that sustains it.273 This selfreferential nature exposes the lack of any undergirding philosophical foundation and
reflects the concerns of postfoundationalist thought of the Continental tradition which has
consistently challenged the essentialism and universalism of persistent philosophical
dualisms (e.g., mind/body, true/false, good/evil) and rejected the underlying humanist
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philosophical presuppositions (e.g., essentialist view of human nature, belief in progress)
which underlie, in their view, its veneer of pluralism, a supposedly liberating humanism,
and a seemingly baseless meliorism.
Post-analytic philosophy has likewise stressed the unviability of traditional
philosophical themes centered on these univocal concerns in ontology and epistemology
and stressed the role of meaning, language, ethical direction and the practical pursuits of
philosophical reflection274 while some recent philosophers of science have questioned the
validity of claims to scientific knowledge given the supposedly authoritarian or fallacious
tendencies of scientific discourse.275 Most contemporary musings on these challenges to
rationalism first highlighted in the nineteenth century echo the common concerns of
postfoundational thinking and harken back to the anti-foundationalist, anti-authoritarian
and anti-intellectual thought of Stirner and Nietzsche.
Despite the long tradition of counter-Enlightenment thought, teasing out what is
authoritarian or limiting about the privileging of Reason, or the primacy of ancillary
notions like a well-defined human nature, can be difficult. The reasons for this difficulty
are twofold. On the one hand, many prominent anti-authoritarian thinkers are accused of
employing the ideal and privileging the faculty that is said to be authoritarian, namely,
274
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Reason.276 On the other hand, detecting the authoritarianism inherent in exercises of what
one noted classical anarchist called private judgment could seem nonsensical,
counterproductive and ineffable.277 After all, how else are we to combat the arbitrary
authority of certain social and political institutions if not through our own reasoned and
unimpeded judgment?
Nevertheless, we can diagnose unease with the authority of Reason by
questioning the “intellectualism” inherent in modern thinking. We could acknowledge
our tendency to claim our conclusions
…are the only logical ones, that they are necessities of universal reason, they
being all the while, at bottom, accidents more or less of personal vision which had
far better be avowed a such; for one man’s vision may be much more valuable
than another’s, and our visions are usually not only our most interesting but our
most respectable contributions to the world in which we play our part.278
Here, American pragmatist William James echoed Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”
yet recognized the necessity of a “stable scheme of concepts, stably related to each other”
which “lay hold of our experiences” and “co-ordinate them withal.” However,
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…all these abstract concepts are but as flowers gathered, they are only
moments dipped out from the stream of mine, snap-shots taken, as by a
kinetoscopic camera, at a life that in its original coming is continuous.
Useful as they are as samples of the garden, or to re-enter the stream with,
or to insert in our revolving lantern, they have no value but these practical
values. You cannot explain by them what makes any single phenomenon
be or go – you merely dot out the path of appearances which it traverses.
For you cannot make continuous being out of discontinuities. The stages
into which you analyze a change are states, the change itself goes on
between them. It lies along their intervals, inhabits what your definition
fails to gather up, and thus eludes conceptual explanation altogether.”279
The ambition to map out the world (conceiving of it wholly and deciphering conceptual
distinctions within it) is what James means by intellectualism. Indeed, this kind of
“Thought deals thus solely with surfaces. It can name the thickness of reality, but it
cannot fathom it, and its insufficiency here is essential and permanent, not temporary.”280
The authority of Reason and auxiliary notions is intimately related to our ambition
to conceive of our world in its totality. Such folly, according to thinkers like Stirner,
Nietzsche, and James, is responsible for our hubristic pursuit of celebrated ideals like
liberty and equality. While such ideals may spark efforts at social progress and political
emancipation (themselves equally idealized pursuits) and, often, secure concrete
279
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advances in combatting the domination of some over others, they often impede our
efforts at thinking freely. Such efforts seem to rely on a limiting understanding of
freedom that privileges intellectualist frameworks.
Martin Heidegger interprets this concern as a concern over thinking itself. While
anarchism traditionally aims at dismantling sites of hierarchy and arbitrary authority
without replacing them with new structures of domination, Heidegger also notes thinking
itself does not aim at structuring new frameworks of understanding nor does it serve
practical aims. By posing the question “what is called thinking?” Heidegger exposes what
thinking is not. He notes, “1) Thinking does not bring knowledge as do the sciences. 2)
Thinking does not produce usable practical wisdom. 3) Thinking solves no cosmic
riddles. 4) Thinking does not endow us directly with the power to act.”281
Leslie Paul Thiele reckons, what then is left for thinking?282 The answer to the
question lies in not answering at all and instead challenging our most fundamental
assumptions. We should, in the vein of Stirner and Nietzsche, seek to challenge the
symptoms of the intellectualism James identified.
Key to challenging the authority of Reason as an ideal and a faculty is to
understand a glorifying of Reason as a symptom of this intellectualism. I will not be
conflating Reason and intellectualism but rather seeing a lauding of Reason (as both a
means to emancipation and the result of emancipation in the anarchist sense) as
281
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undeniably “intellectual” in the Jamesian sense and worthy of anarchist anti-authoritarian
critique in the postfoundationalist vein.
As mentioned above, despite countless attempts to challenge the hegemony of
“intellectualism,” there are two critiques that inspire the postanarchist tradition in explicit
and obvious ways. Interlocutors of Nietzsche and Stirner have emphasized their
contribution to postfoundationalist, anti-authoritarian and pluralistic ways of knowing
and being that highlight both the supposed incoherence and the futility of an overreliance
on Reason and auxiliary notions.283 While Nietzsche challenged the reliance on the
Apollonian (i.e., the orderly, rational, and disciplined aspects of human thought and
action), rejected transcendental moral absolutes, and emphasized interpretation and
perspective in all questions of knowing, Stirner highlighted the arbitrariness of “fixed
ideas,” the limits of language in expressing ideas and inspiring action, and the stifling
nature of conceptual frameworks of understanding. I argue that both Stirner and
Nietzsche serve as linchpins and transitional figures in unpacking both what is antiintellectual about anarchism and what is anarchistic about anti-intellectualism and how
related understandings of anti-authoritarianism inform a politicized sense of ontoepistemological domination.
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Max Stirner, Anti-Authoritarianism and Anti-Intellectualism
Max Stirner is best known as one of Karl Marx’s “idealist” intellectual nemeses in
The German Ideology.284 He is also considered a prominent critic of the left-Hegelianism
of his time and an inspiration for the individualist or egoist anarchist tradition.285 In the
introduction to the Cambridge edition of Stirner’s The Ego and its Own, David Leopold
notes that “Since individual autonomy is incompatible with, and more important than, a
general duty to obey the law, Stirner rejects absolutely the legitimacy of political
obligation.”286 This view has of course secured Stirner as an important figure in the
history of anarchist thought. However, Stirner’s contribution to the anarchist tradition
goes beyond a simple rejection of any raison d’état. Stirner interrogates the foundational
onto-epistemological assumptions on which even the minimalist state seeks to pin its
legitimacy. Moreover, Stirner goes beyond the state to interrogate the legitimating or
foundational assumptions that govern any raison d’être.
For Stirner, overcoming these foundational assumptions begins with challenging
understandings of selfhood, individuality, and autonomy. While the Enlightenment
tradition gave us a robust account of social and political obligation tied to strong
conceptions of human nature and its relation to the state, Stirner seeks to undo the
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Enlightenment-inspired anthropocentric fabric of social contract theory while preserving
the boundless pluralism only recognized through a thorough embrace of absolute
individuality and autonomy. By rejecting the full spectrum of what he sees as religious
thinking, as a way to embrace what contemporary postfoundationalist thinkers would call
a de-totalized philosophical outlook, he embarks on a thorough critique of the history of
philosophy.
He began this endeavor by appraising
…each of the dissident movements of the time – liberal humanism, philosophical
realism, and the philosophy of pure criticism – and had found each of them
infected by an ultimate compromise…at the last moment they had admitted to the
presence of some transcendent object in the scheme of things – not indeed a ‘God’
in the sense of a personal deity, but a ‘Humanity’ or a ‘Society’ or a ‘Morality’,
all of which were as fictitious, and as autocratic in their claims upon the
individual concrete human being, as any personal God had ever been; and thus the
project of atheism still had to be carried out to its conclusion.”287
This theme of “total atheism” – that is, the complete rejection of any absolute authority,
meaning or purpose, runs through Stirner’s work. R.W.K. Paterson notes,
What the total atheist denies (and by this stage he has become identical with the
nihilist) is that our experience has any ultimate moral or metaphysical meaning.
The factual regularities discovered by the scientist are ultimately inexplicable, if
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metaphysical explanation requires reference to a Summum Bonum purposively
directing the world of brute facts; in the absence of such a directive principle, the
scientific order is seen to be a metaphysical chaos. If the idea of ‘God’ is the idea
of a unifying principle which transforms our centrifugal experiences into a
coherent and significant whole, then the atheist’s denial of God is a denial of the
possibility of any such ideal unity.288
“Ideal unities” are akin to “essences” and can just as easily exist in the realms of the
social, political, personal, or intellectual. “Belief in ‘God’, declares Stirner, is always the
belief in a ‘highest essence’, whether this is supposed to be realized in the theistic God, in
the spirit of Humanity, in the ideal of Love, or in the ideals of social unity and justice.”289
Indeed,
It makes no difference whatsoever to him [Stirner] whether the One God or the
Triune God, the Lutheran God or the Etre Suprême, or even no God at all, but
only ‘Mankind’, is held to represent the highest essence; for in his eyes these
servants of a highest essence are all religious men, the ranting atheist no less than
the most devout Christian.’ Nor does it make any difference to him, Stirner would
add, whether the democratic State or the socialist society, personal relationships
or abstract justice, Love, Freedom, or Duty, is held to represent the highest
essence; for if these ideals are put forward as ‘sacred’ ideals transcending, in their
infinite perfection, the finite and fallible individuals whose ‘worship’ they claim,
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then they are religious ideals, and the fanatical democrat and socialist, the
fanatical lover, libertarian, and moralist, are all equally religious men.290
Stirner emphatically rejects any “totalizing” or overarching conceptions concerning just
about everything. He “sharply reminds critics” that
…the only human reality is the reality of the specific, concrete individual, in all
his immediacy, and that the individual is gross body as well as pure thought, a
‘whole fellow,’ with intellectual interests undoubtedly, but also with sensuous,
emotional, financial and many other interests, all of them equally valid for
pursuit, and all of them interests, unintelligible without their reference to a living,
acting self who is conscious of them as interests for him.291
Difficulty arises because Stirner would like to overcome all these “fixed ideas,”
and particularly those concerning our conceptions of ourselves. In order to do this he
must reject the guiding ideas that both underlie our understandings of ourselves as well as
the conceptual frame that structures the power, privilege, and authority he seeks to
undermine. These notions are often understood in opposition to each other. We can find
it difficult to have an idea of freedom without some conception of a lack thereof. In a
clear precursor to Derridean deconstruction, Stirner struggles with the question of
overcoming a stifling existence structured by oppositions.292
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Indeed, as Leopold notes in commenting on Stirner’s magnum opus,
…Stirner ‘will hear nothing of this cutting in two’ (p.32) and insists that
alienation can only be overcome by rejecting the human essence of the ‘liberals’
as the enemy of selfhood rather than its true content and aspiration – as the
striking epigraph to the Second Part has it, ‘Man’, as well as God, must die. In its
place Stirner seeks to rehabilitate the prosaic and mortal self, the ‘in-man
[Unmensch]’ for whom the notion of a ‘calling’ is alien, the ‘man who does not
correspond to the concept man’ (p. 159). For Stirner, because there are no
universal or prescriptive elements in human nature, the concept cannot ground
any claim about how we ought to live…Rather, we need to learn, as Stirner’s
Nietzschean injunction has it, to give up our ‘foolish mania to be something else’
(p. 149) and become what we are.293
Stirner is clear in his distaste for the arbitrary limitations of language and
essentialisms of all kinds. His aversion to classical liberalism emanates from the same
place as his critique of systemic thinking generally. On the one hand he rejects
liberalism’s foundational philosophical anthropology and on the other deconstructs its
edifying “truths.” Stirner notes that,
Liberalism simply brought other concepts on the carpet; human instead of divine,
political instead of ecclesiastical, ‘scientific’ instead of doctrinal, or, more
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generally, real concepts and eternal laws instead of ‘crude dogmas’ and
precepts.294
These human, political, scientific “real concepts” and “eternal laws” aim at a certain kind
of domination for Stirner. Stirner warned that “[Liberalism’s] aim is a ‘rational order’, a
‘moral behaviour’, a ‘limited freedom’, not anarchy, lawlessness, selfhood. But if reason
rule [sic], then the person succumbs.”295
Stirner is referring to how we succumb to a certain intellectual domination that
dresses itself in the liberating veneer of liberalism and humanism. Stirner refers to the
shackling effect of the flowery discourse of “man” and “truth.” According to Stirner, the
Enlightenment inspired liberalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries privileges
essentialist ideas of humanity and truth which serve to further univocal claims about
ostensibly universal values like progress and justice. He warns, “He who is infatuated
with man leaves persons out of account so far as that infatuation extends, and floats in an
ideal, sacred interest. Man, you see, is not a person, but an ideal, a spook.”296
These “spooks” serve as the ghastly foundation to what Stirner sees as an
inherently oppressive intellectual world. To structure the heights of informed opinion on
such a precarious and artificial base represents for Stirner a colossal danger to our
freedom. The divide we pretentiously further between the sphere of the intellect and
everything else (the material world, including our bodies) sinks us ever deeper into our
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dominion and further exacerbates the ludicrous ideals on which we construct our material
and social worlds.
Stirner’s insight, though anticipating Marx’s famed critique of liberal ideology,
goes beyond Marx’s injunction against ideology’s justificatory function in the
exploitation and alienation inherent in capitalism. While Marx replaces liberal ideas of
human nature and natural rights with ideas of “species being” and historical materialism,
Stirner rejects these ideational foundations of social life altogether. Stirner and others in
the postfoundationalist tradition see these ideational foundations themselves as
oppressive rather than emancipatory. While Marx ironically accused Stirner of being just
another idealist in the Hegelian vein,297 Stirner could not have been clearer in his distaste
for the primacy of ideas.
The reasoning behind his view is neatly framed in The Ego and its Own. Stirner
notes,
Men are sometimes divided into two classes: cultured and uncultured. The
former, so far as they were worthy of their name, occupied themselves with
thoughts, with mind, and (because in the time since Christ, of which the very
principle is thought, they were the ruling ones) demanded a servile respect for
thoughts recognized by them. State, emperor, church, God, morality, order, are
such thoughts or spirits, that exist only for the mind. A merely living being, an
animal, cares as little for them as a child. But the uncultured are really nothing but
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children, and he who attends only to the necessities of his life is indifferent to
those spirits; but, because he is also weak before them, he succumbs to their
power, and is ruled by – thoughts. This is the meaning of hierarchy…Hierarchy is
dominion of thoughts, dominion of mind!298
By internalizing these ideational foundations we not only serve the interests that seek to
dominate us but also equally dominate ourselves.
This idea is similar to what Ludwig Feuerbach understood as the nature of
modern thought that simply projected the qualities of God onto our atheistic humanism
and thus shackled us to an anthropocentric foundationalism. According to Feuerbach,
theology has been thoroughly “rationalized.” The idea of God in modern philosophy
reflects the preoccupation with reason and not with any spiritual attributes of the
creator.299 The necessity of God is itself a manifestation of God’s rationality and
intelligence.300 Indeed, “It is, thus, an innate characteristic of God’s own essence that he
is a object of no being other than man…But, if God is only an object of man, what is
revealed to us in his essence? Nothing but the essence of man.”301
Likewise, arguing against the intellectualism inherent in this anthropocentrism
Feuerbach emphasized the role of emotions in thinking. He held that an ideal like Reason
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is lauded only because it is privileged in the lives of those theorizing about it.302 In other
words, “The philosophers who led lives in which reason was itself dominant over feelings
and actions simply projected the structure of their own lives onto the world.”303
Moreover, like Stirner and Nietzsche, Feuerbach highlighted the importance of
the sensuous. He noted, “Truth, reality, and sensation are identical. Only a sensuous
being is a true and real being.”304 He continued, “The unity of thought and being has
meaning and truth only when man is comprehended as the ground and subject of this
unity.”305 According to Feuerbach, the sensuous should ground (in more ways than one)
our endeavor to be thinking beings. In an eloquent critique of the kind of intellectualism
James later interrogated, Feuerbach recommended we,
Desire not to be a philosopher, as distinct from a man; be nothing else than a
thinking man. Do not think as a thinker, that is, with a faculty torn from the
totality of the real human being and isolated for itself; think as a living and real
being, as one exposed to the vivifying and refreshing waves of the world’s
oceans. Think in existence, in the world as a member of it, not in a vacuum of
abstraction as a solitary monad, as an absolute monarch, as an indifferent,
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superworldly God; then you can be sure that your ideas are unities of being and
thought.306
However, Feuerbach remains within a nominalist framework – that is, within a mode of
thought that denies the existence of abstract objects but nevertheless recognizes their
pragmatic or cognitive value and “existence” as terms. Such a framework adequately
helps Feuerbach convey his appreciation for sensuous and natural existence and thereby
does not fully embrace the utter rejection of all idealized concepts, as does Stirner.
Common to all these thinkers who echo Stirner’s sentiments is an effort to deflate
the grandiose pretensions of intellectualistic discourse. While John Locke and other
Enlightenment thinkers sought to demystify the pretended sophistication and grandeur of
government and the Church, Stirner sought to naturalize our understanding of philosophy
as just another misguided mode of thought. According to Stirner, philosophy itself
served as a tool by which we inadvertently dominate ourselves.
Such a claim to self-domination would strike some as nonsensical. How can we
dominate ourselves? The key to understanding this is to unpack Stirner’s notion of
autonomy. Stirner does not conceive autonomy in Kantian terms, as rational human will.
That is, while Kantian morality entails a foundational law (the Categorical Imperative)
derived from our most prized faculty307, and where immorality is irrational, Stirner thinks
self-legislation is still comprised of two misguided concepts, namely the Self and
legislation.
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For Stirner, we should no more be governed by the will of another than by our
own rational self-legislation. This is especially the case when that self-legislation is
premised on idealized renderings of man and his potential imported from the sphere of
religion and God. Stirner notes, “The ghost has put on a body, God has become man, but
now man is himself the gruesome spook which he seeks to get behind, to exorcize, to
fathom, to bring to reality and to speech; man is – spirit.”308
This apparent self-legislation is an effect of the intellectual domination we endure
and a consequence of the humanism we embrace. Our rational will requires as much faith
and submission to religiosity as any belief in God. Indeed,
What Stirner sought to demonstrate is the ultimate identity of total atheism and
total egoism. If atheism is a theological denial, it is also an ethical and social
denial. If it is man’s escape from the clutches of an alien Deity, it is also the
individual’s escape from the alien authority of the State, society, and his fellow
men.309
The tragedy for Stirner is we succumb to this “self-legislation” willingly and
utterly convinced of our freedom in doing so. Not unlike Marx’s “false consciousness,”
Stirner seeks to highlight this tragic element of intellectualism while rejecting any
alternative or underlying emancipatory formula that Marx and other radical thinkers
would propose. In the process of constructing conceptual frameworks that ground our
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very ideas of freedom, we are depriving ourselves of an opportunity to even fathom or
experience freedom in any concrete sense.
Perhaps most importantly, the primary sin of humanism in this sense is the
positing of a “self” that strives for freedom to begin with. Stirner avoids using such
language of “selfhood,” opting instead for the “I.” Indeed, “The I is the foundation, but
because the I is what remains outside any abstraction and that which is constantly eludes
conceptualization, it is, at the same time, an anti-foundation.”310 The “I” is a sort of
“creative nothingness” that should elude surrender to any abstraction or illusion,
“including the illusion of an ideal, unified self.”311
The trajectory of Stirner’s interventions seeks to steer us away from the ethereal
and towards the importance of “life.” Stirner notes, “…the life turned away from things,
the spiritual life, no longer draws any nourishment from nature, but ‘lives only in
thoughts’, and therefore is no longer ‘life’, but – thinking.”312 He is certain of the
impoverishing quality of the vita contemplativa. Instead, he highlights the liberating
effects of the immediacy of a life intimate with and indistinguishable from nature. In
pointing to this “pre-intellectual” paradigm of being, Stirner harkens back to our
childhoods.
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Stirner notes,
For little children, just as for animals, nothing sacred exists, because, in order to
make room for this conception, one must already have progressed so far in
understanding that he can make distinctions like “good and bad”, “warranted and
unwarranted”; only at such a level of reflection or intelligence – the proper
standpoint of religion – can unnatural (that is, brought into existence by thinking)
reverence, “sacred dread”, step into the place of natural fear. To this sacred dread
belongs holding something outside oneself for mightier, greater, better warranted,
better; the attitude in which one acknowledges the might of something alien, not
merely feels it, then, but expressly acknowledges it, admits it, yields, surrenders,
lets himself be tied (devotion, humility, servility, submission).313
We see these sentiments mirrored in James’ appraisal of intellectualism when he notes,
…to the philosophic tradition which treats logos or discursive thought generally
as the sole avenue to truth, that to fall back on raw unverbalized life as more of a
revealer, and to think of concepts as the merely practical things…comes very
hard. It is putting off our proud maturity of mind and becoming again as foolish
little children in the eyes of reason.314
It is this self-imposed “surrender” that resigns us to a “life” of intellectualism and
imprisons us in a framework of the ideal. According to Stirner this traps us in an

313

Stirner, 67.

314

James, A Pluralistic Universe.

162

existence justified by argumentation, rational reflection, and a deluded sense of
existential certainty; it is the opposite of freedom in any real sense. Stirner, like
Nietzsche after him, sought to unravel the domination inherent in our intellects and free
us from the limitations imposed by morality, religion, truth, and other such “fixed ideas.”
Friedrich Nietzsche, Anti-Authoritarianism and Anti-Intellectualism
Nietzsche is best known as a relativist, nihilist, and aphoristic thinker who
prioritized life itself rather than the narrow academic philosophical concerns of his time.
He challenged Christianity and traditional morality and concerned himself with our
concrete this-worldly existence rather than the ethereal and otherworldly. By dismissing
the philosophical tendency to celebrate the utility, functions, or promise of knowledge to
rival our existence Nietzsche embodied the anti-intellectualism central to any consistent
anti-authoritarianism.315
Nietzsche best embodies this move towards anti-intellectualism and echoes
Stirner in noting, “life is not an argument.”316 Indeed, Nietzsche battled against the
engrained appeals to logic in the history of philosophy. He does so not in an effort to
dismiss logic’s utility or force but rather admonishes those who pretend that an appeal to
logic and the enabling faculty of reason are pathways to a discernment of reality. For
Nietzsche, matters of logic apply only to fictitious entities we have created. This makes it
easier to render the world “formutable [sic] and calculable” to us. In this sense, logic, like
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reason, is instrumental and geared towards utility. For Nietzsche, “logic” is a symptom of
an idealized and artificial notion of reason itself.317
This idealized faculty does not exist independently of the schema it conjures, or
more importantly, those who conjure it. Nietzsche does not attribute an independent
existence to reason, only a relative or relational one. That is to say, Nietzsche holds that
reason is not an ideal existing independently of those who fabricate it. Reason is itself a
product of our primal urges, needs, passions, and desires and is adapted, applied, and
morphed according to context. Nietzsche notes there is a “misunderstanding of passion
and reason, as if the latter were an independent entity and not rather a relationship
between different passions and desires; and as if every passion did not have in it its
quantum of reason.”318 According to noted Nietzsche scholar R.J. Hollingdale, “Such a
view of the nature of thought conflicts with any idea involving its objective validity: it
abolishes the ‘faculty’ of thought altogether, and thus calls in question the objective
validity of the ‘science of reasoning’, logic.”319
For Nietzsche, fixation with logic and the faculty of reason is reflective of a
narrow understanding of the limits of our cognition. In The Will to Power Nietzsche
criticizes Aristotle’s law of contradiction by divorcing logic from truth. He notes, “We
are unable to affirm or deny one and the same thing: this is a subjective empirical law, it
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is not the expression of any ‘necessity’ but only of an inability.”320 Interestingly enough,
this insight anticipates recent findings in quantum physics and the social scientific import
of such discoveries. While advances in quantum science have enabled us to, indeed,
“affirm and deny one and the same thing” (as is the case with discovering the location(s)
of electrons), such indeterminacy is said to have some impact on our comprehension of
the social world.321
Such a fixation is also reflective of an underlying psychological weakness. We
seek to tame reality to fit our own comforting illusions because “familiarizing something
unfamiliar is comforting, reassuring, satisfying, and produces a feeling of power as
well.”322 So, Reason is not a reflection of our strength as thinking beings or cunning
animals but rather betrays our ultimate weakness as a species. We employ Reason to
make our lives easier not because we are strong enough to decipher reality and adapt it to
our needs but rather because we are too cowardly to recognize our need to decipher
reality is already a symptom of our psychological weakness.
In this line of thought, Nietzsche also anticipates constructivist renderings of
reality by arguing for a metaphysical world of our making.323 Indeed, thinking itself is
possible only if we “assume being: logic handles only formulas for what remains the
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same” but this assumption “is part of our perspective.” Because “the world is in a state of
becoming” and “knowledge and becoming exclude one another,” “‘knowledge’ must be
something other than knowledge: ‘there must first be a will to make knowable, a kind of
becoming must itself create the deception of beings.”324 That is to say, in order for to
have knowledge a fathomable and effable notion of knowledge itself must exist. This
notion itself, in turn, informs the content of knowledge.
In other words, the production of knowledge involves constructing a framework
for understanding and having that framework inform the content of what is known. In
this way, employing cognitive tools already informed by our idea of knowledge produces
knowledge itself. Our framework for understanding is already our idea of knowledge. In
creating the “illusion of beings” we will the production of knowledge and a desire for it.
Here, knowledge is an effort to order our constructed forms of understanding to suit
understanding of other constructed “things.” In this sense, “knowledge” is not “to know”
but to “schematize.”325 Such systematization should always be scrutinized. Nietzsche
notes, “I distrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of
integrity.”326
Correspondence to some concrete reality or coherence between concepts or, as
Stirner would call them, “fixed ideas” does not undergird Nietzsche’s theory of truth.
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Knowledge entails little about truth and truth little about knowledge. In writing on the
“origin of knowledge,” Nietzsche notes,
Through immense periods of time, the intellect produced nothing but errors; some
of them turned out to be useful and species-preserving; those who hit upon or
inherited them fought their fight for themselves and their progeny with greater
luck. Such erroneous articles of faith, which were passed on by inheritance further
and further, and finally almost became part of the basic endowment of the species,
are for example: that there are enduring things; that there are identical things; that
there are things, kinds of material, bodies; that a thing is what it appears to be;
that our will is free; that what is good for me is also good in and for itself. Only
very late did the deniers and doubters of such propositions emerge; only very late
did truth emerge as the weakest form of knowledge.
Nietzsche continues, “Thus the strength of knowledge lies not in its degree of truth, but
in its age, its embeddedness, its character as a condition of life.”327 The life serving
functions of knowledge have elevated its pursuit to rival existence itself. Here is where
Nietzsche finds both fault with the idea of knowledge and its utility. Knowledge became
crucial to survival; it complemented our cleverness in its ability to aid our thriving. It also
reflected our weakness as psychologically stunted creatures that needed the reassurance
of permanence over flux. In any case, knowledge is artificially imposed on and distinct
from the life it helps preserve and the urges, desires, and passions it seeks to map, delimit
and order.
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Logic has even less of a relation to either truth or knowledge. Nietzsche
questions,
What is the origin of logic in man’s head? Surely it arose out of the illogical, the
realm of which must originally have been immense. But innumerable beings drew
inferences in a way different from that in which we do now perish; nonetheless,
they might have been closer to the truth!328
“Truth” in these scenarios is incidental. We do not arrive at it in any systematic way nor
even know much about when and how we approximate it. There is both a certain
impenetrability of reality and limits to our cognitive ability to fathom such penetration.
The best that can be hoped for is the practical benefit of knowledge acquisition and an
understanding that knowledge itself is artificial.
Nietzsche’s point is to stress the occasional utility of notions like truth and the
employment of logic without attributing metaphysical veracity to their claims. After all,
Nietzsche notes,
We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we are able to live – by positing
bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content;
without these articles of faith no one could endure living! But that does not prove
them. Life is not an argument; the conditions of life might include error.329
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Nietzsche questioned the idea that we could ever reach an objective truth. He saw
objective truth as a symptom of the evolution of philosophy. He saw it as a contingency
of certain modes of thinking and instead embraced perspectivism as an appropriate mode
of “knowing” and dismissed the “knowledge” of knowledge as nonsensical. He
considered philosophers guilty of “concept idolatry”330 and in Twilight of the Idols refers
to Kant as a “concept cripple.”331
Nietzsche reacted to what he saw as the reverence for “rational truth” and the
“virtue and happiness” associated with it in the Platonic tradition. The ultimate result of
this, according to Bruce Detwiler, is “our modern passion for objective truth, with its
underlying assumption that scientific knowledge is not only valuable but more valuable
than anything else.”332 This view is misguided according to Nietzsche. In section 374 of
The Gay Science Nietzsche notes that “we cannot look around our own corner,” and “we
cannot reject the possibility that [the world] may include infinite perspectives.” Indeed,
“the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives, and only in these,”
we cannot know “how far the perspective character of existence extends or indeed
whether existence has any character other than this.”333
We can therefore not fathom the extent of our knowledge of “facts.” We are
inextricably tied to our perspective knowing. Our understanding is always incomplete and
330

Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings, 167.

331

Ibid, 191.

332

Bruce Detwiler, Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1990), 74.
333

Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 239.

169

partial. Moreover, Nietzsche claims we endeavor only to further certain perspectives
against competing internal drives and external adversaries. “Facts” of the matter actually
matter little. Nietzsche argues, “Facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations.”
Indeed, “It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against.
Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to
compel all other drives to accept as a norm.”334
Hence, we have Nietzsche’s preference for “Nature” over “Life.” By Nature,
Nietzsche means our ephemeral passions and instincts grounded in unmediated existence.
By Life Nietzsche means the derivative faculties of clever animals like us that shape,
organize, reify, and master Nature for our own invented ends. Indeed, “Whereas Nature is
boundless, indifferent and amoral, Life remains bounded by a horizon of anthropocentric
preferences and values.”335
Nietzsche’s view of Nature is value-free. As Daniel W. Conway notes, Nietzsche
“…endows the Nature to which he ‘returns’ with no positive content or
character…Nature is simply whatever remains when all super-natural principles of
interpretation have been subtracted from our understanding of the world.”336 The absence
of supernatural principles of interpretation or constructed frameworks of understanding
attracts Nietzsche to the demystified and this-worldly concreteness of natural existence
(as opposed to idealized Life).
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We can see a parallel between Nietzsche’s contempt for God (and its secular
stand-in Reason) and his disdain for Life and its ethical and metaphysical foundations.
Both attempt to fill a void caused by our psychological weakness. For example
Nietzsche considers our attempts at social justice as nothing more than an expression of a
secular and moral stand-in for the almighty. Indeed, explains Detwiler,
Because most of us cling to moral assumptions and their political corollaries,
which depend for their validity upon a God we have largely repudiated, Nietzsche
characterizes modernity as an age of ‘incomplete nihilism.’ In spite of the death of
God a secular gospel of brotherly love and egalitarianism still flourishes…337
There seems to still be a need for some kind of transcendent grounding because most
“people resist total nihilism not simply because they are obtuse but because they are
psychologically incapable of coming to terms with it.”338
The competing drives that animate our nihilistic existence exercise authority over
each other by force and not by any reasoned consideration of utility, expediency, or
verity. Though Nietzsche seems to embrace the naturalness of these competing drives he
couches this embrace in a thorough rejection of the edifying frameworks of
understanding that seek to justify or judge their authority or existence.
In declaring that God is dead, Nietzsche refers to “the new realization that there is
no objective order, meaning, or ethical significance inherent in existence. Rather, man
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himself has always been creator of his own meanings, usually without realizing it.”339
While accepting such a circumstance, Nietzsche affords this reality an ironic absence of
certainty or authoritative account, instead relying on infinite “perspectives.”
We should consider Nietzsche as a thinker who destabilized the epistemological
and ontological landscape in ways that opened opportunities for upstarts, rebellions, and
outright revolutionary thought that interrogates its own presuppositions and hidden
sources of arbitrary authority and privilege. Nietzsche, Stirner, and their interlocutors
have helped highlight what is authoritarian about Reason (both as an ideal and as a
privileged faculty) and paved the way towards postfoundationalist anti-authoritarianism
of the intellect.
Anti-Authoritarianism, Anti-Intellectualism and “Non-Political” Domination
While there is little disagreement in thinking of Stirner and Nietzsche as
ontological and epistemological anti-authoritarians, there is resistance to thinking of them
as politically anti-authoritarian. This is with good reason. Their radicalism is often
interpreted as politically apathetic, an apology for the bourgeoisie or as an unabashed
elitism. While Marx lambasted Stirner for his idealism and for playing into the hands of
the bourgeoisie, Nietzsche has long been considered a reactionary and an inspiration for
Fascism.340 Likewise, many more “interpretations seem possible: between the racial
enthusiasms of national socialism, the still encountered dedication of those trying to live
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a la Demian, a ‘Nietzschean’ life, the bright individualism of most Anglo-American
interpretations, and the dark cosmic mysteries offered by Continental philosophers.”341
Appropriated by Nazi propagandists as an inspiration for the fiercely agonistic great
power politics of the first half of the 20th century and also interpreted as offering a
foundation for the cutthroat individualism of unfettered capitalism, both Stirner and
Nietzsche seem susceptible to the idea of our domination over each other.
However, I argue their thought can be channeled either politically or apolitically.
Or, as I note, their ideas can be exercised in political ways to challenge orthodoxies in
ostensibly non-political spheres and, moreover, serve as critical intellectual linchpins to
the postfoundationalist and anarchist traditions. Stirner and Nietzsche represent seminal
figures in the history of anti-intellectualism and frame the issues which later anarchist
and postanarchist scholars and activists tackled.
For Nietzsche, many of our conceptualizations (e.g., about human nature,
rationality, free will) seek to justify a certain “form of life” and legitimize that over which
“this form of life has sway.” Indeed, as Tracy Strong notes, conceptualizations are “thus a
manner of preserving a certain pattern of domination and of enforcing a legitimacy for a
certain set of horizons, without it ever appearing necessary to seek justification for that
enforcement.”342
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Such a characterization of Nietzsche echoes classical anarchist concerns about the
self-referential justificatory quality of the state. The argument is as follows: The state is
legitimate because it exists. The sovereign authority already imposed on those who think
otherwise than the state already ipso facto delegitimizes thinking otherwise than the state.
Granted, there are countless justificatory frameworks that legitimize governments (and
rebellion against it) but the horizon of legibility (to invoke James Scott) remains the state
form.343 In other words, even when resisting government the sovereignty of the state
remains and is unquestioned. Moreover, such resistance is usually couched in an appeal
to constitutionalism, liberty or equality vis-à-vis the state, rights discourse sanctified by
the state, or even the mythological origins of the state. Any resistance alien to this statecentric framework that does not already recognize the legitimacy of the state (though
could perhaps not recognize a specific government presiding over the state) is already,
usually, considered out of bounds. Moreover, the state itself is never asked to legitimate
its existence (though governments may be said to be justified by the consent of the
governed). The state simply is and any resistance to its oppression or domination is
usually framed legally, morally, or politically within a state-centric horizon of legibility.
In this sense, the horizon of political thought is necessarily limited to the
framework of sovereign state power. These conceptual schemes are always in reaction to
the state-centric framework of reference. No state will disappear for lack of “legitimacy”
unless a competing justificatory narrative (or force) replaces that legitimacy. States do
not simply step aside or dissolve in recognition of their own illegitimacy. Only changes
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in the “forms of life” themselves will invite new justificatory schemes. Anarchists note
that challenges to state authority tend to be considered ipso facto illegitimate unless
grounded in some other theory of popular or individual sovereignty vis-à-vis the state, in
the same way that Nietzsche diagnoses how it seems unnecessary to justify the legitimacy
of arbitrary horizons of the intellect.
Tracy Strong refers to this auto-legitimization when speaking on one such
limiting conceptualization, free will. He quotes Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil,
The doctrine of free will is a cunning method of preserving the credibility of the
ego-cogito. In fact, Nietzsche writes, ‘ “Freedom of the Will” – that is the
expression of a complex state of delight of the person exercising volition…. What
happens here is what happens in every well constructed and happy
commonwealth: namely, the governing class identifies itself with the success of
the commonwealth.’344
In other words, the “ego-cogito” – like the state – privileges its own existence via certain
unquestioned beliefs. In the former this belief is free will, in the latter it is the
preservation and success of the commonwealth.
Likewise, Nietzsche notes that master and slave morality operate in similar ways.
Slave morality is then inherently reactive and limiting in its moral and intellectual
horizons. It is a reaction to master morality (which entails the affirmation of the self and
the consequences of such affirmation as good and noble). While master morality entails
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the affirmation of the self, slave morality reactively defines “good” as the opposite.
Likewise, slave morality defines evil as the opposite of the good in master morality. The
“slave morality” prevalent in modern thinking depends on an intellectual horizon set by
others. It hinges on “master morality” and so lacks the creative character Nietzsche
admired. Nietzsche sought first to identify this “soil,” or the unquestioned ground set by
others, on which such values sprouted, and then to overcome their limiting horizons and
highlight the “creative character of thinking.”
It was Nietzsche’s aim to supersede what was considered the most rigorous
thought – philosophy. Of course, this rigor was grasping at straws according to
Nietzsche. It was a pretended rigor that had no chance of attuning itself to its ostensible
aims (e.g., truth, reality). It was an ostensible rigor that had no basis in any underlying
reality but rather was a reflection of our own psychological weakness and need for
certainty. According to Nietzsche, the project of “knowledge” seeking in philosophy is
Sisyphean. What was needed was not seeking but thinking. Jane Bennett and William
Connolly note,
Nietzsche…thought about the layered and creative character of thinking in a way
that pulls it past the mechanical determinism of reductionists, the
transcendentalism of two-world metaphysicians, and the teleological model
advanced by those who cannot fold nature into culture without investing it with a
final purpose. Thinking for Nietzsche involves a complex process of discord and
coordination between multiple theaters of activity. As he puts it, ‘the chamber of
consciousness is small,’ too small to perform the complex task of thinking by
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itself. ‘Conscious thinking, especially that of the philosopher, is the least vigorous
and therefore also the relatively mildest and calmest form of thinking; and thus
precisely philosophers are most apt to be led astray about the nature of
knowledge.345
Nietzsche held that philosophers are led astray because they artificially impose a
constructed relating of reality onto both our ideas of that reality and our intellectual
impetus for action within it. Jane Bennett and William Connolly aptly describe how this
process unfolds.
These linguistic equalizations enter into habits, organic functions, institutional
regimes and the experimental designs of science. Moreover, they become
corporeally encoded in patterns of perception and cultural vocabularies. But they
are never completely stabilized. The similarities-rendered-equal and the
differences-rendered-similar periodically manifest themselves as rebel forces
within habits, organic functions, etc. These differential energies and energetic
disturbances both enable creativity in thinking and help to propel interventions for
reform of the ‘laws.’ The point is that somatic/cultural relays play a major role in
the stabilization and destabilization of laws. So there is a side of us capable of
coming to terms, though only fugitively, with dimensions of the world that

345

Jane Bennett and William E. Connolly, “Contesting Nature/Culture: The Creative Character of
Thinking,” The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 24, Fall 2002), 158.

177

escape, exceed, resist and destabilize the best equalizations of nature we have
been able to devise and enforce.346
We seem to unwittingly react to this privileged accounting of reality and pivot our
intellectual musings on its constructed framework. The anti-intellectualism I see in
Stirner’s and Nietzsche’s thought seeks to expose such reaction and attempts to unhinge
our thought from its bounds. While Stirner and Nietzsche both fit into intellectual
categories (despite their earnest efforts to the contrary) that lend themselves to either
political and apolitical readings, I argue that their anti-authoritarianism of the intellect
serves as a bridge to the anti-intellectualist strain of postfoundationalist anarchist thought.
This postfoundationalist strain identifies the domination inherent in and compels us to
combat authoritative accounts of intellectuality, thought, and philosophy for non-political
ends. Their ends are for the sake of thinking freely.
Anti-Intellectualism, Post-Foundationalism and the Anarchist Project
Stirner and Nietzsche combat these forms of intellectual domination by pointing
to the totalizing effects of humanist and liberal discourse despite their anti-authoritarian
ethos. While Stirner and Nietzsche have no recourse but to express their thought with
language, ideas, concepts, etc. they consciously qualify and openly reject the sagacity of
their own thinking by admitting to its limitations and encouraging self-reflection and
independence of thought in their readers.347
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Their reevaluations of the history of philosophy lend themselves to anarchist
readings where anarchism purports to dismantle sites of arbitrary authority, power and
privilege. Stirner and Nietzsche identify sites of arbitrary authority, power and privilege
in epistemology and ontology while their anarchist interlocutors intend to dismantle the
political, economic, and cultural sites of domination structured by them. These sites of
intellectual domination stifle both free thought and genuinely creative endeavors
according to these two anti-foundationalist thinkers. Both thinkers are philosophers of
creation and on this point they also converge with the anarchist tradition.
Both thinkers offer an account of creative destruction (Nietzsche of metaphysics
and values, Stirner of all “fixed ideas”) that complements the Romantic impulse that
animates the postfoundationalist tradition. This tendency also reflects the “passion for
destruction” which animated Mikhail Bakunin and also informs the “creative passion” of
thinking freely.348 In the anarchist context, Saul Newman has referred to this general
outlook as turning anarchism on itself. Newman thought of this process of dismantling
sites of authority in the ontological and epistemological spheres as turning the political,
economic, and cultural values of so-called classical anarchism against the ontological and
epistemological pillars of anarchist thought.

idea of trailblazing and setting your own course. Nietzsche writes, “I now go away alone, my disciples!
You too go away and be alone! So I will have it. Truly, I advise you: go away from me and guard
yourselves against Zarathustra! And better still: be ashamed of him! Perhaps he has deceived you. The man
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badly if one remains only a pupil… Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have
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Stirner and Nietzsche were both concerned with domination though not in the
ways those on the political left usually envision such struggles. While the political left,
most notably anarchists, recognize the dangers of concentrated political, economic, and
cultural power, interlocutors of Stirner and Nietzsche in the postfoundationalist anarchist
tradition highlighted the dangers of totalizing conceptual schemes and arbitrary
intellectual consensus on key onto-epistemological issues. Stirner worried about the
dominion of everyday thought and how it insidiously imposed arbitrary limitations on our
thinking, expression, and action while Nietzsche worried about the trend towards
sheepishness and allowing ourselves to be dominated by psychological weakness in the
face of the grandiose intellectual ambitions of philosophy.
While Stirner, Nietzsche, and their interlocutors are also echoed in the AngloAmerican philosophical tradition with regards to the limits of philosophical thinking, they
seek to go a step further than highlight the practical worth of philosophy or its relation to
natural science.349 Moreover, they also seek to highlight the relevance of what are usually
understood as political problems (e.g., domination, authority) to issues in metaphysics
and epistemology.
Nietzsche, like Stirner, was wary of the democratic and socialist experiments of
his day as hopelessly usurping individual freedom and our spontaneous urge to create
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(and destroy according to Bakunin). Anarchists too are wary of such experiments and for
the same reasons. The logic of opposition to such schemes is the same. It is an
opposition to grandiose conceptual mappings (even if consensual) of both social and
intellectual life that respects the individuality of each and disavows us of our Promethean
aspirations and Procrustean tendencies.
Anarchists seek, much like these two thinkers, what can be understood as an
“aristocracy of all, where the liberty and autonomy of each is fully and equally
respected.”350 They seek this “aristocracy” in the context of a Heraclitean reality that
accepts the “essence of life is its continuously changing character; but our concepts are
all discontinuous and fixed, and the only mode of making them coincide with life is by
arbitrarily supposing positions of arrest therein.” Indeed it is
With such arrests our concepts may be made congruent. But these concepts are
not parts of reality, not real positions taken by it, but supposition rather, notes
taken by ourselves, and you can no more dip up the substance of reality with them
than you can dip up water with a net, however finely meshed.351
Stirner, Nietzsche and their interlocutors guard against the authoritarian dangers of such
“congruence” as well as the arbitrary and limiting force of these suppositions.
Reason and its supporting ontological notions like essentialism, human nature,
and foundationalism of all kinds are usually celebrated for their emancipatory value but
are derided by Stirner and Nietzsche as psychological weakness, totalizing domination,
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and an arbitrarily limiting intellectualism. Instead, Stirner and Nietzsche served as a
bridge to contemporary anarchist anti-metaphysical and, I argue, anti-intellectualist
thought by embracing the sensuous and emotive qualities of life as integral to thinking
and rejecting argumentation as the measure of truth or any other authoritative rendering
of reality. By recognizing that the intellectualism inherent in our celebration of Reason
exercises a peculiar logic only applicable to fictitious modes of being wholly divorced
from these sensuous and emotive qualities, Stirner and Nietzsche intended to debunk the
Enlightenment-inspired adulation of Reason and undermine the predictable
intellectualism that accompanies it.
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Conclusion
Towards Public Irony
Anarchism is more than a protest against government. It is quintessentially antiauthoritarian. It challenges authority and interrogates relations of domination inherent in
the inequalities and relations of domination in every realm of life. It follows that
anarchism also questions epistemological and ontological authority. Those with anarchist
inclinations tend to question any claim to knowledge, intellectual authority, or
metaphysical finality. Nevertheless, some contemporary anarchist scholarship has
stressed the notion that their classical anarchist predecessors largely ignored the dangers
of the authority of Reason, science, other “foundational” concepts, and the intellectualism
they engender.
To the contrary, I have argued a direct challenge to the authority of Reason,
science, “foundationalisms” of all sorts, and the intellectualism they usually engender
was already present in the so-called classical anarchists. In doing so, I not only revisited
the sometimes-caricatured readings of the these anarchists and considered
postfoundational traits they already possessed, but also critically consider the novel and
heterogeneous ways anarchists and others have tackled the notion and experience of
freedom.352 I discovered anarchists appeal to our private judgment in the face of
established academic institutional power, they question the notion of a Reason-driven
progress that was integral to the Enlightenment tradition, and they regularly challenge the
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conceptual hegemony of supposed bulwarks of our intellect (e.g., Reason, the scientific
method, univocal understandings of human nature).
In chapter one I briefly theorized employing Wittgenstein to imagine what
anarchist anti-intellectualism might look like. By using what I consider as actionoriented understandings of meaning in Wittgenstein’s notions of “knowing how to go on”
and “rule following” I explore how to broaden our notion of freedom in anarchist
philosophizing. In the rest of this work I interrogate freedom itself and its many
“heterotopic logics”353 as they relate to anarchist anti-intellectualism while surveying
some “paradigmatic” anarchist thinkers.
I continued the “turning” of anarchism “on itself” (as Saul Newman would say) in
a reflection on the “disintegration, of transition, of waning faith in the modern ideas of
Reason and Progress, and the Enlightenment project in general.”354 In reassessing the
ostensible “canon” of anarchist thought I interrogated the assumptions of the
postanarchist literature and connected anarchist anti-intellectualism to the anarchist
approach to liberation more generally. Anarchists sought not only social and political
freedom in their rejection of the legitimacy of the state, the hierarchy of the capitalist
firm, and the ecclesiastical authority of the church, but also to think freely. Central to
such an endeavor is a continual challenge to not only centers of political, economic, and
religious authority but also a challenge to academic institutions, the celebration of Reason
and science, and the foundational concepts that usually undergird them.
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A critique of the overconfidence in the persuasive power of reason is nothing
new. Many have railed against what James C. Scott called “Seeing Like a State” and
embraced his appeal to metis or the local and tacit knowledge born of and passed along
by experience in order to combat the increasingly “rationalized” knowledge prioritized by
the archenemies of anarchists, state systems.355 However, Anarchism is rarely considered
in concert with thinkers like Wittgenstein who challenge the underlying presuppositions
of meaning that sustain such critiques. The reason has much to do with the false
perception that anarchists, by and large, are faithful children of the Enlightenment. Even
more rarely are they considered with thinkers like Rorty or Feyerabend who explicitly
rejected anarchism as a viable political system. This work also navigated anarchist
philosophy with an eye towards the kind of incessant critique central to the anarchist
aspiration to be “without adjectives.”
An incessant critique of the foundational notions of the Enlightenment,
Modernity, and even Anarchism itself seems central to theorizing within an anarchist
framework. However, the drive to perpetually question seems impossible to arrest and
therefore impossible to transcend within the parameters established by modernity that
seems to encourage such questioning.356 The struggle to transcend such a line of critique
goes beyond what Rorty called “private irony,” or the incessant employment of new
vocabularies to better describe and improve our self-image or understanding, because it
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requires us to relate such irony to our relations with others and the political community to
which we belong.357
The process by which we make public our ironism through an anarchist
framework begins with understanding the contradictions of the process itself and how the
anarchist tradition has navigated it in the past. In the so-called classical anarchists we see
an indefatigable faith in the idea that Reason propels progress and that Reason should be
unimpeded in its exercise. Somewhat contradictorily, we also see that Reason (and
intellectual authority more generally) is sometimes viewed with suspicion and critically
appraised as the root of other modes of hierarchy and domination. In the anarchist
tradition, the ideal of Reason, the scientific method, and the auxiliary notions usually
used to sustain them are only celebrated because they are seen to contribute to freedom
within certain contexts and at certain times. However, the classical anarchists also think
these same ideas pose a potential hazard to freedom when unquestioningly embraced. For
anarchists, an uncritical acceptance of these ideals threatens to turn the ostensible search
for truth or freedom into just another idol or hierarchical enterprise.
This critique is not uniquely anarchist. The endeavor can be couched in the wider
reverberations of the Enlightenment. Moreover, there were innumerable debates among
schools of skeptics, subjectivists, deists, and later, romanticists and postfoundationalists
concerning our most esteemed faculty of reason and the potential authoritarianism bred of
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its idealization. In order not stymie to our quest for freedom, anarchists offer twin
concerns. They are wary of the arbitrary authority inherent in government,
concentrations of wealth, and the church (and religion generally) as well as the
questionable authority of Reason and other modes of intellectual authority. These
concerns should not sacrifice freedom in one realm for freedom in another. Means and
ends should be aligned. Similar to their critique of Marx’s “dictatorship of the
proletariat,” many anarchists highlight the importance of resisting the lure of absolute
authority in the realm of the intellect for the sake of some imagined liberation in other
domains. In other words, we should not sacrifice ourselves to the imagined authority of
mental abstractions for the sake of some progress in social and political matters. The socalled classical anarchist thinkers (especially Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, and
Kropotkin) can all be interpreted as having this sometimes-contradictory relationship
with the ideal of Reason and intellectualism. This seemingly incongruous positioning
leads to interesting contrasts and overlaps with postfoundationalist thought (and its
phenomenological and existential predecessors). It also highlights the line between
thought and action that anarchists are often negotiating.
Progress is not Synonymous with Freedom
In Godwin and Proudhon, there is a sense that progress, and therefore freedom, is
only possible through the exercise of our reason. Moreover, the ideal of Reason, which is
implicated in every scheme for societal improvement in these two thinkers, is often
celebrated as an authority independent of its exercise as a faculty. However, this
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celebration of our most prized faculty and the idealized constructs that are a consequence
of this celebration were not absolute.
Godwin and Proudhon, like Bakunin and Kropotkin after them, struggled between
notions of immanence and transcendence. While they celebrated seemingly transcendent
ideals (e.g., liberty, equality, and truth) they also navigated the ephemerality of life and
reflected this ephemerality in their anarchism (thus rejecting the stifling intellectualism
that is often a consequence of the unquestioned obedience to transcendent ideals).358
They recognized the values that should underwrite anarchist ideals but admitted these
values only existed as part of a contingent and transient reality.
Godwin’s general attitude towards the celebration of Reason and the
intellectualism that often follows evolved over time. His faith in the emancipatory
potential of Reason in Political Justice gave way to an appreciation of the limits of
Reason in his literary works. His novels demonstrate the dangers of “progressive
modernity” and largely reject the evident ratiocination of Political Justice (arguably, his
most famous work).359 Progressively, first in Caleb Williams and then in St. Leon and
Fleetwood, Godwin offered an exaltation of fellow feeling and our natural sympathies as
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well as a rejection of overarching schemes for societal improvement and our reliance of
reason for the achievement of justice.360
Likewise, Proudhon shared the excitement of the philosophes for the ideals of
progress, Reason, science, and truth. He goes so far as to say that no person’s will
subjugates the dictates of reason.361 Indeed, Proudhon saw reason as a vehicle for and a
prerequisite of liberation. Moreover, Proudhon was quite consistent in taking political
economy as the Archimedean point of all inquiry. In this way, he shared Marx’s
axiomatic materialist ontology. However, Proudhon also came to oppose an unadulterated
reverence of Reason and the unquestioned faith in the accompanying scientific
methodology that Enlightenment thinkers (and Marx) often praised.
Interestingly, despite many points of agreement Proudhon and Marx vociferously
disagreed over the notion of authority in the revolutionary process. It is in this area
where Proudhon’s views on intellectualism (and the celebration of Reason that sustains
it) became most pronounced. In one of Proudhon’s famous letters to Marx he exhorted
the revolutionary to not become the leader of the “new intolerance” of the “religion of
reason” and instead advocated we tackle a priori dogmatisms and other philosophical
assumptions with “eloquence and irony.”362 For Proudhon, this eloquence and irony
should inspire our interpretation of the constant interplay between abstract Reason and
360
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everyday experience. This interplay highlights Proudhon’s consideration of experience as
a process of becoming and contingency. In this way, he found life to resist fixed and
absolute schematization.
While Godwin and Proudhon privileged Reason they also acknowledged its
limitations and even its dangers. They grappled with the defining features of modernity,
challenging the framework that grounded the Enlightenment enterprise all the while
celebrating its emancipatory potential. While many of their so-called classical anarchist
counterparts were readily skeptical of overarching appeals to Reason and science,
Godwin and Proudhon only gradually came to challenge the intellectualism inherent in an
uncritical celebration of Reason and authoritative accounts of auxiliary notions like
human nature and science.
Science and the Scientific Method Enable Freedom – or Do They?
Bakunin and Kropotkin were openly skeptical of Reason and the intellectualism
associated with it throughout their work. While Bakunin and Kropotkin celebrated the
scientific method they also diagnosed an intellectual monomania that relied exclusively
on Reason and science to bring about revolution. According to them, these obsessions led
to the formation of hierarchically institutionalized forms of scientific discovery, the
dogmatism of a univocal “rationalism,” and an alienation from everyday living bred from
a firm division of “intellectual” and manual labor.
It is clear Bakunin did not consider himself a systematic thinker. He once
emphatically pronounced that he “cleaved to no system” and he was therefore a “true
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seeker.”363 He respected the authority of experts but always reserved his “incontestable
right of criticism and censure” because he recognized “no infallible authority” for such a
recognition would be fatal to his “reason,” “liberty,” and the success of his undertakings
and would make him into a “stupid slave, an instrument of the will and interests of
others.”364 Moreover, he forcefully rejected the auto-legitimating character of scientific
“progress” and the pretense of the intellectuals associated with it.
Likewise, while Kropotkin is the representative of “scientific anarchism,” he
thought anarchism itself was anathema to any institutionalized, scientific, or
philosophical rendering of social relations. While Kropotkin did rely on the scientific
observation of animal behavior in nature to inform his theory of mutual aid, he clearly
delineated the limits of such intellectual endeavors as divorced from our lived experience.
Kropotkin’s anarchism was based on naturally occurring cooperative tendencies in
human life and relied on scientific accounts of the same all the while recognizing the
need to guard against the institutional logic (bred of authoritarian tendencies) of scientific
associations and universities.
In Bakunin and Kropotkin, a disdain for the intelligentsia and a critical treatment
of the ideal of Reason existed alongside an appreciation of our most esteemed faculty and
science. While they were aware of their dangers they were outraged at the abuses of an
idealized Reason and excessive fidelity to science. Those abuses, and the dangerous
authoritarian consequences that followed, were products of the intellectuals that morphed
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an appreciation of intellectual matters into a devotion to intellectualism. In themselves,
the ideal of Reason, science, and various complementary notions were quite beneficial
(and in line with the Enlightenment values both Bakunin and Kropotkin prized) to the
progress of humanity and future anarchist revolutions. However, their consistent misuse
and exploitation by the intelligentsia and the institutions associated with them led to a
dangerous idolization of Reason and science as well as a usurpation of the Enlightenment
ideals that undergirded much anarchist thought.
It was perhaps Stirner and Nietzsche who best understood the dangers Godwin,
Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin highlighted in their treatment of Reason, science, and
intellectualism. Stirner rejected the ostensibly emancipatory value of language,
essentialism, and rationality while Nietzsche challenged the same through his analysis of
the creative forces of the Dionysian, his rejection of moral absolutes, and his
perspectivism. In this way, Stirner and Nietzsche sustained and magnified the antiintellectualist strain of anarchist thought and served as critical bridges to contemporary
anarchist postfoundationalism.
It can be argued that Stirner and Nietzsche went a step further than simply
highlighting our excessive devotion to Reason, science, intellectualism, and even truth.
Indeed, they did not think “rationalization” was dangerous because it moved away from
the Enlightenment ideals cherished by many so called classical anarchists or because they
celebrated the ideals to the point of idolatry. Rather, they pointed to those very same
Enlightenment ideals being dangerous. There were many thinkers that certainly thought
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Enlightenment ideals were being perverted but Stirner, Nietzsche, and their
postfoundationalist interlocutors recognized dangers in these very ideals.
They highlighted the incoherence and futility of an overreliance on Reason and
auxiliary notions like univocal understandings of human nature or the idea of progress.
Nietzsche challenged our celebration of the Apollonian (i.e., the orderly, rational, and
disciplined aspects of human thought and action) and rejected transcendental moral
absolutes, while Stirner highlighted the arbitrariness of “fixed ideas,” the limits of
language in expressing ideas and guiding action, and the suffocating conceptual
frameworks of understanding that limit genuine freedom.
While the Enlightenment tradition gave us a robust account of social and political
obligation tied to strong conceptions of human nature and its relation to the state, Stirner
undoes the Enlightenment inspired anthropocentrism of social contract theory while
preserving the boundless pluralism only recognized through an embrace of absolute and
unbridled individuality and autonomy. According to Stirner, intellectualism in this sense
imprisons us in an existence justified by argumentation, rational reflection, and a dubious
existential certainty. Stirner, like Nietzsche after him, sought to unravel the domination
inherent in our intellects and free us from the limitations imposed by morality, religion,
truth, and other “fixed ideas.”
Nietzsche perhaps best sums up the thrust of the Stirnerian critique by noting,
“life is not an argument.”365 He rails against the appeals to logic in the history of
365
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philosophy. While logic and our faculty of reason certainly have a practical use, they
have little to do with any philosophical pretension to a discernment of reality for
Nietzsche. An appeal to Reason and the intellectualism that is its symptom responds to an
artificial and idealized version of the reality or truth it claims to be discovering.
A common thread in Stirner and Nietzsche’s critique as well as in the antiintellectualism interrogated throughout Godwin’s, Proudhon’s, Bakunin’s, and
Kropotkin’s work is a gravitation towards a sense of freedom that challenged orthodoxies
in ostensibly non-political spheres (e.g., epistemology and ontology). All these thinkers,
in one way or another, offer accounts of “creative destruction.” They reflect the “passion
for destruction” of, in their view, obsolete and stifling modes of thinking and a “creative
passion” for thinking freely.366
Freedom is a Contested Concept
Thinking freely is the ultimate means and end for anarchist anti-intellectualism. It
is also the means by which we are to construct free society along participatory lines.
Without an ability to think freely we hinder our creative potential and our ability to
interrogate our grounding philosophical assumptions. However, freedom in this sense is
considered more broadly than simply an enlightened decision-making. Freedom is a
contested concept. Modern notions of freedom are varied and embrace different guiding
attitudes and philosophical orientations. As Mortimer Adler puts it in his study of the
subject:
366

Mikhail Bakunin famously expressed that “The passion for destruction is a creative passion, too!” in
“The Reaction in Germany,” accessed 5/16/2016,
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bakunin/works/1842/reaction-germany.htm.

194

Burke countered the intemperance of the French Revolution by his own organic
conception of liberty. Hegel, in attacking the great English Reform Bill of 1831,
measured it against his own historical and evolutionary theory. Both the
proponents and the enemies of the New Deal fought under banners of
freedom…whereas the Anglo-American liberty, won chiefly through victories of
dissenting religious sects, was mainly attentive to the rights of minorities, the
French conception, owing much to Rousseau’s theory of the General Will, and to
the drastic course of revolution, put the emphasis on the sovereignty of the people
and majority rights.367
Like Adler’s work, most studies on the subject focus on civil or political liberty. A
glaring omission in many studies on the idea of freedom is a thorough consideration of
the anarchist tradition. Despite anarchism being the quintessential anti-authoritarian
philosophy the idea of freedom in anarchist philosophy is seldom considered.
I have tried to dissect the idea of freedom and its relation to intellectualism in
certain “canonical” anarchist thinkers. That is, I have tried firstly to understand the
anarchist attitude towards bulwarks of our intellect (e.g., the ideal of Reason, the
scientific method, and other foundational philosophical constructs like human nature and
truth). I have also attempted to frame the anarchist attitude towards intellectualism within
a wider consideration of intellectual freedom.
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Anarchism is sometimes described as the “politics of anti-politics.”368 This notion
of politics transcends the usual understanding of politics framed vis-a-vis the state. It
seeks to apply our thinking of political categories (e.g., legitimacy, freedom, domination,
authority) to every sphere of life. Indeed, for anarchists “politics” is a bit of a misnomer
in that its concerns could very well apply to issues of hierarchy and authority that fall
outside the scope of government. Likewise, “freedom” is usually envisioned within a
framework of some sort of governance. Appreciating the anarchist conception of antiintellectualism requires us to think of anti-authoritarianism, freedom, and politics itself as
existing in every realm of life. This conception of freedom, authority, and politics goes
beyond Berlin’s famed distinction between negative and positive liberty as well as
beyond the republican notion of freedom as non-domination or freedom from structural
and relational modes of domination. This freedom entails our ability to interrogate the
very ontological foundation of freedom itself. This requires a healthy suspicion of the
philosophical underpinnings of ostensible authoritative bulwarks of our intellect. Whether
it is the governance of the state or our own rational self-legislation, anarchists envision
freedom as a constant challenge to the authority and legitimacy of governance and share a
suspicion of concentrations of power wherever they may be found.369
Anarchism shares this suspicion with everyone from Romanticists and
Nietzscheans to poststructuralists and post-analytic philosophers. Indeed, there has been
368
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plenty of intellectual flirtation between anarchists, Nietzsche and Nietzscheans, and other
postfoundationalist thinkers indicative of an emphatic anti-intellectualism and “return” to
lived experience. Heidegger soon followed Nietzsche in his explicit appeal (beginning
with his work in Being and Time) to the “priority of the practical, pretheoretical, social
disclosure of the world.”370 According to Gregory Smith, for Heidegger, “Authenticity
implies a form of concernfully absorbed action, shaped by a pregiven ethos that
eventuates in something like Aristotelian phronesis.”371 Indeed, what Smith calls the
epicureanizing of thought is central to how to think of freedom beyond the theoretical or
philosophical and as intimately tied to sensual lived experience.372
Just as easily as the so-called classical anarchists would invoke Reason to justify
anarchist action, so too would they invoke emotion and improvisation as the path towards
liberation. Reflexively appealing to our emotions or improvisation in this way is a clear
rejection of determinism. Indeed, the idea of self-determination can sometimes mean that
our freely chosen acts should not be caused by preexisting conditions (including any kind
of rational determinism).373 Likewise, our thinking, in so far as it is freely undertaken,
should not be saddled with tradition, limiting conceptions of, as Heidegger put it, our
thinking being (i.e., ridding ourselves of “spooks” as Stirner would put it), nor should it
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hinge on one overriding univocal ideal of Reason. As Svetlana Boym asserts, “The
examination of freedom requires a creative logic of its own.”374
Thinking Freely
By pushing the boundaries of existing anarchist scholarship by thinking about
open-ended alternatives to conceiving of freedom in the realm of the intellect I attempt to
describe what it means to think freely. This entails an understanding of antiintellectualism that embraces anarchist anti-authoritarian values and applies them to our
ontological and epistemological presuppositions as well as to the foundations of anarchist
thought (which themselves are constantly negotiated by anarchists of all stripes).
Svetlana Boym best echoes anarchist sentiments on the matter when she notes
Possibly the only way to discover or rescue alternative frameworks of freedom for
the twenty-first century is through thinking freedom neither as the means for an
end nor as an end that justifies the means but simultaneously as means and ends,
or as something that defies the means – and – ends rationale altogether.375
In order to fuse means and ends we need to rid ourselves of intellectual banisters. Boym
continues,
In the extreme circumstances of twentieth-century history, the banister of social
common places and familiar clichés can turn into a scandala, an obstacle that
leads to a moral scandal and foundation for the ‘banality of evil.’ One has to think
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through these radical breaks in the twentieth-century tradition that alter the way
we measure things; otherwise one person’s banisters can turn into another’s
barbed wire.376
Arendt was quite clear on the topic as well. Our need for bannisters or the cold
comfort of Reason “is not inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest for meaning.
And truth and meaning are not the same.”377 And, she notes, “The quest for meaning is
‘meaningless’ to common sense and common-sense reasoning because it is the sixth
sense’s function to fit us into the world of appearances and make us at home in the world
given by our five senses; there we are and no questions asked.”378 She continues,
And not only is the quest for meaning absent from and good for nothing in the
ordinary course of human affairs, while at the same time its results remain
uncertain and unverifiable; thinking is also somehow self-destructive…From
which it follows that the business of thinking is like Penelope’s web; it undoes
every morning what it has finished the night before. For the need to think can
never be stilled by allegedly definite insights of ‘wise men’; it can be satisfied
only through thinking, and the thoughts I had yesterday will satisfy this need
today only to the extent that I want and am able to think them anew.379
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In the Arendtian sense, it is impossible to derive meaning from thinking. Especially when
that thought is grounded in an enterprise whose very foundation is fleeting.
For Paul Feyerabend, attempting to ground this fleeting foundation in the apparent
stability of an “outside world” or concrete reality through empirical scientific evidence is
equally absurd. According to Feyerabend, a “democratic criticism of science…belongs to
the nature of knowledge.”380 No matter how “productive” science might be, its results
have nothing to do with its validity or desirability and should be challenged by anyone.381
In much the same vein as Rorty’s idea of the arbitrariness of “final vocabularies,”
Feyerabend also claims “A tradition assumes desirable or undesirable properties only
when compared with some tradition…”382 The freedom to challenge Reason (and the
tradition that celebrates it) intelligibly and creatively is an integral part of thinking freely.
Feyerabend squarely describes the stifling effects of an unchallenged Reason in
political terms. He notes,
The teaching of standards and their defence never consists merely in putting them
before the mind of the student and making them as clear as possible. The
standards are supposed to have maximal causal efficacy as well. This makes it
very difficult indeed to distinguish between the logical force and the material
effect of an argument. Just as a well-trained pet will obey his master no matter
how great the confusion in which he finds himself, and no matter how urgent the
380
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need to adopt new patterns of behavior, so in the very same way a well-trained
rationalist will obey the mental image of his master, he will conform to the
standards of argumentation he has learned, he will adhere to these standards no
matter how great the confusion in which he finds himself, and he will be quite
incapable of realizing that what he regards as the ‘voice of reason’ is but a causal
after-effect of the training he has received. He will be quite unable to discover that
the appeal to reason to which he succumbs so readily is nothing but a political
manoeuver.383
According to Feyerabend, to overcome this “political maneuver,” itself steeped in the
unequal and many times authoritarian institutions of learning, there is a necessity to
eliminate the alien otherworldliness being imposed by the “standards” of reason, science,
and ideals of all sorts. He notes,
We must expect, for example, that the idea of liberty could be made clear only by
means of the very same actions, which were supposed to create liberty. Creation
of a thing, and creation plus full understanding of a correct idea of the thing, are
very often parts of one and the same indivisible process and cannot be separated
without bringing the process to a stop. The process itself is not guided by such a
programme, for it contains the conditions for the realization of all possible
programmes. It is guided rather by a vague urge, by a ‘passion’ (Kierkegaard).
The passion gives rise to specific behavior which in turn creates the circumstances
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and the ideas necessary for analyzing and explaining the process, for making it
‘rational.’384
In other words, Feyerabend echoes the anarchist aspiration of eliminating any kind of
means and ends rationality.
This is in line with Wittgenstein’s idea that our concepts depend on our own lived
experiences. As Hanna Pitkin puts it in her study of Wittgenstein “…the nature of our
concepts itself depends on our lives as animate creatures in the world.”385 The increasing
disconnects between means and ends, between lived experience and ideational goals,
leads to the tragedies critics of the Enlightenment have assailed. Pitkin eloquently
describes how high-minded emancipatory Enlightenment ideals could degenerate into the
“iron cage” decried by critical theorists of many stripes for precisely this reason. She
notes,
The hidden, the repressed, the distorted, the content of ‘false consciousness,’ also
varies with person, culture, and time. Indeed, what is a liberating philosophical
insight for one generation can become the encrusted and misleading conventional
wisdom of the next. Successful philosophy allows the inquiring mind to discover
what it needs to know about itself or the world; great philosophy performs this
service for us all.386
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Pitkin’s insistence on the Wittgensteinian point that we co-create “great philosophy” in so
far as it serves us all (not just the “inquisitive” few) is central to the postfoundational
effort to include any who might care to consider notions like “truth,” “reason,” “justice,”
or similar instances of “final vocabularies” as largely beside the point.
Willingness to reassess and “be impressed” by other vocabularies and admit those
vocabularies are not connected to anything beyond ourselves breaks open possibilities
that any metaphysical grounding of thought would exclude.387 The challenge of
translating the emancipatory potential of this “ironism” to the political is something the
anarchist tradition is uniquely poised to do. By already considering politics beyond
government and the state, anarchists are attuned to how ironism could help sketch the
possibilities of thinking freely in a way philosophers like Rorty failed to appreciate.
According to Rorty, his defense of ironism
…turns on making a firm distinction between the private and the public. Whereas
Habermas sees the line of ironist thinking which runs from Hegel through
Foucault and Derrida as destructive of social hope, I see this line of thought as
largely irrelevant to public life and to political questions. Ironist theorists like
Hegel, Nietzsche, Derrida, and Foucault seem to me invaluable in our attempt to
form a private self-image, but pretty much useless when it comes to politics.
Habermas assumes that the task of philosophy is to supply some social glue which
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will replace religious belief, and to see Enlightenment talk of ‘universality’ and
‘rationality’ as the best candidate for this glue.388
While Rorty considers ironism useless when it comes to politics, the anarchist conception
of anti-intellectualism seeks to apply this same reconsideration of “final vocabularies” to
a shared skepticism of the social institutions that relay knowledge all the while rejecting
the “Enlightenment talk” of “universality” and “rationality” as any kind of redeeming
“social glue.” However, how can we make public that which, according to Rorty, is
exclusively private? How can we reflect the ironism meant to “form a private self-image”
in our politics and relations with others? The answer lies largely in the contingency and
improvisation inherent in anarchism as a political movement and form of association with
others.
While Rorty holds that “The metaphysician, in short, thinks that there is a
connection between redescription and power, and that the right redescription can make us
free,” the ironist “offers no similar assurance.”389 The anarchist similarly offers no
resolution in the form of a correct redescription and hopes to transfer such a dismissal of
the force of redescription to the public realm. Anarchists’ political attitudes are already
imbued by their own ironism and action oriented understandings of meaning. Anarchists
already believe that any kind of metaphysical grounding or accurate redescription of
reality will not yield freedom. Only direct action aligning our anti-authoritarian means
with our emancipatory ends will yield anything similar. Their refusal to ossify any
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political order or ideal precisely under the banner of freedom is what makes anarchism an
ideal channel to navigate its own lively anti-intellectualism towards a public ironism and
a continued resistance to arbitrary authority in any sphere.
This navigation should not simply be derivative of postfoundational attitudes
towards “grand narratives” and “totalizing notions” that Habermas and Rorty
appropriately consider politically sterile. Rather, in a Wittgensteinian vein, we should
endeavor to think like anarchists. When we care to consider how to think like an anarchist
we are not only contemplating a general suspicion towards concentrations of political,
economic, and ecclesiastical power, or simply reflecting on how best to constitute a
society with voluntary institutions based on the principle of free association so integral to
anarchist philosophy. Instead, we are also aspiring to think without “banisters,” and make
public our ironism, essentially improvising without the comfort of a political blueprint.
That is, we are thinking freely.
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